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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of experimental and theoretical studies on
social norms and cooperation.
The first two chapters focus on effects of social norms on people’s be-
haviour in strategic situations. The Golden Rule is first studied in an ul-
timatum bargaining experiment. The results show that while most people
follow the Golden Rule in the ultimatum game situation, experience and
feedback of playing the opposite role has an important effect on golden-
rule behaviour. Then the link between people’s expectation of social norms
and their own behaviour is studied in an experiment of a trust game. Only
about half of the subjects show a consistent behaviour according to their
own expected norm. Moreover, experience and feedback has asymmetric
effects on the behaviour of trustors and trustees.
In next two chapters, the way people cooperate and how to sustain a
more efficient cooperative result are studied by using both theoretical and
experimental methods. I first experimentally explore the mechanisms that
make people more willing to cooperate and increase the overall welfare in
a public goods game. Then I theoretically study a well-established coop-
erative solution for the bankruptcy problem and design a non-cooperative
game that gives the solution as the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium
outcome.
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“All the world is made of faith, and trust, and pixie dust.”
J.M. BARRIE, Peter Pan
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Game theory is “the study of mathematical models of conflict and coop-
eration between intelligent rational decision-makers”, as stated on the first
page of Myerson’s canonical game theory textbook (Myerson, 1991). The
analysis of games, that is the strategic interactive situations, shows what
completely rational people would do in specific situations.
Real life strategic interactions are ubiquitous. In the Istanbul grand
bazaar, a customer and a shopkeeper bargain over the price of a rug. A
venture capital fund decides on how much to invest on a startup company.
In a community, residents decide how much to donate to a project of build-
ing a park. When a firm goes bankrupt, creditors negotiate to decide how
the liquidation should be divided. Game theoretical analysis of above situ-
ations would tell us if people were all trying to serve their own best, what
they would do. A closer look at the above examples would naturally lead to
the question of what people actually do. Unsurprisingly, people in real life
do not always behave consistently with the prediction of game theory, not
only because people are not completely rational, as assumed in the game
theoretical analysis, but also because being social creatures, our decisions
are influenced by considerations other than best-serving our own interests.
If relaxing the assumption of rationality, we would enter the world of
behavioural game theory. As a branch of behavioural economics, it “uses
1
2psychological regularity to suggest ways to weaken rationality assumption
and extend theory” (Camerer, 2003). By utilising controlled experimental
environment, behavioural game theory answers the question of how people
behave under certain circumstances. Moreover, it suggests possible other
factors beyond self-utility maximising that might also influence people’s
decision making.
This thesis is a collection of essays on different aspects of game the-
ory utilising both theoretical and experimental approaches. The two ap-
proaches complement each other in order to provide a comprehensive in-
sight on the topics.
Two general aspects that I will explore are the influences of social
norms and cooperation in strategic situations. Although distinctive in forms,
social norm and cooperation are often inseparable. As the unresolved is-
sues in experimental game theory, different forms of social norms have
been studied in order to explain the cooperative behaviour in games. The-
oretical models have been proposed to incorporate social norm in agents
decision making in strategic situations. Cooperation in modern society
is mainly supported by social norms. Theoretical analysis of cooperation
still assumes the rationality of players and more often than not, enforce-
able agreements among players (as in cooperative game theory), while the
experimental study of cooperation focuses on the rationale behind the co-
operation and explores ways to reinforce social norms and improve the
cooperation in strategic situations.
In this thesis, I first focus on two important social norms and phenom-
ena, the Golden Rule and Trust related issues. Then, I experimentally ex-
plore possible ways to improve the cooperation level in a specific setting
and theoretically study how a mechanism could be designed to achieve a
cooperative solution without a binding agreement.
31.2 Social Norms
In many interactive situations with two or more agents, there is a conflict
of interests. Whenever there is such conflict, people involved need to nego-
tiate to achieve an agreement, which in most cases means to sacrifice part
of their own welfare in order to achieve a joint gain. This is when social
norms kick in. People in strategic situations or when there is a conflict of
interests, care about not only their own payoffs, but also many other things
like other people’s well-being, how other people would look at them if
people can observe their behaviour, or whether they conform to their own
perception of the social norms even when other people cannot observe their
behaviour. We may also apply social norms unconsciously, but still be able
to explain our behaviour in terms of beliefs (Bicchieri, 2006). The norms
may have affected how we think we should behave under certain circum-
stances, or how we expect others to behave in that situation, or even how
we should behave because of others’ expectation on us.
Experimental studies observe how these social norms influence peo-
ple’s decisions in different interactive settings. They help us to better un-
derstand the reasoning process in specific games, as well as provide inspi-
rations for the development of theories.
Here I focus on two specific social norms: the Golden Rule and the
trust.
1.2.1 Golden Rule
As one of the most universally studied maxims, the “Golden Rule” ap-
pears in almost every ethical tradition in different forms (Blackburn, 2001).
The concept of “treat others in a way that you yourself would like to be
treated” appears long before the term of “Golden Rule”. As early as in the
Analects of Confucius, there is teaching of “Never impose on others what
you would not choose for yourself”. Similar teachings also appear in other
major religions, including Hinduism, Buddism, Taoism and Zoroastrian-
ism (Spooner, 1914). It is so deeply rooted in people’s everyday life, that
consciously or unconsciously in decision making, the golden rule sneaks
4into our mind and ask “Would I want the other people to do the same to
me?”. Bergstrom (2009) describes four categories of the golden rule: “love
thy neighbour, do-unto-others, negative do-unto-others, Kantian Categor-
ical Imperative”. In Chapter 2, I will explore the implication of “nega-
tive do-unto-others” in a specific strategic setting. In order to observe the
Golden Rule in a situation of conflicts, the ultimatum game1 is chosen as
a benchmark game. The simple nature of the game makes it easy for the
subjects to understand the game situation, while preserving the property
of conflicting interests between two players. More specifically, one of the
players, the proposer, makes an offer of how to divide a certain amount of
money; the other player, the responder, either accepts or rejects the offer.
In the case of acceptance, they each get the amount as proposed. In the
case of rejection, they both get nothing.
The main question that I will try to answer is “Do people’s behaviour
conforms with the teaching of the Golden Rule?”. Although the Golden
Rule has been studied extensively in many fields, this is the first study
from an experimental economics point of view. The study quantitatively
defines the proportion of people who conform to the Golden Rule under
certain circumstances. It also sheds light on how experience and feedback
from “walking in the opponents’ shoes” could shape people’s behaviour.
1.2.2 Trust and Expected-Norm
Trust is often seen as an important form of social capital, which reduces the
transaction cost in an economy and increases the economy development
(Zak and Knack, 2001). In the context of strategic situations, however, an
act of trust would place the trustor in a vulnerable position where he will-
ingly relinquishes the control of his own payoff which would then depend
on what the trustee does.
The trust game, initially designed by Berg et al. (1995), provides an
efficient way to study trust and trustworthiness. It is a two-person game,
involving a trustor and a trustee. The trustor decides how much out of a
1The experimental study of the ultimatum game popularised since the seminal work
by Gu¨th et al. (1984). See Gu¨th and Kocher (2014) for a recent survey.
5certain amount of money to send to the trustee. The amount sent will be
tripled on the way to the trustee. The trustee after receiving the money
decides how much to return to the trustor. The amount sent is designed to
be a measurement of the level of trust, while the amount returned measures
the level of trustworthiness.
I look at trust (and trustworthiness) from a different angle in Chapter 3.
Different from other studies the trust game, I link a subject’s expectation of
his opponent to his own behaviour in the opponent’s position. By looking
at the effect of the expectation on people’s decision making and relating
the expectation to their own behaviour in the same situation, I answer the
basic question of how people’s behaviour fits into their own perception of
the norm that the others would follow.
1.3 Cooperation
As discussed before, completely rational agents may not like cooperation
when there is a conflict of interests, as it requires a sacrifice of their own
interests. Nevertheless, in reality, people do sometimes cooperate in order
to increase the overall benefit. In chapter 4 and 5, I explore possible ways
to improve the cooperative behaviour, experimentally in a public-goods
provision situation and theoretically for bankruptcy problems.
1.3.1 Public Goods Game
The general concept of a public-goods situation is when people can con-
tribute part of their own endowments to a public project which would in
return benefit themselves. The more the other people contribute the more
benefit one will get. The aggregate contribution represents the overall wel-
fare of the whole society. The problem here is to fight the incentive of
free-riding. People need to sacrifice their own payoffs in order to generate
a greater welfare overall. The equilibrium outcome is that no player con-
tributes and no public good is provided. It has long been shown that people
6are willing to contribute in the game, but not all of their endowment. Typi-
cally, they contribute about 50% of their endowments. (See Ledyard, 1995
and Camerer, 2003 for surveys.)
Effort has been made in trying to find mechanisms to increase the con-
tribution and reduce the free-riding. Popular mechanisms include repe-
tition, punishment, pre-game communication and etc. One mechanism
that recently caught much attention is the institution formation. People are
given the choice of joining an institution which would force its members
to contribute at a certain level. The mechanism readily gains popularity
due to the resemblance of the negotiations in EU and on international en-
vironmental agreements. The study in Chapter 4 builds on the institution
formation mechanism by Kosfeld et al. (2009), and investigates the effects
of different voting systems within the institution. A modified mechanism
to improve the efficiency in the public goods game is proposed and com-
pared to other possible mechanisms.
1.3.2 Bankruptcy Problems
Theoretical study of the cooperative games is typically divided into ax-
iomatic and strategic approach. While the axiomatic approach charac-
terises the solutions of cooperative game with sets of axioms, the strate-
gic method approaches a cooperative game solution by designing a non-
cooperative game whose equilibrium outcome is the desired solution. Such
method has been used to build the non-cooperative foundation for cooper-
ative solutions, and helps us to have a better understanding of the coopera-
tive solutions. For example, the non-cooperative games to the core (see, for
example, Perry and Reny, 1994 and Serreno and Vohra, 1997) and Shapley
value (see, for example, Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) provide intu-
itive game procedures for those solutions to be achieved as non-cooperative
equilibria.
I focus on a fair division problem called the bankruptcy problem. A
bankruptcy problem describes a general situation when several creditors
who each entails to a certain part of an estate decide on how the estate
should be divided. The sum of all the entitlement is larger than the whole
7estate. There are several classical solutions to this problems, for exam-
ple, the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule and the con-
strained equal losses rule. Talmud rule, originated from the Talmud, was
first formulated by Aumman and Maschler. It possesses several desirable
properties of the fair division problem.
The bankruptcy problem has been studied as a cooperative game, where
the Talmud rule is found to coincide with the Nucleolus of the correspond-
ing bankruptcy game. Chapter 5 looks at the bankruptcy problem from a
non-cooperative point of view. A strategic game is designed such that its
unique sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome coincides with the Talmud
solution of the bankruptcy problem. There are several games proposed
with the same goal in mind, for example, by Serrano (1995) and Dagan et
al. (1997). The game proposed here, however, does not rely on the consis-
tency property of the solution which is different from the existing studies.
It also cherishes the cake-cutting mechanism in fair division.
Chapter 2
An Experimental Study of the
Golden Rule1
Never impose on others what you would not
choose for yourself.
– CONFUCIUS
2.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses a general, yet, open issue common to most soci-
eties, cultures, and religions: whether agents’ behaviour in some economic
environments conforms to the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is a cen-
tral concept about human interaction that has a long history, and, as put
by Blackburn (2001), “can be found in some form in almost every ethical
tradition”.
The form of the Golden Rule most frequently referred to by a wide
range of cultures and religions states that one should not treat others in
ways that are not agreeable to oneself: in The Analects of Confucius, it is
said “Never impose on others what you would not choose for yourself”;
in Buddhism, it is said “Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would
1This chapter is based on Role-Reversal Consistency– An experimental Study of the
Golden Rule, a joint work with Miguel Costa-Gomes and Yuan Ju.
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9find hurtful”; according to the Talmud, “That which is hateful to you, do
not do to your fellow”; according to the Zoroastrian Shayast-na-Shayast,
“Whatever is disagreeable to yourself do not do unto others”; in Islam, the
Golden Rule is implicitly expressed in the Qur’an, but explicitly stated in
the Hadith.2 We confine our study to this form of the Golden Rule (and
henceforth, we have it in mind when we refer to the Golden Rule).
The Golden Rule is an ethical norm or a moral principle that approaches
strategic situations in a distinctive way: first, it tells the agent to think about
the opposite role; second, suggests to the agent to think how she would
behave in the opposite role rather than how an abstract opponent would
behave in that role (in other words it replaces the agent’s belief about the
behaviour of the agent who is her opponent as is standard in game theo-
retic reasoning, with what her own behaviour in the role of her opponent
would be; however, note that under projection bias (Allport, 1924; Krueger
and Acevedo, 2005) the former and the latter coincide, as the agent’s belief
about her opponent’s behaviour mimics the agent’s own behaviour in that
role); finally, it tells the agent to take her hypothetical behaviour in the op-
posite role into account in a particular way when deciding what to play in
her current role.
The idea that an agent should consider how she should play the differ-
ent roles in a game, that is key to the Golden Rule, has found its way into
the economics literature. Gerchak and Fuller (1992) offer a first theoretical
analysis of the dissolution of business partnerships that include buy-sell
clauses in contracts. According to such clauses, one owner proposes a
buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either purchase the pro-
poser’s shares or sell her own shares to him at the proposed price. This
mechanism embodies the spirit of the Golden Rule, as the price at which
one party proposes to buy out the other is also the price at which he would
have to sell his stake to her. A setting with symmetric agents illustrates this
2The Golden Rule has other interpretations. Its positive form states that one should
treat others as one would like others to treat oneself, as appears in the Bible “So what-
ever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them, for this is the Law and the
Prophets.” Bergstrom (2009) describes four versions of the Golden Rule: “Love-thy-
neighbor”, “Do-unto-others”, “Negative do-unto-others” (the negative form we allude to),
and Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative.
10
in a vivid way: the optimal proposed price by any of the two agents can
only lie in between the agent’s minimum willingness to sell and maximum
willingness to buy, as otherwise she will make a loss because the other
agent will sell his stake to her, if the price is higher than the latter, or will
buy her share, if the price is lower than the former. Any offer that the agent
would find hurtful to herself if she were playing the other role, should not
be made, as it would be turned down by the other party, and would then
hurt her. Thus, a mutually beneficial deal (also Pareto efficient) is achieved
only when both agents act according to treat no one in ways that they find
not agreeable to themselves.
Another mechanism whose game theoretic solution (in this case its
unique subgame perfect equilibrium) agrees with the Golden rule is Brams
and Taylor’s (1996) divide-and-choose procedure in fair division. Very
recently, Alger and Weibull (2013) study the role that the Golden Rule
plays in the evolutionary stability of preferences in the context of assorta-
tive matching.
The main focus of this chapter is to experimentally test the behavioural
implications of the Golden Rule, i.e., of treat no one in ways that are not
agreeable to yourself. We do this by asking subjects to play both roles of a
(modified) ultimatum bargaining game, in which each subject in each role
faces multiple independent opponents simultaneously.
In an ultimatum game, the proposer suggests a division of an amount
of money which the responder either accepts or rejects. If the responder
accepts, the money is divided between both players as proposed, otherwise
both get nothing. In this game, the Golden Rule has an intuitive interpre-
tation: an agent playing the responder’s role accepts the offer she makes
as a proposer. To be more precise, if an agent, when playing the role of a
responder (i.e., when dealing with how others treat her), accepts the offer
she would make as a proposer (i.e., when treating others), then that im-
plies she does NOT treat others in ways she finds not agreeable to herself,
thereby conforming to the Golden Rule. We call such agent role-reversal
consistent. On the contrary, if an agent, when playing the responder’s role,
rejects the offer she would make as a proposer, then that implies she DOES
11
treat others in ways she finds not agreeable, therefore violating the Golden
Rule.
We use the term role-reversal consistent, because in our study each sub-
ject plays different subjects when playing the game’s two different roles
(which is role-reversal), which is different from each subject playing the
same subject twice, once in one role, the other time in the other role (which
is role-switching). We believe that the principle of Never impose on oth-
ers what you would not choose for yourself reflects better the way people
should behave when interacting with different people, than when interact-
ing with the same person repeatedly. Furthermore, role-reversal eliminates
reciprocity across games (apart from anonymous reciprocity) likely to arise
in a role-switching situation.
The goal of our study is neither to dispute the well known stylized facts
of ultimatum game experiments (for a survey see Camerer (2003), among
others) nor to question any of the models of other regarding preferences
that center their attention on distributional preferences and/or reciprocity
that purport to explain behaviour in the ultimatum and many other games.
Instead, we simply study whether subjects’ behaviour in this game is role-
reversal consistent and identify variables that have an effect on such con-
sistency.
Subjects first play one of the roles of the ultimatum game, being un-
aware they will play the opposite role later. In one treatment we use the
direct-response method (henceforth, shortened to response method or re-
sponse treatment), and in the other treatment we use the strategy vector
method (henceforth, shortened to strategy method or strategy treatment).3
Next, subjects play the opposite role under the same method as before, be-
ing aware that they are playing people they have not played before. In the
response treatment, subjects get feedback during and in between the two
3While the term strategy (vector) method is uniformly used to describe a protocol
where a player has to specify an action for each of her information sets, the protocol
where players are only asked to choose an action for information sets on the path of
play is referred to in different ways, such as “direct-response”, “sequential decision”, etc.
Others (e.g., Brandts and Charness (2000)) refer to the two protocols as “cold” and “hot”.
For a survey of similarities and differences in players’ behaviour under the two methods,
see the recent survey by Brandts and Charness (2011).
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games, while in the strategy method treatment they do not, so that the sub-
ject’s elicited complete strategy profile (i.e., her choices under both roles)
cannot possibly be influenced by the feedback she could receive in the role
she plays first. We constrain subjects’ offers to whole amounts in sterling
(GBP) so that: i) we can use the strategy method for the responder’s role
in one treatment; ii) to increase the probability that a subject when playing
the responder role is made the offer she herself makes as a proposer in the
response treatment; iii) to elicit a proposer’s beliefs about the probability
of acceptance of each possible offer.
Our main findings are as follows.
First, we find that overall 82.01% of the subjects are role-reversal con-
sistent. However, the response method, where subjects receive feedback
about the reactions of others to the way they treat them or how others treat
them, yields a higher level of role-reversal consistency, 92.97%, than the
strategy method, 72.67%, where such feedback is suppressed.
Second, regression analysis suggests that the high rate of role-reversal
consistency is not the result of strategic play in the role of the proposer,
in the sense of the subject choosing the offer that maximizes her expected
monetary earnings, given her beliefs about the responder’s behaviour.
Third, role-reversal consistent subjects are more accurate predictors of
the actual probability with which each offer is accepted than inconsistent
subjects. Role-reversal consistent subjects also earn more money in the
experiment than inconsistent ones.4
Fourth, we do not find that any of the demographic, socio-economic or
cultural variables we collect data on has a significant effect on the level of
role-reversal consistency, although the sample is large (each role is played
by 300 subjects) for a laboratory experiment.
Finally, we add to the literature that compares behaviour under the
strategy and the response methods. As we explain below, our design makes
4We also find that subjects who first play the role of proposes are more likely to be
role-reversal consistent than subjects who first play the role of responders. However, this
effect is only statistically significant in the treatment using the strategy method.
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a methodological contribution because it sharpens the comparison of one-
shot behaviour of the second mover in a two-person two-move game under
the strategy and the response methods. Furthermore, our data suggests that
first movers (i.e., proposers) behave differently in the two treatments not
because their beliefs about second movers’ (i.e., responders) behaviour are
different, but because their preferences (or within the context of our study,
the way they apply the Golden Rule) in the two treatments seem to be dif-
ferent.
2.2 Related Literature
Earlier papers have asked subjects to play both roles of a two-person game
under a variety of protocols, different from ours. Gu¨th, Schmittberger and
Schwarze (1982) describe a treatment where each subject simultaneously
decides how much to offer as a proposer and the minimum offer she accepts
as a responder. They find that 86.49% of the subjects are, in their own
terminology, “consistent”, because the sum of their offer and the minimum
acceptable offer is smaller than the amount to be divided.5
In a later study, Oxoby and McLeish (2004) ask subjects to specify a
complete strategy profile in the ultimatum game, both writing down the
offer they would make as a proposer and answering whether they would
accept or reject each feasible offer (they use a $10 pie, and restrict offers
to whole dollar amounts). They compare subjects’ aggregate behaviour
in this treatment with that in another treatment where subjects are as-
signed one of the two roles and play an ultimatum game using the direct-
response method, i.e., with the proposer making an offer that is conveyed
to the responder who either accepts it or not. Blanco, Engelmann and Nor-
mann (2011) also ask subjects to play both roles simultaneously in the
ultimatum game using the strategy method. Neither of the studies ana-
lyzes whether a subject would accept her own offer or considers the direct
response method.
5Although role-reversal was first used in the context of the ultimatum game, its use has
spread to other games and to issues as varied as the inferring of subjects’ distributional
preferences, as in Charness and Rabin (2002).
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More recently, Chai, Dolgosuren, Kim, Liu and Sherstyuk (2011) use
role-reversal in one of their treatments. However, their study does not ad-
dress the issue of subjects’ role-reversal consistency. Furthermore, their
design is not suited to understand the effects that feedback, or the order of
play of the roles have on consistency. They run two treatments (which they
call one-role and two-roles treatments) with several games, among them
the ultimatum game. In their one-role treatment subjects either play the
role of proposer or responder. In their two-roles treatment, they use a role-
reversal protocol in which subjects play the proposer role first, and next
specify a cut-off strategy for the role of responder. Their main aim is to
correlate behaviour with attitudinal responses. They find that the average
offer is the same in the one-role and two-roles treatments and also that the
order according to which subjects play the two roles does not affect the
average offer made as a proposer.
Our study differs from all the studies above. We use the response
method (in addition to the strategy method), which reflects the conflicting
nature of the strategic situation our study depicts more naturally, even if it
makes it harder to test role-reversal consistency, as explained below. We do
not force responders to report a cut-off strategy, because we want to control
for the possibility that could cue subjects to choose an offer and a cut-off
strategy that sum up to an amount not larger than the pie. Subjects play
one role at a time, rather than both roles simultaneously, as real-life situ-
ations are better described through sequential play of opposite roles. We
eliminate the 50-50 split of the pie outcome because its focalness might
nudge subjects’ behaviour to be role-reversal consistent. We also elicit the
proposer’s beliefs about the probability of acceptance of each offer, as we
aim to understand whether subjects’ beliefs about the responder’s role re-
flect the way they play that role. The data we collect allows us to answer
whether subjects’ behaviour is role-reversal consistent and to identify fac-
tors that influence such behaviour.
At a conceptual level, the idea closest to ours is that of Blanco, Celen
and Schotter (2011). They introduce and formalise the notion of “blame-
freeness”, which defines one’s kindness. Their concept relies on role-
reversal, because a subject’s judgement whether her opponent is kind or
15
unkind to her, requires her to compare the strategy played by her oppo-
nent with the strategy she would herself play in her opponent’s role (if
she would have acted in a more unkind manner than her opponent ac-
tually does, then her opponent is blame-free; otherwise, her opponent is
blameworthy). Note that blame-freeness and role-reversal consistency are
different notions. While “blame-freeness” relies on comparing an oppo-
nent’s role with one’s behaviour in that role, role-reversal consistency is
only about comparing one’s behaviour in both roles. Furthermore, we add
that Blanco et al.’s work formulates a general notion of “blame-freeness”
that can be applied to any game, and experimentally test it using tourna-
ment games where subjects play both advantaged and disadvantaged roles
with different opponents, finding support for it. We simply apply the idea
of role-reversal consistency to one game and investigate if behaviour can
be interpreted according to it.
2.3 Experimental Design
Our experimental design tweaks the standard version of the ultimatum
game to test whether a subject does not treat others in ways that she does
not find agreeable to herself, which we call “role-reversal consistency”. To
conduct this test we ask subjects to play both roles of the ultimatum game.
To avoid inadvertently nudging subjects to simultaneously think how they
would play both roles, subjects are asked to play one role at a time, not the
two roles simultaneously, unaware that they will be asked to play the other
role next.
In our games players bargain over £7, but offers can only be made in
whole (i.e., integer) sterling amounts (£0, £1, . . . , £7). Thus, the pie cannot
be split evenly, an outcome very often observed in typical ultimatum game
experiments. The availability of this outcome could yield a high level of
role-reversal consistent behaviour, but would confound such explanation
for behaviour with all the other explanations (ranging from pure inequality
aversion to such outcome being the focal point in a bargaining situation)
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that have been proposed for it.6 To avoid this confoundedness we only
allow unequal splits of the pie, which sharpens the test of role-reversal
consistency.
The experiment has two treatments: one uses the response method,
the other uses the strategy method. In both treatments each subject is first
assigned either the role of proposer or responder. In the response treatment,
the proposer’s offer is conveyed to the responder, who either accepts or
rejects it. The proposer is informed about the responder’s decision. Next,
each subject plays the opposite role. In the strategy treatment, the proposer
makes an offer that is not conveyed to the responder. The responder decides
whether to accept or reject each of the feasible offers. Subjects are not told
the outcome of the game, and play the opposite role next.
Under the strategy method, it is always possible to test whether a sub-
ject is role-reversal consistent, because in the role of the responder she is
asked to accept or reject each of the feasible offer amounts, and, therefore,
also the amount she offers in the proposer’s role.
Under the response method, we can only test whether a subject is role-
reversal consistent when in the role of a responder she is offered the amount
she offers as a proposer. Since one of the stylized facts in the ultimatum
game is that low and very low offers are observed infrequently, the proba-
bility that the role-reversal consistency of subjects making such offers can
be tested with the ultimatum game can be quite low. Thus, in order to max-
imize the probability that we can test a subject’s role-reversal consistency
under the response method, proposers make an offer that is sent simul-
taneously to multiple responders, with responders receiving simultaneous
offers from multiple proposers. For the sake of comparability, we also use
this feature in the strategy treatment.
In our experiment subjects interacted with each other only via z-tree’s
computer interface (Fischbacher (2007)). Their identity and experimental
ID number were kept strictly confidential from each other throughout and
6We thank Matthias Sutter for highlighting this possible confoundedness, which ulti-
mately led us to drop the equal split outcome from the set of feasible offers. Gu¨th, Huck
and Muller (2001) compare behaviour between mini ultimatum games with and without
the equal split outcome.
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after the experiment to ensure anonymity. Each session had thirty subjects
(selected from the undergraduate student population at a UK university
and from many different majors with the exception of Economics to rule
out subjects who have been exposed to game theory) who were randomly
divided into three groups of ten, A, B and C. They were told that the session
had three independent parts, and that each group would participate in two
parts, interacting with a different group in each part. Subjects were not
described the decision situation they would face in a part before they got
to it.
In part I, group A subjects played group B subjects, the former as pro-
posers, the latter as responders, while group C subjects were passive. In
part II, group A subjects became responders and played group C subjects
who were proposers, and group B subjects were passive. In part III, group
B subjects became proposers and played group C subjects who became re-
sponders, and group A subjects were passive. The passivity of one group in
each part reinforced to the subjects in each group the fact that they would
only interact once with the subjects from each of the other two groups.
This rotation of the groups suppresses reciprocity-driven behaviour across
games. The structure of a session’s different parts is summarized in Table
2.1 and in Figure 2.1 (A).
TABLE 2.1: The structure of the experiment
Group Role Previous Role
Part I
A Proposer None
B Responder None
Part II
C Proposer None
A Responder Proposer
Part III
B Proposer Responder
C Responder Proposer
In each part, each proposer made an offer that was sent to all 10 re-
sponders. Accordingly, each responder received 10 offers, one from each
proposer, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (B) and (C).
In the response treatment, each responder received the 10 offers all at
once. She then had to decide whether to accept or reject each of them,
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and submitted all her decisions at the same time. This allowed her to both
accept and reject offers of the same amount.7
In the strategy treatment, each responder was asked to decide whether
she would accept or reject any of the feasible eight offer amounts for each
of the 10 offers. She was neither constrained to choose a cut-off strategy
(e.g. can reject high offers and accept low ones) nor to accept or reject
a particular (hypothetical) amount for all 10 proposers. In other words,
when a subject played the responder role, she could either use the same
or different strategies to play the ten different proposers. Not constraining
responders to use cut-off strategies provides a clean comparison of their
behaviour between the two treatments.8
In both treatments, each proposer, after making her offer (but before
the game’s outcome is revealed in the response treatment), states her be-
lief about the responder’s conditional probability of acceptance for each
feasible offer (i.e., for all whole amounts between £0 and £7). Subjects
state their beliefs before they play the opposite role, which happens in a
later part of the experiment. We use a quadratic scoring rule to elicit such
beliefs, which is incentive compatible under the assumption of risk-neutral
expected monetary earnings maximizing behaviour.
We determined subjects’ earnings at the end of the last part of the ex-
perimental session (to suppress wealth effects as much as possible). We
paid subjects for playing both roles and for the accuracy of their stated be-
liefs. For each subject we paid: i) the outcomes of two randomly chosen
responses to her offer as a proposer (see the thick arrows in Figure 2.1 (B));
ii) the outcomes of her decisions as a responder to two randomly chosen
7Although there is evidence that a responder does not always accept or reject a partic-
ular amount, it comes from experiments where the ultimatum game is played repeatedly
(either with same proposer or with different proposers). In such experiments this be-
haviour can be explained by the responder dynamically adjusting her behaviour given the
history of offers she receives to either teach proposers to increase their offers or because
she learns to accept lower offers. Our design rules out such explanations. In our design,
the observation that a responder accepts some while rejecting other offers of the same
amount is either evidence of her indifference (if that happens only for one amount), or of
her choice being stochastic (if the responder acts in that way for different offer amounts).
8In addition, a few past studies (see Roth, Okuno-Fujiwara, Prasnikar and Zamir
(1991)) document that some subjects reject very high offers, which reinforces the ap-
propriateness of eliciting an unconstrained strategy.
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offers (see the thick arrows in Figure 2.1 (C)); iii) the accuracy with which
she estimates that each of two offers randomly selected from all ten offers
made by the proposers in her group is accepted by one randomly chosen
responder from the opposite group, with a maximum of £1 per estimate.9
The average payment (excluding a show-up fee of £3) was £13.7 in the
response treatment and £13.0 in the other treatment. The highest and low-
est earnings in the response treatment were £20.0 and £4.8, respectively,
while the figures for the strategy treatment were £18.9 and £1.0, respec-
tively.
At the end of the session subjects completed a questionnaire, after
which they collected their monetary earnings.10 Each treatment had 5 ses-
sions, and the whole experiment had 300 participants.
2.4 Data Analysis
In this section, we present the data analysis and our findings. We start by
providing a summary of the offers subjects made as proposers, their stated
beliefs about the responder’s behaviour, and their behaviour as responders.
Next, we look at each subject’s behaviour in both roles and check whether
it is role-reversal consistent. Finally, we try to identify some factors that
affect the probability that a subject is role-reversal consistent.
9This reward mechanism deals with hedging because it yields a very low (4%) prob-
ability that the same outcome of the subject’s interaction with an opponent is chosen to
reward her decision as a proposer and her stated beliefs. In addition, so far there is little
empirical evidence that such concerns matter (see Blanco, Engelmann, Koch and Nor-
mann (2010)). Unlike what would happen with role-switching, in our design subjects
would find it hard to maximize the minimum earnings from playing both roles, as they
face different opponents in each role and are paid for just two (out of ten) randomly cho-
sen interactions in each role at the end of the session.
10The questionnaire has questions about basic demographic data such as age, gender,
major of study, life-experience variables such as paid and non-paid work (e.g. charity)
experiences, and other socio-economic and family background variables like financial
situation, number of siblings and being religious.
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FIGURE 2.1: The experimental design
2.4.1 Offers and Acceptance Rates
We first analyze subjects’ offers. In each of the treatments we do not
find a statistically significant (at the 5% level) difference (using a Fligner-
Policello robust rank order test) in the offers made by the proposers in
groups A and C (that is expected since subjects in these groups play the
role of proposers first). The same is true when we compare the pooled of-
fers of groups A and C to group B’s offers. Table 2.2 presents the offer
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data pooled across the three groups within each treatment.
TABLE 2.2: Number of times each offer amount is observed
£0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7 Total
Response treatment 2 4 9 80 48 3 4 0 150
Strategy treatment 8 2 25 75 37 2 0 1 150
The offer distributions in the two treatments are different (a Fligner-
Policello robust rank order test yields a p− value of 0.007). The average
offer is higher under the response method (£3.29) than under the strategy
method (£2.95).
Under subjective expected utility, this difference can be driven by ei-
ther or both the proposer’s preferences and beliefs being different in the
two treatments. If the proposer believes that the responder is less likely
to accept an offer when it is revealed to her before her decision (response
method) than when it is not (strategy method), the offer that maximises her
monetary earnings will be higher in the response than in the strategy treat-
ment. On the other hand, if the proposer’s preferences are less kind to the
responder’s rejections in the strategy than in the response treatment, that
will lead her to make a smaller offer in the former than in the latter treat-
ment. Since we find evidence that the proposer’s beliefs are very similar in
both treatments, we conclude that the offers in the two treatments are dif-
ferent because the proposer’s preferences are different across treatments.
The top two rows of Table 2.3 display subjects’ conditional acceptance
rates in the responder role in each treatment.
Within each treatment we do not find significant differences in respon-
ders’ acceptance decisions between groups A and C. We use Fisher’s exact
test to compare responders’ decisions to each of the feasible offers and
only find significant differences at the 5% level for the offer of £3 in the
response treatment and for the offers of £1 and £6 in the strategy treat-
ment. When we pool the responders’ behaviour of groups A and C and
compare it to group B’s, we find no significant differences between them
in the response treatment (only for the offer of £4 do we find a significant
difference), but find differences for all offers in the strategy treatment. The
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acceptance rate of group B is statistically significantly lower than that of
the pooled groups A and C for all offers. The differences range from 2.9%
(for offer of £4) to 16.9% (for offer of £7).
When we pool responders’ behaviour across all three groups within
each treatment, we do not find any differences (using a Fisher’s exact test
and a significance level of 5%) between the treatments’ conditional accep-
tance rates (which we display in the first two rows of Table 2.3).
TABLE 2.3: Conditional acceptance rates: Responder’s choices and Pro-
poser’s stated beliefs
Offers £0 £1 £2 £3 £4 £5 £6 £7
Responder’s actual choices
Response trm. 0.100 0.300 0.422 0.911 0.973 1.000 0.900 –
Strategy trm. 0.067 0.305 0.529 0.899 0.973 0.959 0.933 0.893
Proposer’s stated beliefs
Response trm. 0.024 0.164 0.322 0.660 0.869 0.942 0.975 0.989
Strategy trm. 0.033 0.153 0.312 0.619 0.815 0.879 0.896 0.905
We now turn to individual subjects’ behaviour as responders. We first
check if a subject’s strategy as a responder is deterministic, i.e., if she al-
ways either accepts or rejects all offers of the same amount. This is a
relevant issue because a particular type of deterministic strategies (more
specifically, cut-off strategies, i.e.,“reject all offers smaller than x, accept
all offers greater than or equal to x”) is often used in theoretical models
of bargaining. Furthermore, in previous one-shot ultimatum game experi-
ments that used the strategy method, responders’ were restricted to playing
deterministic strategies. In our study, 89.3% (134) and 52.7% (79) of the
subjects always respond in the same way when offered the same amount by
different proposers in the response and strategy treatments, respectively.11
11In the strategy treatment, 70 out of 150 subjects make their accept/reject decisions
for the first proposer and then simply press a key to automatically play them in each
of the pairings with the other nine proposers. Another 9 subjects who choose not to
automatically play the decision for the first pairing at least once, still end up playing it in
all pairings. The remaining 71 subjects (play non-deterministic strategies) do not change
their strategies very often either: 67.6% (48) of them still automatically copy one of the
strategies they play more than 6 times out of 9 times. Interestingly, we find that subjects
who have the experience of being a proposer before being a responder (subjects in groups
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The amounts most often both accepted and rejected by individual sub-
jects are £2 and £3. Most of the deterministic strategies are cut-off strate-
gies. Overall, 87.3% (131/150) and 49.3% (74/150) of subjects in the re-
sponse and strategy treatments use cut-off strategies. Given that across the
two treatments one third of the responders do not employ a deterministic
strategy, we next ask whether they use a cut-off strategy that is determin-
istic everywhere except in the cut-off (an amount that the individual some-
times accepts and other times rejects, perhaps due to being indifferent),
which we call monotonic:
Definition 2.1. A responder’s strategy is monotonic if s/he accepts all of-
fers greater than x, where x is the lowest offer the subject accepts. Other-
wise a responder’s strategy is non-monotonic.
Although, overall a high percentage (82.7%) of responders’ strategies
are monotonic, the percentage is much higher in the response treatment,
96.0%, than in the strategy treatment, 69.3% (the p-value of a Fisher’s ex-
act test is 0.000).12 This suggests that seeing an offer before deciding leads
to more systematic responder behaviour. It also suggests that constrain-
ing subjects to use cut-off strategies under the strategy method distorts the
choices of one third of them.13
A and C), use deterministic strategies more often than subjects (in group B) who do not
have such experience, 61% vs. 36% (a Fisher’s exact test yields a p-value of 0.005).
12Among all non-monotonic subjects, half of them reject relatively high offers, while
the rest are indecisive about relatively low offers. With respect to those 6 subjects whose
strategies are not monotonic in the response treatment, 3 of them reject offers of £5 or
higher and the other 3 reject offers of £3 or £4 while accepting lower offers. In the
strategy treatment, 27 out of 46 non-monotonic subjects reject offer of £5 or higher at
least once. Among the remaining 19 subjects, 7 are non-monotonic only on offers lower
than £2, while the others’ strategies are not systematic for offers up to £4.
13Interestingly, we find that subjects whose responder’s strategy is monotonic earn
more. The average (across all 10 responses, i.e., before selecting the two responses that
determine payment) earnings of the monotonic responders are higher than that of the non-
monotonic responders, £3.04 vs. £2.10 in the response treatment and £2.71 vs. £2.36 in
the strategy treatment. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests show significant differences at the 5%
level in both treatments.
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2.4.2 Stated Beliefs
Table 2.3 also presents the average of proposers’ stated beliefs about the
responders’ probability of acceptance of each feasible offer in each treat-
ment.14 The average estimates are close in both treatments, differing by
less than 6 percentage points for offers up to (and including) £4. A two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test only finds differences at the 5% signif-
icance level for offers of £4 and above, which represent only one third of
the offers actually made (see Table 2.2). Therefore, given that proposers’
beliefs differ little between treatments, and assuming subjective expected
utility, the difference in proposers’ offers between treatments has to be ex-
plained by their preferences being different in the two treatments.
Another thing to notice in Table 2.3 is that at the aggregate level pro-
posers underestimate the probability of acceptance of offers of £5 or less
in both treatments.
However, at the individual level we find evidence of a mild projection
bias effect. First, the jump in the proposer’s beliefs (about the conditional
acceptance rates of the responder) for the subjects who use cut-off strate-
gies in the role of responder from the offer £1 below the cut-off to the
cut-off amount is much higher than the jump for any other two consecu-
tive offer amounts.15 Second, we cannot reject the null hypothesis (using
a binomial test) that the subject’s belief is different from her behaviour as
a responder for five out of eight offer amounts for 76% of the subjects in
the strategy treatment.16 Therefore, the subject forms her beliefs about the
responder based on her behaviour in that role.
Although we cannot infer subjects’ preferences (or, how the Golden
Rule influences their offers in the two treatments), we know that if there
14As usual (see Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker (2008)) we note that subjects’ stated
beliefs are coarse: 81.67% of the stated beliefs are numbers that have one decimal place,
while 95.2% have two decimal places, with the second digit either being 0 or 5.
15The average jump in the belief is 30.03 percentage points (p.p.), while it is only 16.17
percentage points from the offer £2 below the cut-off to the offer £1 below the cut-off, and
19.91 percentage points from the cut-off offer to the offer £1 above the cut-off.
16We cannot perform this test in the response treatment because unlike in the strategy
treatment subjects are not offered all feasible amounts ten times.
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were no treatment effects, players would maximize their expected mone-
tary earnings equally often and deviate from such maximization in similar
ways in both treatments, given that their beliefs are very similar in the re-
sponse and strategy treatments. To assess this hypothesis we first identify
for each subject the offer that maximizes her expected monetary earnings
as a proposer given her stated beliefs about the responder’s probability of
acceptance of the feasible offers.17 The distributions of such offers (pre-
sented in the right column of each panel of Table 2.4 are not different from
each other in the two treatments (a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test
yields a p− value of 0.96).
Next, we compare a subject’s offer with her expected monetary earn-
ings maximizing offer (henceforth EMEMO). The second to the fourth col-
umn of Table 2.4 present the results (“=”, “-”, “+” means the offer is “equal
to”, “smaller than”, “larger than” EMEMO).18 By looking at the “Total”
row we may conclude that the EMEMO accurately predicts half of the sub-
jects’ offers in both treatments.
However, the subjects who deviate from the EMEMO exhibit different
patterns. While in the response method, subjects deviate from the EMEMO
in both directions equally, in the strategy method they tend to go for a lower
offer than the EMEMO (a Fisher’s exact test for the “+” and “-” categories
in the two treatments yields a p− value of 0.044). More concretely, when
a subject’s EMEMO is £4 she makes an offer different from it equally often
in both treatments. However, when subjects’ EMEMOs are £3, they deviate
from it differently in the two treatments: in the response treatment, subjects
hardly ever choose an offer lower than £3, while they do so one sixth of the
time in the other treatment.
These deviations can only partly be explained by subjects’ attitude to-
wards risk: only 53.33% (32/60) of the subjects who offer more than their
17Our working assumption is that subjects state their beliefs truthfully, even if Costa-
Gomes and Weizsa¨cker’s (2008) results suggest that might not always be the case.
18There are 16 subjects who state beliefs that have two EMEMOs. We assign such
cases to the amount they offer, or to largest EMEMO amount when they offer more than
the EMEMOs, or to the lowest EMEMO amount when they offer less than the EMEMOs.
There are 3 subjects whose offers are in between their two EMEMOs and we exclude them
from Table 2.4. Their behaviour cannot be explained by their risk attitudes.
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TABLE 2.4: Offer vs. Expected Monetary Earning Maximizing Offers
Response Treatment
EMEMO/Offer = - + Total
£0 0 0 0 0
£1 2 0 5 7
£2 3 1 7 11
£3 46 2 19 67
£4 26 31 3 60
£5 0 2 1 3
£6 0 0 0 0
£7 0 0 0 0
Total 77 36 35 148
Strategy Treatment
EMEMO/Offer = - + Total
£0 1 0 2 3
£1 1 1 4 6
£2 3 0 6 9
£3 44 11 12 67
£4 22 37 0 59
£5 0 4 1 5
£6 0 0 0 0
£7 0 0 0 0
Total 71 53 25 149
EMEMO can be explained by risk aversion, and that 75.28%(67/89) of
the subjects who offer less than their EMEMO can be explained by risk
loving.19
The evidence from this individual level analysis reinforces our view
that the main driver for the difference in the distribution of subjects’ of-
fers in the two treatments (with the mean also being lower in the strategy
treatment) is the difference in subjects’ preferences in the two treatments.
19Often the risk attitude’s explanation fails because the subject makes an offer to which
she attaches a probability of acceptance not higher than the one attached to the amount £1
lower than it.
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2.5 Role-Reversal Consistency
We now analyse each subject’s joint behaviour as a proposer and a re-
sponder with the aim of understanding whether most subjects do not treat
others in ways that they find not agreeable to themselves, which we call
role-reversal consistency. In the context of the ultimatum game we define
this concept as follows:
Definition 2.2. A subject is role-reversal consistent if she always accepts
the offer she makes as a proposer. She is role-reversal inconsistent if she
rejects that offer at least once. When the subject is never offered the offer
she makes, the subject is role-reversal inconclusive.
The definition of role-reversal consistency seems to be a close interpre-
tation of the principle “never impose on others what you would not choose
for yourself” in the ultimatum game. The rejection of an offer reflects the
subject’s dislike of being treated that way. Thus, when a subject makes an
offer to the others that he himself rejects as a responder, he treats others in a
way he himself finds not agreeable, and thereby violates the principle. On
the other hand, when a subject accepts an offer equal to her own offer, that
suggests that she does not dislike this offer, which, together with the fact
that she actually makes this offer to the others, implies that she does not
treat others in a way she herself finds not agreeable. Thus, whether or not
a subject accepts the offer she makes as proposer is what determines her
role-reversal consistency. Note that a subject who rejects an offer higher
than the offer she makes will not be role-reversal inconsistent (or violate
the Golden Rule), so long as a responder she accepts her own offer. There-
fore, a subject’s strategy as responder does not need to be monotonic in
order for her to be role-reversal consistent.
In our data the large majority of our subjects, 82.01%, is consistent.
However, the relative frequency of consistent subjects is higher in the re-
sponse treatment, 92.97% (out of 128 subjects, as we have to exclude 22
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subjects who are not offered the amount they offer as a proposer) than in
the strategy treatment, 72.67%.20 21
Thus, it seems that receiving feedback about how others react to the
way one treats them and observing how others treat one, helps one to ac-
cept that others treat one the way one treated them, or to not treat others in
a way that one herself would not like to be treated. This finding has several,
not mutually exclusive, interpretations. One is that a subject understands a
strategic situation better (and therefore, finds it easier to apply whichever
principle guides her behaviour more consistently) when playing a role, if
not only she has the experience of playing the opposite role, but also, and
more importantly, if both players observe each other’s behaviour.22 An-
other interpretation is that a subject will ignore principles that she uses to
guide her behaviour more often, when she knows that her actions are not
immediately observed by her opponents.
The finding that most subjects are consistent is in line with the findings
of Gu¨th et al. (1982), despite the fact that the treatment they used to study
this issue is markedly different from our study. Gu¨th et al.’s (1982) subjects
20A Fisher’s exact test for the difference in proportions yields a p− value of 0.0001.
The much higher frequency cannot be explained by the fact that in the response treatment
subjects who make low offers are less often offered the amount they themselves offer
at least once than the subjects who make higher offers. Out of the 22 subjects who are
never offered the amount, 1,4,6,5,3 and 3 subjects offered £0, £1, £2, £4, £5 and £6,
respectively. Even if we were to assume that subjects who were offered £0, £1 and £2
would themselves reject such offers, a Fisher’s exact test for the difference in proportions
would yield a p− value of 0.0039., thus rejecting the null hypothesis that role-reversal
consistency is the same in the two treatments.
21Since subjects in the strategy treatment have to decide whether to accept or reject the
amount they offer as proposer 10 times, while in the response treatment they make such
decision only as many times as they are offered that same amount by the proposers, one
might think that the design makes it harder for subjects to be role-reversal consistent in
the strategy treatment. To account for this possibility we compare the consistency rates
of the sub-sample of subjects who use deterministic strategies as responders (i.e., make
the same decision for all offers of the same amount), finding that the difference between
the consistency rates is still statistically significant (100% and 92.4% in the response and
strategy treatments, respectively, and a p− value of 0.004). We thank Dirk Engelmann
for this suggestion.
22This echoes Roth’s (1995) interpretation of the behaviour observed in Binmore et
al. (1985)’s role-switching two-period alternating offers bargaining experiment. In this
experiment subjects who are second-movers in the first game make offers closer to the
subgame perfect equilibrium in the the second game as first-movers. Roth’s interpretation
is that the experience of playing the role of second-mover might help a subject better
anticipate the behaviour of someone in that role when playing the role of first-mover.
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were asked to simultaneously write down their demands as proposer and
responder. They call a subject’s demands consistent/conflict/anti-conflict
(more recently, Gu¨th and Kliemt (2010) refer to consistency as intra-personal
coherence) when their sum is equal to/greater/smaller than the total amount
to be divided. Out of their sample of 37 subjects, they found 5 subjects
whose demands were in conflict, 15 which were consistent and 17 which
were in anti-conflict. Since according to our definition both consistent
and anti-conflict demands are role-reversal consistent, in their experiment
86.49% of the subjects were role-reversal consistent.
If we use a notion similar to Gu¨th et al.’s definition of consistency,
which we would call strict consistency (the lowest offer a subject always
accepts as a responder is the one she makes as a proposer, but allow the
individual to reject higher offers than it), we find rates of 51.6% and 30.0%
(statistically significantly different from each other) in the response and
strategy treatments, which are on average identical to Gu¨th et al’s rate
(40.5% (=15/37)). Note that any subject who is in anti-conflict in Gu¨th
et al.’s sense cannot be strictly consistent in our sense.23
Finding that most subjects are role-reversal consistent raises two ques-
tions: one is which factors, if any, explain why people behave that way;
the other is to ask whether consistent and inconsistent subjects perform
differently.
We start with the latter. We find that in the response treatment a con-
sistent subject earns an average of £6.38 per pair of proposer/responder
decisions, a higher figure than the one, £5.77, earned by inconsistent sub-
jects (£5.93 vs. £4.95, in the strategy treatment).24 Equally interesting,
consistent subjects’ stated beliefs are closer to the actual acceptance rates
than inconsistent subjects. Indeed, the average of subjects’ absolute devi-
ation between the actual and the predicted conditional acceptance rates is
23The higher rate of strict consistency in our response treatment might have to do with
35 subjects not receiving offers £1 lower than their own offers. Therefore, we assume that
the offer they make is the lowest they would accept. If we exclude these subjects from the
analysis, our strict consistency rate is 33.3% (31/93).
24K-S tests for the equality of the distributions of earnings of consistent and inconsistent
subjects yield p− values of 0.0000 and 0.064 in the strategy and response treatments,
respectively.
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16.75 percentage points for the consistent subjects and 18.38 for the incon-
sistent subjects (a K-S test for the equality of the distributions of subjects’
average absolute deviation prediction error yields a p− value of 0.043).
TABLE 2.5: Probit regressions on role-reversal consistency
(reporting marginal effects)
1 2
Offer 0.079 (3.69)** 0.070 (3.39)**
Monotonicity 0.256 (3.74)** 0.240 (3.56)**
EMEM 0.078 (1.85) 0.098 (1.66)
Response-method 0.157 (2.14)* 0.159 (2.24)*
Prop.time 0.002 (1.78) 0.003 (1.92)
Resp.timerm -0.002 (2.40)* -0.001 (2.22)*
Resp.timesm -0.001 (1.15) -0.001 (1.10)
Age 0.014 (1.31)
Gender -0.010 (0.25)
Quant. major -0.029 (0.71)
Native Speaker 0.012 (0.21)
Work experience -0.022 (0.41)
Charity experience -0.010 (0.24)
Has siblings 0.103 (1.43)
# Rooms at home -0.073 (1.84)
# Family cars 0.033 (1.32)
# Observations 275 261
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets; * (**) significant at 5% (1%);
The 22 inconclusive subjects and the 3 subjects whose offers lie between their two EMEMOs are excluded
from regression 1 and 2;
Those who did not complete the post-experiment questionnaire are excluded from regression 2.
In order to identify the extent to which different aspects of behaviour
or innate characteristics influence the likelihood of a subject being role-
reversal consistent we use a probit regression (see Table 2.5). We regress
a subject’s role-reversal consistent behaviour binary variable on her offer
as a proposer, on a binary variable of whether her offer coincides with her
EMEMO (labeled EMEM in regressions), a binary variable of whether her
behaviour as a responder is monotonic, the treatment she took part in, the
decision time she took as a proposer and as a responder, and a series of
demographic, socio-economic and life-experience related variables.25
25We treat the responder’s decision time differently in the two treatments. In the re-
sponse treatment it is the time taken to decide on all 10 offers (often some offers are equal
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We include the subject’s offer in the regression because we expect that
the higher the offer a subject makes as a proposer the higher the prob-
ability that she will accept it as responder, and therefore the higher the
probability that she is role-reversal consistent. We include the binary vari-
able of whether the subject’s offer coincides with her EMEMO to test
whether behaving strategically as a proposer under the assumptions of risk-
neutrality and own-payoff maximization is confounded with role-reversal
consistency. Such confounding could arise as a result of projection bias.
A subject who as a responder uses a cut-off strategy believes others in that
same role behave the same way. Therefore, the subject’s EMEMO as a
proposer is equal to the cut-off. In this case, and if the subject offers her
EMEMO, there is a confounding between behaving strategically and being
role-reversal consistent. However, there is no confounding if the subject
offers a different amount.
The binary variable of whether the subject’s behaviour as a responder
is monotonic is included because cut-off strategies play such a huge role
in the bargaining literature, and because such behaviour reveals that a sub-
ject has clear preferences as to what offers to accept and reject (with the
possible exception of the cut-off). We include a dummy variable for the
treatment the subject took part in to test which of two effects is stronger:
the “hot vs. cold” effect which suggests that subjects might be less role-
reversal consistent in the response treatment, as they are likelier to reject
(when in the responder’s role) the low offer they make as a proposer; or
the “experience effect”, since subjects play the second role in the response
treatment after having observed the behaviour of their opponents in the
other role (either how they treated her or whether they accepted how she
treated them, depending on which role she had played first), which might
make fairness or moral principles like the Golden Rule more salient.
The results in Table 2.5 show that a higher offer, and monotonic be-
haviour as a responder, have a positive effect on role-reversal consistency.
to each other) received. In the strategy treatment it is time spent entering a strategy, i.e., a
conditional decision for each of the eight feasible offers for each proposal averaged across
the 10 proposals. If when specifying a strategy to play a proposer the subject simply in-
vokes the strategy she specified for the previous proposer, the decision time spent for that
proposal is assumed to be zero.
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The response treatment also yields a higher consistency level, which con-
firms the non-parametric analysis above. The results also confirm that be-
having strategically, i.e., choosing the offer that maximizes one’s expected
monetary earnings does not explain the high rate of role-reversal consis-
tency, and therefore allows us to say that the observed behaviour is not
driven by the confounding of these two explanations in our study.
Among the proposer’s and the responder’s decision time variables (the
latter sorted according to treatment) in the regression, the responder’s de-
cision time in the response treatment is the only one whose statistical sig-
nificance is robust to the specification chosen. Its effect is negative, which
means that taking longer to decide leads to less consistent behaviour. An
intuitive explanation is that the moral principle behind role-reversal con-
sistency is simple and easy to apply. Longer decision times might reflect
the individual taking into account a variety of (possibly competing) con-
siderations when deciding, or her use of harder to apply heuristics.
We find that none of the demographic, socio-economic, life-experience,
and family related variables affect role-reversal consistency.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter reports an experiment that tests whether people do not treat
others in ways that they themselves would not like to be treated, which we
refer to as role-reversal consistency. In the experiment, each subject plays
both roles of a modified version of the standard ultimatum game and states
her beliefs as a proposer about the responder’s behaviour either under the
response or the strategy method. In our design each subject when playing
as a proposer makes the same offer to multiple responders simultaneously,
and when playing as a responder receives offers from multiple proposers,
in a way that preserves the one-shot nature of the interactions. This feature
improves the comparison of the second mover’s behaviour in a two-person
two-move game under the response and the strategy methods, because she
is asked to make decisions for different actions of the first mover under
both methods. Hence, in our design, the main difference between the two
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methods is whether the second-mover responds to “hypothetical” (in the
strategy method) or “actual” (in the response method) actions of the first
mover. This differs from the typical previous design comparing both meth-
ods in which the second-mover makes one decision given one actual action
of her opponent in the response method, but makes decisions for multiple
hypothetical actions of her opponent in the strategy method.
Overall, we find that the majority of subjects are role-reversal consis-
tent, a finding that is not driven by subjects behaving strategically as pro-
posers (i.e., choosing the offer that maximizes their expected monetary
earnings). We also find that the response method produces a substantially
higher level of role-reversal consistency than the strategy method. Further-
more, a larger offer and a monotonic response to others’ offers are more
likely to produce role-reversal consistent behaviour. On the other hand, we
find that subjects who take longer to decide as responders in the choice-
method are less consistent. In addition, we find that role-reversal consis-
tent subjects are better predictors of the behaviour of their opponents, and
earn more money than inconsistent subjects.
We also add to the debate on the differences in subjects’ behaviour in
the strategy and the response methods under subjective expected utility,
by showing that in a two-stage game, the first mover behaves differently
in the two treatments not because her beliefs about the second mover are
different, but because her preferences are different across treatments.
Finally, the observation that the proportion of role-reversal consistent
subjects is high indicates that theoretical models of strategic interactions
that do not rely on the usual assumption of common knowledge of ratio-
nality, but instead assume that an agent makes a decision considering how
she would play the opponent’s role, might have a role to play in predicting
both one’s and one’s opponent’s behaviour. Such line of inquiry might be
appealing in situations when an agent knows very little about her oppo-
nents’ preferences, characteristics, personalities, and so on.
Chapter 3
Expected-Norm Consistency: An
Experimental Study of Trust and
Trustworthiness1
3.1 Introduction
Do you trust the others the way you expect the others to trust you? Are
you as trustworthy as you expect the others to be? The first of 7 Principles
of Admirable Business Ethics2 is Be Trustful. Considered as an important
component of social capital (Coleman, 1990; Arrow, 1972), trust plays a
vital role in people’s daily life as well as the functioning of the economy.
Expectation is important in people’s decision making process, while ex-
pectation of social norm enters the process when people are not certain
about what kind of norm the others would follow under relative strange
circumstances.
Despite the vast literature on trust, the empirical analysis of the rela-
tionship between trust and the expectation of norms has been neglected, or
1This chapter is based on Do I play the way I expect others to play my role? Evidence
from a expected norm trust game experiment, a joint work with Miguel Costa-Gomes and
Yuan Ju.
2See http://sbinformation.about.com/od/bestpractices/a/businessethics.htm. Note
that there is also a version of 12 Ethical Principles for Business Executives,
http://josephsoninstitute.org/business/blog/2010/12/12-ethical-principles-for-business-
executives/
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to the least, lacks systematic study. The unanswered question is “To what
extent do people follow social norm in a situation like to trust or not to
trust?”. There are two types of social norms: one is injunctive norm which
describes what people should do; the other is descriptive norm which de-
scribes what people do. In a strategic situation, people choose their strate-
gies by applying the injunctive norm to themselves and their opponents,
while people relates to the descriptive norm by conforming to their percep-
tion of it. The existence of the injunctive norm requires people to believe
that others would follow the norms. However, in a relatively new situation
with stranger opponents, it is difficult to be certain whether their opponents
would follow whichever injunctive norm they think is appropriate. Instead,
people form expectations about what their opponents would do. While we
cannot precisely measure the injunctive norm people have, we can elicit
their expected norm and check whether their own behaviour follow such
norm.
This chapter aims to develop our understanding of trust in relation to
the expectation of norms. More specifically, we do this by experimentally
testing whether people’s trust and trustworthiness behaviour conform to
their own expectation of the norms the others would follow when playing
a trust game. The experimental design adopts role-reversal to get subjects
to play both roles, in a way that allows us to check whether a subject’s
behaviour in both roles conforms to their expected norm, or in our termi-
nology, is expected norm consistent.
In a trust game stylised by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), one
player (the trustor) decides how much out of a certain amount of money
to send to his opponent (the trustee). The amount sent is tripled on the
way to the trustee who then decides how much out of the tripled amount to
return to the trustor. The amount sent is normally considered as a measure
of trust, and the amount returned as a measure of trustworthiness.
Given that by the Oxford Dictionary trust is defined as firm belief in the
reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something, we know that trust is
all about the trustor’s expectations or beliefs of the trustee. Therefore, to
answer the question of whether people follow their expiated norm when
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playing the trust game, a crucial issue is to figure out a players’ expecta-
tion of norm the others would follow. Then in order to see how he actually
do, we ask such a player to play the opposite role. By comparing a player’s
expectation and his actual action, we could determine whether he is ex-
pected norm consistent. Moreover, given the two roles of the game, we
can separate the expected norm consistent trust from the expected norm
consistent trustworthiness, with the former to compare a trustor’s actual
amount sent with his expectation of the amount being sent by the (new)
trustor when he becomes the trustee, and the latter to compare a trustor’s
expectation of the amount returned by the trustee and the actual amount he
returns when he acts as the trustee.
Subjects in our experiment play either the trustor or the trustee first,
being unaware that they will play the opposite role later. We use a strategy
method for the trustees to elicit a complete strategy profile of how much
they would return given different amount they could potentially receive.
After their decisions, they are then asked to state their beliefs about the
probabilities of each possible amount to be sent or returned by their oppo-
nents (incentivised according to the accuracy based on a quadratic scoring
rule).
In one treatment, subjects are informed the outcome of the game after
stating their beliefs (henceforth, shortened to feedback treatment). In an-
other treatment, such information is withheld from the subjects until the
end of the whole session (henceforth shortened to no-feedback treatment).
Next, subjects play the opposite role and state their beliefs about their op-
ponents, knowing that they are not facing the same opponents as in the
previous game. Both the amount sent and returned are restricted to be
whole pounds so that we could use the strategy method for the trustees and
elicit subjects beliefs about the probability of each possible amount sent
and returned.
Our main findings are as follows.
First, more than half of the subjects are expected norm consistent either
in trust or trustworthiness. However, 60.67% of the subjects are expected
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norm consistent in trust, which is significantly higher than the level of ex-
pected norm consistency in trustworthiness at 50.33%.
Second, experience of playing the trustor role has a negative impact on
the expected norm consistency in trustworthiness, but no significant effect
on the expected norm consistency in trust.
Third, players who are expected norm consistent in both trust and trust-
worthiness get the highest payoff when play the trust game among them-
selves.
Fourth, we find that none of the demographic data has a significant
impact on the expected norm consistency.
Finally, we contribute to the literature of comparing the trust and trust-
worthiness behaviour with or without experience and feedback informa-
tion. Our result shows that experience of playing the opposite role and
feedback information has a significantly negative impact on trustee’s be-
haviour, while such impact is not due to a not fulfilled expectation.
3.2 Related Literature
Two distinctive features of our experimental design are the expected norm
design and belief elicitation. Given the vast literature of the trust games,
we only discuss the experimental work whose design either involves a two-
role design or belief elicitation.
In our experiment, we ask the subjects to play both roles, one at a
time with different opponents. The order of playing these two roles is
varied for different subjects. Such a design allows us to have a clean test
of the experience effect of playing the opposite role. Combining with the
comparison between the two treatments with or without feedback from
their opponents, we could also identify the mix effect of experience and
feedback.
In trust games where subjects play both roles, most existing studies
have subjects play both roles together (Tu and Bulte, 2010; Tan and Vogel,
2008; Altmann et al., 2008 and Walkowitz et al., 2004) or play the trustor
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role first, followed by the trustee role, without receiving feedback in be-
tween playing the two roles (for example, Garbarino and Slonim, 2009;
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan, 2007 and Sapienza et al., 2013 among the
existing many trust game studies). Yet, neither of these studies finds any
significant difference in subjects’ behaviour in either role due to playing
both roles of the trust game.
One different result comes from Burks et al. (2003). In Burks et al.
(2003)’s design, subjects play trustors first and trustees next, but with dif-
ferent opponents in each role. In some treatments, they know they will
play the trustee role next, while in others they don’t. There is also a con-
trol treatment where subjects would only play one of the roles. Trustors
in the treatments where they know they will play the trustee role send sig-
nificantly less. For trustees, the experience of playing the trustor role first
significantly reduce the fraction of money returned to the trustor. Players
do not receive feedback in between playing the two games, but they do not
use the strategy method for the trustees, which means the trustees can see
how much the trustors send them.3
Burks et al. (2003)’s interpretation of the golden rule focues on how
sympathy and revenge affects the play of either role. We links a person’s
action in a role closely to her expectations of the others playing the opposite
role.
In order to elicit the belief of how the subjects expect the others to treat
them, we explicitly ask them to state the probability distribution over all
possible actions that could be taken by their opponents. This task is given
to both the trustors and trustees.
The novelty of our method of belief elicitation is to elicit the subjects’
complete probability distribution among all possible amounts rather than a
3It is also possible that the trustees’ expectation of the trustors’ are not fulfilled, so
that they return less to express the dissatisfaction. Also the regressor ‘no prior’ (no prior
knowledge) is not significant in all of their regressions, and as they have suggested the
trust level in ‘no prior’ treatment is lower, which indicates the possibility that the lower
level of return is because of lower level of amount being sent. The ‘amount received’
variable remain marginally significant through out all of their regressions. This also high-
lights one of our design feature. By using the strategy method and compare the average
fraction returned or the total of return, we make sure our test for experience and feedback
is conditioned on the amount received.
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simple point estimation as it is traditionally done. As Johansson-Stenman
et al. (2011) pointed out, rather than a point estimation, subjects generally
have a subjective probability distribution over different amount returned.
It is generally avoided eliciting the full probability distribution because if
the amount sent is relative large, after being tripled, it would be a very
confusing and labouring job for the subjects to answer dozens of questions
on probabilities. Different from the previous works, we ask subjects to
state a probability distribution over every possible amount sent/returned.4
Subjects are paid according to the accuracy of their predictions using a
quadratic scoring rule.
Although belief elicitation is frequently used to determine players’ ex-
pectations of their opponents’ behaviour in trust game, few have done with
monetary incentive or for both roles.
In most experiments with the belief elicitation task, the focus has been
put on the beliefs of the trustors. Trustors are asked to state how much
they expect the others to return to them given their amount sent. Trustors’
expected amount to be returned by the trustee is found to be positively cor-
related with their amount sent. See for example Sapienza et al. (2013),
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007), Ashraf et al. (2006), Fehr et al.
(2003) and Bolle (1998).
Few experiments of the trust game elicit the beliefs of the trustees about
the trustors behaviour. Wilson and Eckel (2006) conduct an incentivised
belief elicitation task (asking for a best guess of amount sent) for trustees’
and found that for a group of subjects, trustees punish trustors by return-
ing less if their expectation of amount sent is not met. But such result is
not robust in other settings, among the experiments that involve eliciting
the beliefs of both roles. For example in Tu and Bulte (2010), Eckel and
Wilson (2004) and Buchan et al. (2008), they find a significant positive cor-
relation between trustors’ belief and their decision, but no relation between
the trustee’s beliefs and their decisions of return.
4The maximum number of possible outcomes is ten. As it turns out, most subjects
have no difficulty understanding the task.
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However, experimental data from the above mentioned experiments do
not allow us to compare one’s belief in one role and his own action in the
other, for which both the expected norm design and the belief elicitation
task is necessary. In Tu and Bulte (2010), subjects play both roles together
and state their beliefs for both roles. However, due to the fact that the
trustees’ behaviour is not their main focus, they do not use strategy method,
thus the number of observations, i.e., matched pairs of a trustor’s belief
given his amount sent and his return behaviour for the same amount sent in
the trustee’s role would be rather small. Therefore, it is not difficult to see
that in order to find out the answer of our main research question in this
chapter, it requires a specific design, which we will discuss in details in the
following section.
3.3 Experimental Design
A main goal of our study is to examine the links between a subject’s de-
cisions in a role and her stated beliefs about how others would play that
same role when she plays the opposite role in order to detect evidence for
projection bias and check whether behaviour conforms to expected-norm
consistency. Other goals are: i) to test whether a subject’s experience of
playing one of the trust game’s roles has an effect on her strategy and stated
beliefs in the opposite role;5 ii) whether there is an additional effect from
receiving feedback in one role on the strategy and stated beliefs in the op-
posite role.6
Our goals lead us to adapt Berg et al. (1995)’s classical version of the
Trust game as follows. First, the trustor has an initial endowment, but, un-
like in Berg et al. (1995), the trustee does not.7 The trustor’s and trustee’s
5Note that in previous studies in which subjects play both roles of the trust game,
subjects either play both roles simultaneously or the trustor role first and the trustee’s role
next. Therefore, prior to our study only the effect of experience as trustor on decisions as
a trustee had been studied.
6Note that it is not possible to study the effect that the (own) feedback one receives
when playing one role has on one’s behaviour in the opposite role without having first
played the former’s role, i.e., without having experience in that role.
7This modification has previously used by Glaeser et al. (2000) and Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2011).
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different endowments might lead players to transfer larger amounts to the
player in the opposite role than in the equal endowment’s design of Berg et
al. (1995), as in such setting transfers reflect both trust and trustworthiness
as well as subjects’ aversion to payoff inequality (e.g., the trustor has to
transfer some money to the trustee to alleviate the extreme initial payoff
inequality). However, since we are mostly interested in exploring the links
between a subject’s decision in a role and her beliefs about how other sub-
jects would play that same role, and examine how they vary across different
conditions, not on measuring the absolute level of trust per se, any differ-
ence that our design modification has on the latter is irrelevant for our pur-
poses. Moreover, we expect that the difference between the trustor’s and
trustee’s initial endowment lead social norms (such as trust and inequality
aversion) to have a larger role on subjects’ strategy and stated beliefs in the
game. This helps us to test whether in the trust game a subject’s behaviour
in a role conforms to her expected norm of behaviour of others in that same
role in a cleaner way.
Second, the initial endowment given to the trustor, i.e. £3, is substan-
tially smaller, than in Berg et al. (1995) who give her $10. This together
with our restriction that players can only transfer whole (i.e., integer) Ster-
ling amounts to each other (Berg et al. (1995) do the same with US dollars)
reduces the cardinality of the action space for either player role (in relation
to Berg et al.,1995) in a way that makes it feasible to elicit subjects’ beliefs
over the support of players’ action spaces. The whole amount constraint
also makes it impossible for the trustor to send half of her initial endow-
ment to the trustee. Furthermore, since the amount received by the trustee
is the triple of the amount sent by the trustor, while the amount sent back
by the trustor is a one-to-one transfer, final outcomes that equalize players’
payoffs are ruled out.8
In the experiment subjects play the trust game twice, once in each role,
and make their decisions according to the strategy method. Trustors decide
how much to send which we denote as X(X ∈ {0,1,2,3}). Before being
8The sum of the payoffs of the trustor and trustee, given that the trustor can send £0,
£1, £2 or £3, is £3, £5, £7 and £9, respectively. The whole amount constraint rules out
payoff equalization.
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told how much she received from the trustor, trustees choose the amount
they would return to the trustor for every possible amount they could re-
ceive from her which we label as YX(YX ∈ {0,1,2, · · · ,3X}). We have two
treatments: in one treatment, the Feedback Treatment, at the end of the
game in which they play the first role assigned to them, subjects receive
feedback (i.e. are told the decision of their opponent and their own pay-
off from which they can infer their opponent’s payoff), before they play
the opposite role in the next game; in the other treatment, the No-Feedback
Treatment, subjects only receive feedback after they have played both roles.
In both treatments, after playing each role, but before playing the op-
posite role (and before receiving feedback in the first game they play in the
Feedback Treatment), subjects state their beliefs about which action their
opponent chose: trustors are asked to state a probability distribution over
each possible amount that could be returned to her out of 3X (i.e., over
{0,1,2, · · · ,3X}); trustees are asked to state a probability distribution over
each possible amount that could be sent to her (i.e. over {0,1,2,3}).
We use a three-parts-three-groups scheme (identical to the structure
shown in Figure 2.1 (A)) to implement an expected norm design that guar-
antees that subjects play against different opponents when playing the two
different roles, in order to suppress any direct induced reciprocity or re-
venge. More specifically, subjects are divided into three groups. In each
part, subjects from two of the groups play the game against each other,
with the third group being idle. In part I, group A subjects play trust games
against group B subjects, the former as trustors, the latter as trustees. In
part II, group A subjects become trustees and play trust games with group C
subjects who play as trustors. In part III, group B subjects become trustors
and play trust games with group C subjects who become trustees. Thus,
subjects in a group only interact once with the subjects of each of the other
two groups. Our procedure also varies the order the two roles are played
across subjects: some subjects play the trustor role first, while others play
the trustee role first.
This design allows us to observe subjects’ behaviour (strategies and
stated beliefs) in each of the two roles depending on whether they have
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previous experience of playing the opposite role and on whether in addi-
tion they received feedback in the game in which they played that role.
Table 3.1 details the level of Experience and Feedback in the opposite role
conditions under which subjects in the different groups play the roles of
trustor and trustee.
This allows us to study the effects (if any) that experience in one role
has on the chosen strategy (i.e., on the absolute levels of trust and trust-
worthiness) and stated beliefs in the other role as well as the added effects
(if any) that feedback received in that role has on the chosen strategies and
stated beliefs in the other role.
A novelty of our design is that we can measure the effects of experience
in one role on the behaviour in the other role in both directions, i.e., from
the trustor to the trustee, and vice-versa.
TABLE 3.1: Features of the data
Role Groups Treatments Condition Label
T
R
U
S
T
O
R A&C Both No Exp. & No Feedb. GACnenf
B No Feedb. Trustee Exp. & No Feedb. GBenf
B Feedb. Trustee Exp. & Feedb. GBef
T
R
U
S
T
E
E B Both No Exp. & No Feedb. GBnenf
A&C No Feedb. Trustor Exp. & No Feedb. GACenf
A&C Feedb. Trustor Exp. & Feedb. GACef
We implemented our design as follows. For each of five sessions of
each treatment we recruited thirty students from different majors (with the
exception of Economics) at the University of York, who were randomly
divided into three groups of ten, A, B and C. This gave us 150 subjects per
treatment, about two thirds of which are British. Subjects were then told
that the session had three independent parts, and that each group would
participate in only two parts, and interact with a different group in each
part. Subjects received the instructions for each part they participated in
only at the start of that part. Therefore, when playing the first of two roles
of the trust game they were unaware they would be asked to play the re-
verse role later. This prevented subjects from playing the two independent
games as a whole or balancing their payoffs, at least when playing the first
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role assigned to them. Subjects interacted anonymously via a z-tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) program. Each subject was paid for their decisions in both
roles and for the accuracy of their stated beliefs about the behaviour of
another subject in each of the roles, as well.
After all subjects have played both roles they completed a question-
naire that elicited their social background, past trusting behaviour and at-
titudes towards trust and empathy. Subjects received their earnings (which
included a show-up fee of £3) in cash at the end of the experiment.
3.4 Data analysis
TABLE 3.2: Trustor’s behaviour and Trustee’s stated beliefs
Trustor sends £0 £1 £2 £3 Average
Trustor’s behaviour
Feedback treat. 10.66% 45.33% 30.67% 13.33% £1.47
No-feedback treat. 12.00% 42.67% 33.33% 12.00% £1.45
Pooled 11.33% 44.00% 32.00% 12.67% £1.46
Trustee’s stated beliefs
Feedback treat. 23.26% 37.90% 26.01% 12.83% £1.28
No-feedback treat. 21.91% 36.90% 26.73% 14.45% £1.34
Pooled 22.59% 37.40% 26.37% 13.64% £1.31
In this section, we present the basic data analysis and briefly summarise
the behaviour of the trustor and trustee as well as their stated beliefs about
the opposite role’s behaviour.
3.4.1 The Trust Level
Table 3.2 presents the trustor’s behaviour and trustee’s stated beliefs. Sub-
jects in the role of trustors send an average of £1.46 to the trustee (i.e.,
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TABLE 3.3: Trustee’s behaviour and Trustor’s stated beliefs
Groups A&C Group B
Send £1 £2 £3 £1 £2 £3
Actual return
Feedback 61% 80% 71% 100% 95% 94%
No-Feedback 89% 106% 105% 104% 107% 111%
Pooled 75% 93% 93% 102% 101% 102%
Expected return
Feedback 122% 129% 115% 101% 115% 99%
No-Feedback 121% 128% 126% 92% 115% 110%
Pooled 122% 129% 121% 97% 115% 103%
about 50% of the trustor’s endowment) which is in line with the existing ex-
perimental results.9 However, subjects’ stated beliefs as trustees underesti-
mate the amounts they expect to be sent by the trustor, £1.31 (i.e., 43.7% of
the endowment).10 The gap between the two figures arises mainly because
the trustee overestimates the probability of the trustor sending nothing.
Neither the trustor’s behaviour nor the trustee’s stated beliefs react to
whether subjects have prior experience of playing the opposite role (i.e.,
trustee and trustor, respectively), or to whether or not they received feed-
back when playing that opposite role.
Comparing the amount sent by the trustors between groups11, we do
9Berg et al. (1995) find that the trustor sends an average of 51.6% of her endowment.
In addition, they find that giving the trustor information about outcomes of trust game pre-
viously played by others does not significantly increase the amount send by her (53.6%).
Walkowitz et al. (2006) and Tan and Vogel (2008) find in a study in which each subject
plays both roles sequentially, but without receiving feedback in between the two roles,
that the amount sent by the trustor is the same regardless whether it is the first or second
role played by a subject. Burks et al. (2003) find that subjects who are told they will
play the role of the trustee after playing the role of trustor transfer a smaller fraction of
their endowment as trustors than when they do not have such prior knowledge, 65.0% vs.
47.3%. In our experiment, when subjects are first assigned a role, they are not told they
will play the opposite role next.
10This is in line with existing evidence: Tu and Bulte (2010) report that trustees’ (mon-
etary unicentivized) beliefs reveal that they expect the trustor to send 39.7% of her endow-
ment; Wilson and Eckel (2006) report that trustees’ (monetary point incentivized) beliefs
reveal that they expect the trustor to send about 50% of her endowment.
11For simplicity of description, we refer to the label given in Table 3.1 when talking
about subjects in specific groups.
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not observe significant experience effect of playing the trustee on the trustors’
behaviour either. GACnenf12 play as trustors without any experience of
playing the opposite role. Their average send level is £1.49. GBnenf,
on the other hand, have the experience (but not the feedback information
of how much is being sent by their opponents) of playing trustees before
playing trustors and their average send level is £1.42. Experienced players
generally send less than inexperienced players, but the result is not signifi-
cant. (The p-value of a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test is 0.7548.)
Furthermore, GBef have both the experience and the feedback from play-
ing the trustees. However, the send level of GBef and GACnenf is not
significantly different from each other (£1.38 vs. £1.49). Experience with
feedback does not have any significant effect on the trust level either. (The
p-value of a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test is 0.5013.)
3.4.2 The Trustworthiness Level
Table 3.3 describes the trustee’s behaviour and the trustor’s stated beliefs
(about the trustee’s behaviour). The top panel presents the average amount
returned by the trustee to the trustor conditioning on the hypothetical amount
sent (not the amount effectively sent, since we use subjects’ strategies as
trustees for this computation) by the trustor. On average the trustee sends
back to the trustor slightly less (91.9%) than the amount that she receives
from him, which is in line with the existing experimental evidence.13 14
We find that subjects in the role of trustees who have prior experience
of playing the trustor’s role and received feedback in that role return 27.6%
12Tests of equal distribution for send level between group A and group C players across
treatments are not significant. We thus pool the trustor data of group A and group C from
both treatments.
1310.0%, 28.3% and 36.0% of our subjects return a larger amount than the £1, £2, £3
sent to them, respectively. In Berg et al. (1995), the trustee returns 90.0% of the amount
the trustor sent (i.e. before being tripled). However, in Burks et al. (2003), the trustee
returns 120.0% of the amount the trustor sent, which might be the result of the trustor
sending larger amount to the trustee than in Burks et al. (2003).
14Define the amount a subject in the role of trustee returns when receiving £3, £6 and £9
as Y3, Y6 and Y9, respectively. We say that the subject’s strategy as a trustee is monotonic
if Y3 ≤ Y6 ≤ Y9. 95.67% of the subjects’ strategies satisfy the inequalities. 62.0% of the
subjects strategies satisfy the strict inequality.
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and 26.2% less than the subjects who either did not receive such feedback
or who had no prior experience of playing the trustor’s role, respectively.15
GBnenf16 play the trustees first without any previous experience or
feedback. There is no significant difference between group A and group
C on the level of return within each treatment, so we pool the data of these
two groups in each treatment respectively.
Comparing to GBnenf, GACenf have an experience of playing trustors
but not the feedback information of how much is being returned by their
opponents. In addition, GACef have the trustor-experience as well as feed-
back from their opponents. To identify the experience effect on the re-
turning behaviour, we first compare the return level between GBnenf and
GACenf. Group A and C players return slightly less (£0.89 vs. £1.02)
when £1 is sent but more (£2.12 vs. £2.02, £3.15 vs £3.07, respectively)
when £2 or £3 is sent. However, no significant difference can be found
in any of the return levels,17 which suggest that the experience of playing
trustor does not have a significant effect on the trustee behaviours.
However, when comparing GBnenf with GACef, the difference in re-
turn level becomes highly significant for every amount sent.18 GBnenf re-
turn on average 33.93% of the amount they received, while GACef return
only 24.59%, over 9% less. GACef, on top of playing the role of trustors,
15In most studies (for example, Tan and Vogel, 2008 and Walkowitz et al. , 2006), the
trustee’s behaviour is not affected by whichever role they played first. However, Burks et
al. (2003) find that subjects who have previously played the role of trustor although not
receiving feedback return lower amount in the role of trustees. One possible explanation
of why Burks et al. (2003) find a lower level of return is their design. In their control
treatment, they replicate the Berg et al. (1995)’s procedure where both the trustor and
trustee are given $10 at the beginning. However, it is not clear whether in their two-role
treatment, when their subjects play the trustee role, they are given an extra $10 to make
the games in these two designs identical. If the players are not given the initial endowment
when playing the trustee in the two role treatment as in the control treatment, the trustees
are $10 less than the trustors to begin with. It is natural that players return less when they
are in a worse off situation then the trustors than when they begin with the same level of
wealth. In other words, it may not be the experience but some other structural difference
in the game that drives down the return level in Burks et al. (2003) two-role treatment.
16Tests of equal distribution for all the return levels by group B players between treat-
ments is not significant. We thus pool the trustee data of group B from both treatments.
17The p-value of Fligner-Policello robust rank order test is 0.1865, 0.4206 and 0.8603
when £1, £2 and £3 is sent respectively.
18The p-value of Fligner-Policello robust rank order test is 0.0001, 0.0136 and 0.0147
when £1, £2 and £3 is sent respectively.
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also learn about how much their opponents return given the amount they
sent. The evidence suggests that trustees with trustor experience and feed-
back information send significantly less than those who do not. Experience
together with feedback information provides a strong drive for trustees to
lower their level of trustworthiness.
This shows that feedback from, not simply experience of, playing the
opposite role is the main reason for the reduction of the amount returned
by the trustee.19
One possible explanation for the above result is that learning about
how other subjects as trustees behave gives subjects a reference point of
how they should behave in that role, and therefore lower the amounts that
they return.
The bottom panel of Table 3.3 describes the trustor’s stated beliefs
about the amount that the trustee will return to her. As explained earlier,
the trustor states a probability distribution over the different amounts that
can be returned given the amount that she sent (rather than stating a dif-
ferent probability distribution over the feasible outcomes for each of the
amounts that she could send).
Subjects’ beliefs revealed that they as trustors expect to receive on av-
erage (across treatments) 117.5% of the amount sent to the trustee. Having
prior experience as trustee lowers the fraction of the amount sent to the
trustee that the trustor expects to be returned, 104.3% vs. 123.9% (for the
subjects who do not have experience). Receiving feedback in the role of a
trustee has no effect on the subsequent beliefs that subjects state in the role
of trustor.
Overall the data shows, that the trustor’s stated beliefs overestimate
(117.5% versus the 91.9% actually returned by the trustee) the amount
19In our design, we cannot explicitly identify the effect on behaviour of receiving feed-
back from playing the opposite role, since it is necessary for players to experience play-
ing that role in order to get that feedback. Nevertheless, by comparing the fraction of
the amount received that is returned between the GACef and GACenf subjects, we find
that the feedback variable is what explains the change in behaviour; GACef subjects send
about 9% less than GACenf subjects.
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returned by the trustee, and this is true regardless of whether or not sub-
jects have have prior experienced as a trustee.20 However, experience as a
trustee moves the subject’s beliefs as a trustor somehow closer to the actual
behaviour of the trustee.21
3.5 Expected-Norm Consistency
In this section, we present our main findings. First, we investigate, sepa-
rately for each role, the relationship between a subject’s behaviour in one
role and the beliefs she states about how others would play that role when
she plays the opposite role, which we call expected norm consistency. We
then examine the implications of behaviour that is expected norm con-
sistent in both roles and expected profit seeking behaviour in the role of
trustor. Next, we use simulations to determine the benefits and costs of
being expected norm consistent when playing subjects who are also con-
sistent vs. subjects who are not. Last, we examine which variables explain
subjects’ expected norm consistent behaviour.
For trustors who send X , we use trustor’s stated beliefs to compute the
amount that the trustor expects to be returned and refer to it as yX .22 We
use trustee’s stated belief to compute the amount the trustee expects the
trustor to send and refer to it as x.
We now examine the relationship between a subject’s behaviour in one
role and the beliefs she states about how others would play that same role
when she plays the opposite role. We check whether a subject in a role
behaves in a way that is consistent with her expected norm of how others
would behave in that same role, which we call Expected-Norm Consistent
20This goes against the underestimation implied by trustrors’ (monetary unincen-
tivized) beliefs in Tu and Bulte (2010) (95.1%) and by trustors’ point estimated monetary
incentivised beliefs for the different subgroups who played quite different trust games
from ours in Garbarino and Slonim (2009) (range between 70.0% and 74.8% ).
21Similar effects have been observed in the ultimatum game where playing the respon-
der role first helps the proposer better predict the responder’s behaviour.
22Subjects who send zero are not asked to complete this task, since the only possible
amount to be returned is 0, i.e. for them yX = 0.
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behaviour. We apply this notion of consistency separately for trust- and
trustworthiness-related behaviour.
Definition 3.1. A subject’s trust behaviour is expected-norm consistent if
the amount she sends, as a trustor, X , is greater than or equal to the amount
she expects to receive from another subject playing the trustor role when
she plays the role of a trustee, x, (i.e., if X ≥ x).
Definition 3.2. A subject’s trustworthiness behaviour is expected-norm
consistent if the amount she returns when she receives 3X , YX is greater
than or equal to the amount she expects to be returned when she sends X ,
yX , (i.e. YX ≥ yX ).
In our data the level of trust consistency is much higher than the trust-
worthiness consistency, 60.7% (182/300) vs. 50.3% (151/300).23
Subjects’ coarse beliefs24might have a negative effect on the consis-
tency rates on either role. For some inconsistent subjects, their behaviour
in one role and the expected value of the beliefs they state about how oth-
ers would behave in the same role differs by less than £0.1. If we were
to ascribe these small differences (i.e., < £0.1) to the effect of subjects’
stated beliefs being coarse and classify subjects for whom the differences
are small as consistent, the consistency rates go up by fewer than five per-
centage points in either role. This difference is all driven by the feed-
back treatment, where the consistency rates are 62.0% (93/150) vs. 45.3%
(68/150).25
An explanation for the feedback treatment’s difference is that experi-
ence and feedback lower the level of trustworthiness consistency (espe-
cially for groups A and C), but has no significant effect on the level of trust
consistency. 26
23These figures assume that the subjects who send £0 are trustworthiness consistent.
When we exclude them from the analysis because they were not asked to state their beliefs,
the level of trustworthiness consistency is 44.0% (117/266).
24We look at the last digit of subjects’ stated beliefs and confirm that they are coarse.
In total, subjects in our experiment stated 2780 beliefs in percentage number and 96.25%
of them have two decimal places with the second digit being 0 or 5. 74.67% of the stated
beliefs are either 0 or have only one decimal place. (18.81% of the stated beliefs are 0.)
25In the no-feedback treatment the difference is small, 59.3% (89/150) vs. 55.3%
(83/150).
26An alternative explanation is that 44.7% of the trustors (those who send £2 and £3)
state beliefs about a larger number of outcomes (7 or 9 outcomes) than the trustees do
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Now we look at the effect of feedback and the order effect of choosing
an action in one role and stating the beliefs in the opposite role on the
consistency of trust and trustworthiness. There is no feedback effect or an
order effect (of choosing an action in one role and stating the beliefs in the
opposite role) on the trustor-consistency, but such effects are significant on
the trustee-consistency. The proportion of trustee-consistency subjects is
much higher in group B than that in groups A and C (64.0% vs. 43.5%,
across both treatments, and the p− value of Fisher’s exact test is 0.001).
Such difference is mainly due to the difference in the feedback treatment
(where the proportions are 64.0% vs. 36.0%, the p− value of Fisher’s
exact test is 0.002), while in the no-feedback treatment, such difference
less prominent (64.0% vs. 51.0%, the p− value of Fisher’s exact test is
0.164).
Among the four different groups, GACef, GBef, GACenf and GBenf,
GACef has the lowest trustworthiness consistency level. There is a signifi-
cant difference in the trustworthiness consistency level between subjects in
GACef and GACenf (the p−value of Fisher’s exact test is 0.046). We also
observe significant difference between GACef and GBef. The difference
between each of the above pairs is whether subjects get feedback informa-
tion before playing the trustee’s role. Our conclusion is that the feedback
information about trustees behaviour has a negative impact on the trustee-
consistency level.
There is no significant correlation between a subject’s trustor and trust-
worthiness consistency (φ = 0.008). This means that the percentage of
subjects who are expected norm consistent in both roles is close to the
product of the consistency rates in the two different roles, i.e., 30.3%. The
right column of Table 3.4 reports the number of subjects across the two
treatments who are consistent in either role, in both role and in neither
role.
(always 4 outcomes). The trustworthiness consistency level for subjects who send £1 is
36.4%. Although they also report probability distributions over 4 possible outcomes as
the trustees do, their trustworthiness consistency level is still much lower than their own
trust consistency level (41.7%). This is evidence that this explanation cannot account for
the difference between the trust and trustworthiness consistency levels.
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TABLE 3.4: Number of Consistent and Expected Profit Seeking Subjects
Consistent
in role
Feedback Treat. No-Feedback Treat.
Total
EPS Not-EPS Sum EPS Not-EPS Sum
Neither 27 2 29 27 2 29 58
Trustor 41 12 53 26 12 38 91
Trustee 23 5 28 26 6 32 60
Both 22 18 40 30 21 51 91
Total 113 37 150 109 41 150 300
3.5.1 Trustor’s Expected Profit Seeking behaviour
We say that a subject as a trustor is an expected profit seeker (EPS) if the
amount she expects to be returned to her (yX ) is greater than or equal to
the amount she sends to the trustee (X), i.e. yX ≥ X .27 In our data 74.0%
(75.3% in the feedback treatment, and 72.7% in the no-feedback treatment)
of the subjects behave in this fashion.28
We find that having received feedback from playing the trustee’s role
has no effect on a subject’s expected seeking behaviour as a trustor.29 As
discussed earlier subjects who have the experience of playing the trustee’s
role before the trustor’s role (group B) expect lower amounts (which is
indeed more accurate) to be returned by the trustee than subjects who do
not have such experience (groups A and C). However, since such subjects
do not lower the amounts they send as trustors, they end up being expected
27In our design, we cannot determine whether a subject’s decision as a trustor max-
imises her expected monetary earnings since we do not the elicit beliefs about how much
money the trustee would return for every possible amount that the trustor could send.
Interestingly, no design of the experimental studies so far can answer this question.
28In line with the expectation interpretation of trust see Gambetta (2000) and James
(2002) for general discussion of trust and expectation. Studies that elicit trustors’ ex-
pectations on the possible amount returned, for example, Garbarino and Slonim (2009),
Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007), Sapienza et al. (2013), Tu and Bulte (2010), all find
a positive correlation between trustors’ actual amount sent and expected amount returned.
The behaviour of trust could be partly explained by the expectation of others’ trustworthi-
ness.
29There is no significant difference in the proportion of EPS subjects between the
GACef (81%) and GACenf (77%) (p=0.603 for Fisher’s exact test) or between GBef
(64%) and GBenf (64%)(p=1.000 for Fisher’s exact test).
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profit seekers (statistically significantly) less often than group A and C
subjects, 64.0% vs. 79.0%.30
For a subject who is both trust and trustworthiness expected norm con-
sistent and is also an expected profit seeker as a trustor, the following in-
equalities hold, YX ≥ yX ≥ X ≥ x, where the middle inequality imposes
expected profit seeking behaviour in the role of trustor. Note that these in-
equalities imply YX ≥ X , i.e., that the subject in the role of a trustee when
sent the amount she sends as a trustor, must return no less than that amount.
In such case, her opponent will profit from her behaviour. We find these
inequalities only hold for about 1/6th of the subjects.
3.5.2 The Benefits and Costs of Expected-Norm Consis-
tency
In this part we look at whether it is profitable to be expected norm consis-
tent when playing against different opponents.
We first summarise the payoff data from the experiment. Consistent
trustors send significantly more than inconsistent trustors (£1.91 vs. £0.77,
p-value for a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test is less than 0.0001).
Meanwhile, consistent trustees return significantly more in total for all pos-
sible amounts sent than inconsistent trustees: £7.74 (excluding all subjects
who send £0 as trustors, because these are not asked for their beliefs; £6.64
if including those) vs. £4.60; p-value for a Fligner-Policello robust rank
order test is less than 0.0001.
Based on the basic characterisation, there is a substantial number of
inconsistent subjects. When the proportion of inconsistent subjects is rel-
atively big, subjects risk their payoffs by being consistent, because the in-
consistent subjects send less as trustors and return less as trustees than the
consistent subjects. We analyse this by first looking as the real payoff data
and then the simulation results.
30Fisher’s exact test result show that the hypothesis for equal proportion of EPS sub-
jects in GACnenf and GB (pooled data of GBenf and GBef) is rejected at p=0.008.
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TABLE 3.5: Simulated result for payoffs
(between consistent/inconsistent trustors and trustees)
trustee
Con Incon
trustor
Con 3.24, 3.57 2.54, 4.27
Incon 3.03, 1.51 2.75, 1.79
TABLE 3.6: Simulated payoffs for different combinations of expected
norm consistency at subject level
Combinations
Consistent in Trust YES YES NO NO
Consistent in Trustworthiness YES NO YES NO
Payoffs
as trustor 3.63 2.39 2.95 2.80
as trustee 3.38 4.24 0.96 2.41
Total 7.01 6.63 3.91 5.21
Through out all the sessions and treatments (after random pairing and
random selection of the pairing) , consistent trustors earn on average £2.80,
while inconsistent trustors earn slightly more at an average of £2.86.31
Consistent trustees earn on average £2.66 which is significantly (p= 0.0081
for a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test) less than the £3.22 earned by
the inconsistent trustees.
It is worth finding out what is the earning for the pair when they are
both consistent in two roles comparing with those who are both inconsis-
tent in both roles. Consistent pairs earn on average £1.25 more than incon-
sistent pairs (£5.50 vs. £6.75). Given that the trust consistent subjects send
more than trust inconsistent subjects, it is key to have a larger pie to divide
between both players.
Next, we analyse the payoff based on a large simulated sample in or-
der to see how being consistent pays. We randomly draw (with immediate
31The difference is not significant with p-value of a Fligner-Policello robust rank order
test equals to 0.7265. The difference when they play against consistent or inconsistent
trustees is not big with the highest average of £3, when inconsistent trustors play against
consistent trustees, and lowest at £2.62, when consistent trustors play against inconsistent
trustees.
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replacement) 10,000 subjects’ play as trustors and trustees from the consis-
tent and inconsistent categories and match them to calculate each subject’s
payoff in each role.
First of all, the best scenario for trustors (with average payoff of £3.24)
is to be consistent as trustor and play against inconsistent trustee. On the
other hand, for trustees, they get the highest payoff (£4.27) when they
are inconsistent as a trustee, but their opponents are consistent as trustor.
The lowest payoff in each role is achieved by being consistent and playing
against inconsistent opponent.32
In Table 3.6, we report the simulated payoffs when all players are of
the same kind and they play among themselves.33 Interpreting along the
line of Kant’s “categorical imperative” , it means that a player’s expected
norm consistency principle is adopted as a maxim by the population, but
in relative terms, that is each player in the population treat other people
according to one’s own expected norm.
We randomly draw 30 subjects from certain consistent categories and
divide them into three groups. Subjects from each group play the game
once in each role against one of the other two groups. The payoff of a sub-
ject is the sum of payoffs in playing both roles. Payoffs of 10 subjects from
one of the three groups are recorded as 10 observations. This procedure is
repeated 1000 times to generate 10,000 observations. Comparing the av-
erage of these 10,000 observations from different consistency categories
gives the following results.
The trustor-consistent and trustee-consistent population comes first,
they could earn on average £7.01 for playing the two roles. Next comes the
trustor-consistent and trustee-inconsistent subjects, their average earning is
32Analysis from a subject level confirms the above results. When we look at a subjects’
consistency in both roles as a whole when they play the two roles, the highest earning
subjects are consistent as trustor but inconsistent as trustee while their opponent are con-
sistent as both trustor and trustee. They could expect to earn on average £8.23. Subject
who are consistent in trustor and trustee get the lowest payoff when they face opponents
who are inconsistent as trustor and consistent as trustee. They earn on average £3.45.
33In Table 3.5, the consistent trustor is not necessarily trustworthiness consis-
tent(inconsistent), while in Table 3.6, subjects are characterised according to both trust
and trustworthiness consistency. This means that the pools from which the strategies are
randomly drawn is different.
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£6.63, which is not significantly lower than the top population.The both in-
consistent subjects population comes the third with the average earning of
£5.21; it is significantly lower than the top two populations. The worst situ-
ation as we have mentioned is when the subjects are all trustor-inconsistent
and trustee-consistent. They earn on average only £3.91.
Subjects who send more are more likely to be consistent as trustor,
thus creating a bigger pie between the pair. Inconsistent trustees generally
return less thus keeping more for themselves. The general welfare of the
population largely depends on the amount sent by the trustors, which is
why trust is considered as a social capital. Trustworthiness is important in
determining the distribution of the total welfare. When the environment
is kind, that is when subjects are consistent as trustor and trustee, their
payoffs are the highest.
3.5.3 Regression Analysis
In this section, we present parametric analysis to identify which variables
influence the amount sent by the trustor, the sum of the amounts returned
of the trustee’s strategy (∑Return) and the trustor’s and trustee’s Expected-
Norm consistency.
We start with the first two regressions whose results we present in
Table 3.7. We include the variables Experience and Feedback to check
whether experience of playing the opposite role and receiving feedback in
that role influence either the amount sent by the trustor and/or the sum of
the amounts returned of the trustee’s strategy. We also include variables
that relate to the beliefs that a subject states both as a trustor and as a
trustee. The variable Expected Sent Amount (ESA) by Trustor is calcu-
lated based on the probability distribution a subject states as a trustee over
the possible amounts sent by the trustor. The variable Expected Returned
Fraction of Amount Sent (ERF) is the ratio between a trustor’s expected
amount returned by the trustee and the trustor’s amount sent. This variable
varies between 0, when the trustor expects nothing to be returned, and 3,
when she expects the whole tripled amount to be returned. We also include
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TABLE 3.7: Ordered Probit Regression on the Trustor’s Transfer and
Tobit Regression on the Trustee’s Sum of Amounts Returned (∑Return)
(1) (2)
Trustor Trustee
Transfer ∑Return
Experience 0.064 (0.43) -0.605 (1.44)
Feedback 0.026 (0.19) -1.169 (3.05)**
Expected Sent Amount 0.916 (5.74)** 2.706 (6.66)**
Expected Returned Fraction 1.04 (6.17)** 1.900 (4.28)**
Decision Time 0.004 (2.66)** 0.006 (2.38)*
Male 0.074 (0.51) 0.114 (0.26)
Quant. Major -0.040 (0.28) 0.250 (0.59)
British 0.374 (2.55)* -0.233 (0.55)
Trust People -0.012 (0.14) -0.335 (1.27)
Others’ Feelings 0.073 (0.76) 0.309 (1.18)
Take Advantage 0.039 (0.44) 0.166 (0.64)
Helpful People 0.089 (1.17) -0.083 (0.37)
# Observations 288 288
* (**) significant at 5% (1%);
Absolute value of z statistics (regression 1) or t statistics (regression 2)in brackets;
Subjects who did not complete the questionnaire are excluded from the regressions.
TABLE 3.8: Probit regression on Trustor’s and Trustee’s Expected-Norm
Consistency
(3) (4)
Trustor Trustee
Experience -0.134(1.81) Experience -0.184 (2.81)**
Feedback 0.005 (0.07) Feedback -0.064 (1.01)
Amount Sent 0.608 (8.69)** ∑Return 0.045 (4.27)**
Decision Time 0.000 (0.47) Decision Time 0.000 (0.25)
Male -0.028 (0.39) Male 0.143 (2.11)*
Quant. Major -0.057 (0.77) Quant. Major -0.100 (1.48)
British 0.090 (1.30) British 0.032 (0.46)
Trust People 0.019 (0.40) Trust People -0.070 (1.68)
Others’ Feelings -0.026 (0.53) Others’ Feelings -0.011 (0.26)
Take Advantage -0.38 (0.84) Take Advantage 0.010 (0.26)
Helpful People -0.067 (1.72) Helpful People 0.021 (0.61)
Obs 288 Obs 288
Coefficients are marginal effects; * (**) significant at 5% (1%);
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets;
Subjects who did not complete the questionnaire are excluded from the regressions.
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the Decision Time (the amount of time a subject spent on making the de-
cision that appears as the dependent variable in the regression), a series of
demographic variables and answers to social attitude questions.34
Regression (1) shows that experience in the role of trustee and receiv-
ing feedback when playing that role do not influence the amount the trustor
sends. This confirms the earlier non-parametric analysis. As in the previ-
ous literature, we find that trustor’s expectation about the amount returned
by the trustee has a positive effect on the amount that she sends. Regres-
sion (1) also shows that the amount a trustor sends is greater the larger the
amount she expects other subjects to send her if she were the trustee. This
is a novel finding of our study. Decision Time is also highly significant
but with a small effect. The longer the trustor takes to decide the more she
sends.
Regression (2) shows that receiving feedback when playing the role of
trustor influences the sum of the amounts the trustee returns as in the earlier
non-parametric analysis. Another novel finding of our study is that the sum
of the amounts a trustee returns is greater the larger the amount she expects
others to send her. We also find that trustee’s expectation about the amount
returned by the others if she were a trustor have a positive effect on the sum
34The demographic variables includes: Male, which takes value 1 if a subject is a male
and 0 otherwise; Quant. Major, which takes value of 1 if a subjects study a quantitative
major such as Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Economics, and 0 otherwise; British,
which takes value 1 if a subject’s nationality is UK and 0 otherwise.
The variables that describe the answers to the attitudinal questions are the following.
Trust People, which represents the answer to the question “Would you say that most peo-
ple can be trusted?”, takes value of 1 if a subject choose the answer “Most people can be
trusted”; −1 for the answer “Most people cannot be trusted”; 0 for the answer “I don’t
know”. Others’ feelings, which represents the answer to the question “In a situation of
conflict, to what extent does the thought of how others will feel about your decision affect
it?”, takes value of 2 if a subject answers “It significantly affects my decision”; 1 if a
subject choose the answer “It has only a small effect on my decision”; −1 for the answer
“It does not affect my decision at all”; 0 for the answer “I don’t know”. Take Advantage,
which represents the answer to the question “Do you think most people would try to take
advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”, takes value of 1 if a
subject choose the answer “They would try to be fair”;−1 for the answer “They would try
to take advantage”; 0 for the answer “I don’t know”. Helpful People, which represents the
answer to the question “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or
that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?”, takes value of 1 if a subject choose
the answer “They try to be helpful”; −1 for the answer “They mostly just look out for
themselves”; 0 for the answer “I don’t know”.
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of the amounts she returns. The longer the trustee takes to decide the more
she returns.
All demographic variables and the answers to all the social attitude
questions are not significant in regression (1) and (2), except that British
subjects send a higher amount as trustors.
To further explore which factors influence Expected-Norm Consistency,
we run separate probit regression for each role. See Table 3.8. We use the
same explanatory variables as in the previous two regressions, but drop
the two expectation variables and add the amount sent by the trustor in
the trustor’s expected-norm consistency regression and add the sum of the
amounts returned by the trustee in the trustee’s expected-norm consistency
regression.
The amount sent is only statistically significant variable in regression
(3). The larger the amount the subject sends as a trustor, the more likely
she is expected-norm consistent in the role of trustor. Regression (4) shows
that the experience of playing the role of trustor has a positive effect on the
expected-norm consistency of trustee. The larger the sum of the amounts
returned, the higher probability for the subject to be expected-norm con-
sistent as a trustee.
None of the demographic variables and the answers to all the social
attitude questions are significant in regression (3) and (4), except that male
subjects are more likely to be expected-norm consistent trustees.
3.6 Conclusion
One important lesson to learn from the previous studies of the trust game
is that trust and trustworthiness are very sensitive to the experimental envi-
ronment. The expectation of what other people would do have an important
effect on how people behave. The background of subjects and what infor-
mation they receive before and during the game can dramatically change
the results.
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The study of the Expected Norm in strategic interactions is relatively
new comparing to the extensive literature on the trust game. Here we find
ourselves in examining a complex relationship between people’s expecta-
tion of how others would do in the opposite role and their own behaviour
in that role. We interpret people’s expectation of what others do as the Ex-
pected Norm. The question is whether people’s own behaviour conforms
to their expected norm.
We find that more than half of the subjects are consistent with their
expected norm, while the level is higher when they are in the trustor’s role
than in the trustee’s role. Trustees, as the second mover, are more likely to
violate their expected norm.
Second, experience of playing in the trustor’s role has a negative effect
on consistency in the trustee’s role. The experience of playing the game
as a trustor significantly reduces the level of being consistent as a trustee,
while whether getting feedback or not from playing the trustor’s role does
not have a further effect on the consistency level.
Third, consistent trustors and trustees get the highest payoff overall
when they play the game against each other. The result also sends out the
positive message that in a society with consistent trustors and trustees, the
overall welfare is higher than in other cases.
Chapter 4
Let Them Vote!–An
Experimental Study of the Public
Goods Game1
4.1 Introduction
The provision of public goods relies on cooperation among agents who
face a conflict between self-interest and social welfare. Neoclassical eco-
nomic theory and game theory predict that such dilemma typically leads to
under-provision of the public goods and loss of efficiency. Experimental
studies, however, have found that people do voluntarily contribute to pub-
lic goods. The average contribution rates range from 40% to 60% (of the
initial endowment), and they typically decline over time as the interaction
is repeated (Ledyard, 1995).
Both theoretical and experimental research have expanded tremendously
over the past decades in the direction of identifying possible ways to solve
the free-riding problem and to improve efficiency. One possible way around
this “classical conundrum” (as Bowles, 2006, prefers to call the social
1This chapter is based on the joint work with Yukihiko Funaki and Ro´bert F. Veszteg,
Public-goods game with endogenous institution formation: Experimental evidence on the
effect of the voting rule.
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dilemma) is to create and rely on institutions that enforce high contribu-
tion levels. Most of the theoretical analysis is set in the context of the
international environmental agreements (IEAs) negotiation, and in the pro-
posed models, participants first decide whether or not to participate in an
institution which forces its members to contribute to the public goods at
a level decided collectively. Non-members can decide how much to con-
tribute on their own. Theoretical results suggest that there is no substantial
efficiency gain from this mechanism (Barrett, 1994; Hoel, 1992; Carraro
and Siniscalco, 1993). The reason is that if an institution was to maximize
the joint benefits of its members, it would require the highest possible level
of contribution to public-goods provision from its members. Therefore,
only a relatively small institution would be formed on a voluntary basis,
and participants would have a strong incentive to free-ride.
These pessimistic conclusions seem to have also been reflected in real-
life IEAs negotiations among countries. Agreement is typically hampered
by the facts that too many countries are trying to agree on a too ambitious
contribution level. More often than not, the negotiation breaks down with-
out significantly improvement in efficiency.
Contrary to the pessimism from theoretical models, experimental re-
sults show that people are willing to form institutions and provide public
goods if the institution is sufficiently large. Consequently, there does exist
a real chance for significant improvement on the efficiency level as com-
pared to the non-cooperative status-quo (Kosfeld et al., 2009, Burger and
Kolstad, 2009).
In this paper, we focus on a mechanism of voluntary institution forma-
tion with a relatively large group of participants. We also aim to find out
how the institution-formation mechanism works under different decision
protocols, so we analyse the unanimity voting rule or the plurality/major-
ity voting rule. Even if Kosfeld et al. (2009) report promising experimental
results where the implemented institution would often include all partici-
pants (4 in each group), our conjecture is that in a large group it is more
difficult to form a grand coalition. Moreover, comparing to the plurality
rule, the unanimity rule is more demanding at the implementation stage,
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which makes it less likely for the initiated institution to be implemented.
One simple way to increase the chances of reaching an agreement is to re-
place the unanimity voting rule with the plurality/majority rule. However,
that could come at the price of a relatively low participation and initiation
rate, and consequently, in a smaller institution.
Experimental studies of institution formation are relatively new, few
and inconclusive. Beside the rather optimistic message sent by Kosfeld et
al. (2009), there is also experimental evidence suggesting that allowing
institution members to propose a binding minimum contribution level gen-
erates only a marginal efficiency gain. However, if joining the institution is
not a voluntary decision but it is forced exogenously on all participants, the
efficiency gain can be substantial (Dannenberg et al., 2010; Dannenberg et
al., 2014). On the other hand, and similarly to our results, changing the
threshold of the number of institution members required to determine the
binding minimum contribution level (from simple majority to 34 ) does not
change the overall efficiency level. It simply shows a trade-off between the
participation rate and contribution level inside the institution (Dannenberg,
2014).
Our experimental design is based on the one presented and analysed
by Kosfeld et al. (2009). Participants first voluntarily decide whether to
join an institution. If more than one person decides to do so, a collective
decision has to be made about the contribution level that the institution will
impose on all of its members. Different from Kosfeld et al. (2009), our de-
sign uses the plurality/majority voting rule when members decide whether
the institution should be formed and if yes with which required contribution
level. Also, in our main treatment members, in order to balance participa-
tion rate and contribution level (i.e., successful institution formation), we
allowed participants to vote for three different possibilities: to dissolve the
institution, to form the institution and to require a 50% contribution rate,
and to form the institution and to require a 100% contribution rate. This
choice has been inspired by some theoretical analysis of trade-off between
the participation rate and the required contribution level inside the institu-
tion (Barrett, 2002; Finus and Maus, 2008). The idea is that by lowering
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the required contribution level an institution might be able to attract more
participants to join, which then would lead to a higher efficiency level.
In our experimental study, we find that, as compared to the volun-
tary institution-formation mechanism with unanimity rule, the plurality/-
majority rule induces a lower participation rate, but makes it easier to
reach an agreement and to form an institution. Interestingly these op-
posing effects cancel each other out, which makes it impossible to rank
the two voting rules by contribution levels or efficiency. As for the ob-
served institution size, in line with Burger and Kolstad (2009) who show
that the grand coalition is rarely formed in large groups, we argue that it
is closer to the minimum efficient institution size than to the size of the
grand coalition. Meanwhile, note that comparison across papers is rather
difficult, because for example Dannenberg (2014) does not use the “tradi-
tional” voluntary-contribution mechanism, but relies on a model from the
coalition-formation literature (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994).
Also, in her case, the institution determines a binding minimum contribu-
tion level, not the contribution level. Nevertheless, the main message is
clear, which says a less demanding voting rule combining with less strin-
gent contribution requirements in the institution does not affect the overall
efficiency but only results in a tradeoff between the institution size and the
implementation rate.
Besides the trade-off of institution formation, the change of mecha-
nism also leads to a significant impact on the contribution levels of players
outside the institutions. While under the unanimity rule, players outside
the institution (or all the players when no institution is formed) normally
choose to free-ride, with the plurality rule, those players still contribute a
considerable amount of their endowments. We also show that experience
in general, whether playing the game within a same or a different group
significantly lower the efficiency level.
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4.2 Theoretical Predictions
Our experimental design is based on a simple linear public-goods game in
which a group of n(≥ 2) people are required to decide individually how
much money they contribute to a public good and how much money they
keep for themselves from an initial endowment of w(> 0) monetary units.
Given the complete list of contributions (g1,g2, · · · ,gn), agent i’s mon-
etary payoff can be written as
pii(g1, · · · ,gn) = w−gi+a
n
∑
j=1
g j, (4.1)
where a is the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from contributing to the
public good. Note that whenever a < 1, contributing zero to the public
good is a dominant strategy for each player. Also, as long as 1n < a, the
group would do better if everybody contributed the entire initial endow-
ment. With other words, for 1n < a < 1, the above game has a unique
Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies where each player contributes
zero, while the welfare-maximizing strategy profile is when everybody
contributes the entire initial endowment.
The public-goods game with institution formation is a multi-stage game
based on the previously described game. People first express their willing-
ness to form an institution that later in the contribution stage will enforce
the jointly-determined contribution level.
• Participation stage: Agents simultaneously and independently an-
nounce whether they are willing to join an institution which, in the
last stage, is going to force its member to make a certain level of con-
tribution (to be determined in the second stage). Agents who choose
to join are called members; those who choose not to join are called
non-members.
• Implementation stage: Members are informed about the total num-
ber of members, and they are asked to vote simultaneously in order
to decide the contribution level that the institution is going to enforce
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in the final stage. Note that members will not be allowed to deviate
(positively or negatively) from the chosen contribution level. There
are three possibilities to be considered in the institution:
1. Project 0: the institution is dissolved,
2. Project 12 : each member contributes half of the initial endow-
ments, and
3. Project 1: each member contributes the entire initial endow-
ment.
The decision in the institution is based on the plurality rule, that is
the project that receives the most number of votes is going to be
implemented. All members must comply with the decision which in
case of projects 12 and 1 is costly. Costs are shared equally among
the members of the institution.
• Contribution stage: If the institution is not dissolved in the imple-
mentation stage, all its members must make a contribution accord-
ing to the chosen project. Non-members, after being informed of the
size of the institution, decide individually how much to contribute
to the public good. If the institution is not implemented (i.e., it is
dissolved), all agents decide their contribution individually and si-
multaneously.
Note that this game is essentially identical to the one introduced and
studied by Kosfeld et al. (2009). The only difference is that in our design
participants use the plurality rule (instead of unanimity) to reach a deci-
sion in the institution and they have three projects to choose from. Also
the game-theoretical analysis presented below follows closely the one by
Kosfeld et al. (2009).
In order to write agent i’s final payoff pii, let S be the set of players who
are members of the institution, s the size of the institution (s = |S|), and
c≥ 0 the cost of enforcing project 12 or project 1. If project 0 is chosen, we
say that the institution is not implemented and consider S to be empty, so
s = 0.
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If S 6= /0, i.e. the institution is implemented, then agent i’s payoff is
given by
pii =
{
w−gi+a∑nj=1 g j− cs if i ∈ S
w−gi+a∑nj=1 g j if i /∈ S
. (4.2)
Note that by joining the institution, members commit to comply with the
decision made collectively in the institution. Members’ contribution level
is determined by the chosen project, while non-members’ is determined
outside the institution, individually.
If S = /0, i.e. the institution is not implemented, then agent i’s payoff is
given by
pii = w−gi+a
n
∑
j=1
g j, (4.3)
where all contribution levels are determined individually.
Following the idea of backward induction, let us consider the subgames
that start in the contribution stage. Zero contribution is optimal for each
agent in the contribution stage if no institution is implemented (this sub-
game is identical to the public-goods games analyzed at the beginning of
this section). If the institution is implemented, members do not make deci-
sions in the final stage, their contribution level is determined in the previous
stage by the vote, while it is still optimal for non-members to contribute
zero.
A key insight of this model is that, although agents individually have
incentives to free-ride in the public-goods game that appear in the final
stage, they could increase joint and also individual payoffs by coordinating
their contributions with the help of implementing an institution. In equi-
librium, members earn asw− cs if the institution has been implemented and
project 1 has been chosen, and 12asw− cs if project 12 has been chosen. Due
to the incentives to free-ride in the contribution stage, everybody earns w
if no institution is implemented. Note that voting for project 12 is a weakly
dominated strategy for all members (dominated by voting for 1).
Kosfeld et al. (2009) consider institutions that make their decisions
based on unanimity, which implies that each vote is pivotal. The use of
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the unanimity rule instead of the plurality rule increases the set of equi-
libria of the game, because the change of a single member’s vote will not
always affect the collective decision inside the institution when the plural-
ity rule is used (e.g., when all the others vote for the same project). In what
follows, we are going to consider equilibria in weakly undominated strate-
gies. This implies that members are going to vote for project 1 as long as
the number of members s is such that
asw− c
s
≥ w. (4.4)
Solving for s gives the minimum institution size s∗ for members in the
implementation stage to vote for project 1 rather than project 0 to dissolve
the institution.
Kosfeld et al. (2009) show that for any number of members s there
exists a status-quo equilibrium in which no institution is implemented, be-
cause of the strong status-quo (i.e. project 0) bias of the unanimity rule.
Although the plurality rule is less biased towards the status quo, when at
all (and at least two) members vote for project 0 a single deviation can not
change the outcome. Therefore a similar no-institution equilibrium exists
in our game, too.
More importantly, there exist organizational equilibria in which an in-
stitution is implemented when s≥ s∗. Kosfeld et al. (2009) also show that
the institution-formation game has a unique strict subgame-perfect equilib-
rium in terms of the institution size. Strictness of the equilibrium requires
that player play a unique best-response strategy in the equilibrium, i.e. they
should be strictly worse off by deviating from the equilibrium strategy. In
such an equilibrium, exactly s∗ players become members of the institu-
tion.2
2“Strictness of equilibrium yields a clear-cut prediction regarding organisation size:
exactly the minimum number of players s∗ required for the organisation to be individually
profitable form the institution. Unless s∗ = n, players are thus divided into two proper
subsets: those who voluntarily implement the sanctioning institution, hence contributing
to the public good, and those who do not participate and do not contribute.” (Kosfeld et
al., 2009) As long as s−1 ≥ s∗, there will exist a player in S who can choose not to join
the institution and free-ride instead. Thus in equilibrium only institution of size equal to
s∗ will be implemented.
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In summary, by focusing on subgame-perfect Nash equilibria that are
strict in the participation stage and do not include undominated strategies
in the implementation stage, we expect that institutions of s∗ will be imple-
mented and that members will be required to contribute their entire initial
endowment, while non-members will contribute nothing.
4.3 Experimental Procedure
As discussed in there previous section, the core of our experimental study
is a ten-player (n=10) linear public-goods game with institution formation
adopted from Kosfeld et al. (2009). Five treatments have been designed
to explore the effect of different voting systems on contribution levels and
institution formation. A sample of the instructions that were used in the
experiment is in the Appendix.
In the baseline treatment, players (with initial endowments of 20 points
(w=20)) played the public-goods game with voluntary institution formation
and used the plurality rule to choose one among the three available public
projects inside the institution (PLU3).3 Participants were informed about
the number of people who decided to join the institution in the participation
stage. At least two participants were required to form an institution which
had a total cost of c = 2. In the implementation stage, members of the
institution had to decide whether to dissolve the institution and not to force
its member to contribute anything to the public good (Project 0), or to
force all its members to contribution exactly half of their initial endowment
(Project 12 : 10 points), or to force all its members to contribute their entire
initial endowment to the public good (Project 1: 20 points). Participants
did not incur the cost of forming the institution if Project 0 was chosen.
Players who had not joined the institution did not make any decisions at
the implementation stage and were not informed about the decision reached
by the members of the institution either. They (and also including those
who joined the institution if Project 0 was selected) were required to de-
cide how much to contribute to the public goods in the final, contribution
3In case of a tie, a project was randomly chosen from those that got the most votes.
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stage. The MPCR (a) from contributing to the public good was set to 0.4.
Note that, given these parameter values, the minimal institution size for
an organisational equilibrium, i.e. for members to vote for implementation
(rather than dissolution), is s∗ = 3.
Table 4.1 offers an overview of all our five treatments containing se-
quences of the above described game and/or its slightly modified versions.
• In treatment PLU3, participants played the PLU3 game in fixed groups
for 20 rounds.
• In treatment PLU3RS, participants first played the PLU3 game in
fixed groups for 20 rounds. Then, in newly assigned groups, they
played another 20 rounds of the PLU3 game.
• In treatment PLU3SUB, participants first played a subgame of the
PLU3 game for 40 rounds (in fixed groups for two sequences of 20
rounds). The subgame that they played was in which all participants
were exogenously forced to join the institution at the participation
stage of the game. The rest of the game was as in the original PLU3.
After round 40, participants were reassigned to groups and played
the PLU3 game for another 20 rounds.
• Treatment UNA consisted of two games. Game UNA3 is identical
to PLU3 except that the decision of the institution is made by the
unanimity voting rule. In game UNA2, the unanimity rule is applied
and only two projects (Project 0 and Project 1) are available. Note
that our UNA2 game replicates the Kosfeld et al. (2009) design, but
the group size is larger (10 people instead of 4). In this treatment,
participants played in fixed groups 20 rounds of the UNA3 game, and
in reassigned fixed groups another 20 rounds of the UNA2 game.
• The game in treatment MAJ2 differed from PLU3 only in that Project
1
2 was not available to the members of the institutions. This is why
the plurality rule got simplified into a majority rule.
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TABLE 4.1: Treatment summary
PLU3 PLU3RS PLU3SUB UNA MAJ2
# OF SESSIONS 1 1 2 2 1
GAMES PLU3 PLU3+PLU3 SUB+SUB+PLU3 UNA3+UNA2 MAJ2
# OF PARTICIPANTS 20 20 20 20 20
# OF GROUPS 2 2 2 2 2
# OF ROUNDS 20 20+20 20+20+20 20+20 20
# OF PLU3 OBS. 40 80 40 - -
20 subjects participated in each session and were randomly assigned
into two groups of ten. The experiment was computerized with zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and participants were not allowed to communicate with
each other.
We conducted one session of treatments PLU3, PLU3RS and MAJ2,
and two sessions of the treatments PLU3SUB and UNA. All the experi-
ments were run at the experimental laboratory at Waseda University (Tokyo,
Japan). In total, 140 subjects participated in our experiment. No one was
allowed to participate in more than one session. On average sessions lasted
around 90 minutes. Earnings accumulated during the experiments were
converted to Japanese yen at the rate of 2 points to 1 yen, and participants
earned around 1700 JPY (about $17 including show-up fee). Participants
were paid individually and privately at the end of the session.
4.4 Results
In the data analysis, we focus on the PLU3 game, i.e. the public-goods
game with voluntary institution formation under the plurality voting rule
with three available projects, but report results for all other game, too. The
statements and results are based on parametric statistical tests and are sig-
nificant at least at 5% significance level, unless stated otherwise.
Table 4.2 offers a detailed summary of our experimental results and
also shows the main findings from related works in the literature for com-
parison.
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It shows in the first panel of Table 4.2 that, in line with prior evidence,
overall initiation rates4 are close to 100% in all treatments with some fluc-
tuations and variations between initial (first five rounds) and final play (last
five rounds).
The implementation rate5 is presented in the second panel of Table 4.2.
From all the initiated institutions on average more than 50% get established
in all our treatment with one remarkable exception: in the UNA3 game, the
implementation rate is merely 12.5%. Just like in the other treatments, it
experiences a significant and important drop from when the first five peri-
ods are compared to the last five, but even during the initial round it (30%)
is located well below the comparable rates from other treatments. The
average institution is composed by 3-4 members in the treatments based
on the plurality and majority voting schemes, and by 5+ in the treatments
based on the unanimity rule. In the UNA3 game the institution size reached
a remarkable maximum of 8 members. (See the third panel of Table 4.2.)
We believe that the relatively large number of participants of the institution
and the additional available project made reaching a unanimous decision
very difficult, especially because communication was not allowed before
voting. We shall look into this results with the help of regression analysis
later.
The fourth panel of Table 4.2 describes the contribution level. The
overall contribution levels to the public good are around 30-40% of the ini-
tial endowment. They are constantly very high (roughly 90-100%) inside
the institution, and very low (10-30%) with a decreasing trend outside the
institution. Efficiency rates6 across treatments show a very similar picture,
given that they are computed with the help of group earnings and the cost
4The initiation rate is the proportion of groups (throughout the 20 rounds among all
groups) in which at least one participants decides to join the institution in the first stage
of the game.
5The implementation rate is the proportion of groups (throughout the 20 rounds among
all groups that initiated an institution) in which the members of the institution managed to
choose (with the help of the imposed voting scheme) a project other than Project 0.
6Following Kosfeld et al. (2009), the efficiency rate is defined as (∑ipiobserved −
∑ipimin)/(∑ipimax − ∑ipimin), where ∑ipiobserved denotes the observed group earnings,
∑ipimin is the theoretical minimum group earnings (200 in all our games), and ∑ipimax
is the theoretical maximum group earnings (800 in all our games).
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of forming an institution is relatively low in our games. See the last panel
of Table 4.2.
In sessions PLU3RS and PLU3SUB, participants were required to make
various decisions before playing the PLU3 game in the final 20 rounds.7
(See Table 4.1.) We refer to those results as experienced play even if the
experience that participants gained differed. We did not find any signifi-
cant difference in contribution levels or implementation rates when looking
at observations from those games (p = 0.9411 for the Wilcoxom-Mann-
Whitney test), therefore we pooled them for future analysis and we will
refer to them as from experienced play. Similarly, we pooled data from the
PLU3 session and the first 20 rounds of session PLU3RS under the name
of inexperienced play (p = 0.3252 for the Wilcoxom-Mann-Whitney test).
7In treatment PLU3RS, they played 20 rounds of the entire PLU3 game, and 2 sets
(groups reshuffled after each set) of 20 rounds of a subgame in the treatment PLU3SUB.
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TABLE 4.2: Summary of experimental results
PLU3
POOLED
PLU3
INEXP.
PLU3
EXP.
KOR UNA2 UNA3 BK MAJ2 BK
# OF OBSERVATIONS 200 80 120 220 80 80 80 40 80
GROUP SIZE 10 10 10 4 10 10 10 10 10
MPCR 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6
# OF PROJECTS 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
VOTING RULE PLU PLU PLU UNA UNA UNA MAJ MAJ MAJ
INITIATION RATE (%)
AVERAGE 96.00 91.25 99.17 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 90.00 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 1-5) 98.00 100.00 96.67 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 70.00 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 16-20) 92.00 80.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 - 100.00 -
IMPLEMENATION RATE (%)
AVERAGE 58.85 57.53 59.66 43.18 63.75 12.50 - 52.78 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 1-5) 71.43 75.00 68.97 - 80.00 30.00 - 42.86 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 16-20) 45.65 37.50 50.00 - 60.00 5.00 - 50.00 -
INSTITUTION SIZE
AVERAGE 3.69 3.71 3.67 3.85 5.24 5.00 3.50 3.32 5.06
MAXIMUM 7 6 7 4 8 8 6* 6 7*
AVERAGE (PERIODS 1-5) 3.97 3.67 4.20 - 5.81 5.00 - 3.00 -
MAXIMUM (PERIODS 1-5) 6 6 6 - 8 6 - 4 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 16-20) 3.38 3.50 3.33 - 4.50 8.00 - 3.00 -
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TABLE 4.2: Summary of experimental results (Continued)
MAXIMUM (PERIODS 16-20) 6 6 5 - 7 8 - 5 -
PLU3
POOLED
PLU3
INEXP.
PLU3
EXP.
KOR UNA2 UNA3 BK MAJ2 BK
CONTRIBUTION (% OF INIT. ENDOWMENT)
AVERAGE 35.66 42.43 31.14 53.00 37.45 26.56 38.40 29.31 57.90
AVERAGE (IN) 94.60 90.38 97.13 - 100.00 100.00 - 100.00 -
AVERAGE (OUT) 22.25 33.27 15.89 - 8.15 23.19 - 15.66 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 1-5) 47.45 55.63 42.00 - 50.25 43.10 - 32.70 -
AVERAGE (IN, PERIODS 1-5) 94.24 88.18 98.21 - 100.00 100.00 - 32.70 -
AVERAGE (OUT, PERIODS 1-5) 31.95 44.19 22.50 - 8.71 36.70 - 29.31 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 16-20) 24.53 27.20 22.75 - 30.50 13.38 - 23.35 -
AVERAGE (IN, PERIODS 16-20) 95.07 95.24 95.00 - 100.00 100.00 - 100.00 -
AVERAGE (OUT, PERIODS 16-20) 15.24 22.93 11.83 - 7.50 12.14 - 12.50 -
EFFICIENCY (%)
AVERAGE 35.47 42.25 30.94 51.00 37.24 25.11 - 29.15 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 1-5) 47.22 55.38 41.78 - 49.98 43.00 - 32.60 -
AVERAGE (PERIODS 16-20) 24.39 27.10 22.58 - 30.30 13.36 - 23.18 -
NOTE: PLU3 - all PLU3 games with or without experience; PLU3 inexp. - PLU3 games from the first 20 rounds in session PLU3RS; PLU3 exp. - PLU3 games
from the last 20 rounds in sessions PLU3RS and PLU3SUB; KOR - results from treatment IF40 in Kosfeld et al. (2009); BK - results from Burger and Kolstad
(2009). All variables are as defined in the main text.
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4.4.1 The Effect of the Voting Rule
In order to analyze the impact of the voting rule on decisions in the var-
ious stages of the game, it is desirable to control for the effect of other
variables such as experience, the number of available projects, etc. Table
4.3 reports odds-ratio estimates from logit models on institution-formation
and implementation decisions in the first two stages of the game, and coef-
ficient estimates from a linear-regression model on individual contribution
decisions in the last stage of the game. Note that all regressions exclude
observations from the PLU3SUB game, and in the case of implementation
observations are for groups, while in all the other cases they are for partici-
pants. This is why the number of observations differs radically in the third
numerical column of the table. Individual voting decisions will be ana-
lyzed later in the text. All the regressions that analyze individual decisions
incorporate a large number of control variables. They were created with
the help of the answers participants gave in the post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. Most of the questions are related to demographics and attitudes
towards cooperation and competition (refer to Appendix for details and the
complete list).8
As compared to the unanimity rule studied by Kosfeld et al. (2009), the
plurality/majority rule serves as a filtering device: only those who strongly
would like to form an institution join in the first stage given that it is rather
difficult to withdraw and abandon the institution later. The unanimity rule
completely eliminates the risk involved in the first-stage decision, because
each participant has veto power when deciding the future of the institution.
Kosfeld et al. (2009) report 100% initiation rate, and that is exactly what
we observe in our UNA2 and UNA3 games.
The odds ratios estimated for the PLU./MAJ. dummy, which captures
the effect of the voting rule, are not only highly significant, but also impor-
tant in their size. The use of the plurality/majority rule reduces the odds
8Although participants were required to report their major to an open-ended ques-
tion, we decided to use answer to the more specific questions about whether they studied
Economics, Micreoeconomics, or Game Theory instead. Also, due to problems of multi-
collinearity we excluded the variable related to membership in associations (and student
circles), given that all of the participants reported to be a member of at least one.
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of joining to somewhere between a quarter and a half of the odds other-
wise.9 At the same time, it also makes the odds of successfully forming
an institution is almost 30 times larger. (See Regressions (1)–(3).) These
results are consistent with the column-to-column average comparisons that
we described above based on the numbers in Table 4.2. It is still remark-
able that the average initiation rate is at least 90% in all our games in spite
of the risk of having to follow the majority even if one does not agree to its
decision.
As for the end result, i.e. contribution levels and realised efficiency, the
use of the plurality/majority voting rule does not constitute a significant
change. (See Regressions (4) and (5).) The negative impact of the plural-
ity/majority voting rule on the first-stage joining decisions and its positive
impact on successful institution formation practically entirely cancel each
other out. The following subsections look further into the details of the
observed joining, voting and contributing behavior in order to disentangle
the impact of our treatment variables (voting rule, number of projects, and
experience).
4.4.2 Institution Formation
The numbers in Table 4.3 indicate a significant, but rather small negative
time trend in all decisions, i.e. as time goes by - on average - participants
are less likely to join, institutions are less likely to be formed and con-
tributions are likely to decrease (refer to the PERIOD row in Table 4.3).
We interpret these effects as the result of getting to know one’s interacting
partners and their behavior better. That is one kind of experience which
is different from the effect of getting to know the rules of the game bet-
ter. The latter (captured by the EXPERIENCE regressor) does not seem to
matter for the joining decision in the first stage, but it does make the imple-
mentation of the institution significantly more likely (it induces a threefold
increase in the odds). It also reduces the contribution level significantly
by roughly 1.75 points. This effect might look surprising at the first sight,
9The difference between the two logit regression for joining decision is that the second
includes some lagged variables among its regressors.
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TABLE 4.3: Regression analysis of strategic behavior (institution forma-
tion and contribution)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
JOIN JOIN FORMED CONTR. CONTR.
LOGIT, OR LOGIT, OR LOGIT, OR OLS OLS
PERIOD 0.9833∗∗∗ 0.9731∗∗∗ 0.9576∗∗ -0.1613∗∗∗ -0.1987∗∗∗
PLU./MAJ. 0.2580∗∗∗ 0.4944∗∗∗ 28.4223∗∗∗ -0.0841 0.0649
EXPERIENCE 1.0310 0.8809 3.1547∗∗∗ -1.7467∗∗∗ -2.4549∗∗∗
# OF PROJECTS 1.5168∗∗∗ 1.2071 0.2165∗∗∗ 0.7080∗∗∗ 0.8811∗∗∗
JOIN (LAG1) 7.3328∗∗∗
JOIN (LAG2) 3.9046∗∗∗
EARNING (LAG1) 0.9801∗∗∗
EARNING (LAG2) 0.9898∗∗∗
# JOINED 2.0996∗∗∗
INSIDE 15.5316∗∗∗ 5.5710∗∗∗
PERIOD * INSIDE 0.2409∗∗∗
EXPERIENCE * INSIDE 3.2091∗∗∗
INST.SIZE 0.4581∗∗∗
INST.SIZE2 -0.0727∗∗
INST.SIZE * INSIDE 1.4490∗∗
INST.SIZE2 * INSIDE -0.0519
CONS. 0.2202∗∗ 0.8200 0.3889 3.4930∗∗ 2.7908∗
CONTROLS YES YES NO YES YES
R2 0.1325 0.3920 0.2305 0.6240 0.6370
# of obs. 4000 3600 400 4000 4000
NOTE: coefficient significantly different from zero at ***1%, **5%, *10% significance
level. Estimated odds ratios are reported for the logit regressions. Observations from the
PLU3SUB are excluded. JOIN - 1 if the participants decides to join the first stage, 0
otherwise; FORMED - 1 if the institution is formed, 0 otherwise; CONTR. - individual
contribution level. PLU./MAJ. - 1 if the plurality or majority rule is applied, 0 when
unanimity is required; # JOINED - number of participants who join in the first stage;
INSIDE - 1 if the participant is a member of the institution, 0 otherwise; INST.SIZE - size
of the implemented institution. When indicated, we used answer to the
post-experimental questionnaire as CONTROLS.
but we believe it captures the sharp decrease in contribution outside the
institution. In other words, it shows that experienced participants (who are
more familiar with the game) are more likely to play the dominant strategy
outside the institution which indicates not to contribute at all. (Also refer
to the fourth panel of Table 4.2.)
The odds of successfully forming an institution are closely (signifi-
cantly and in an important way) related to the number of participants who
show their willingness to join in the first stage of the game. On average,
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each extra member causes a twofold increase in those odds. For a more ac-
curate picture, we have disaggregated the implementation rates according
to institution size in Table 4.4. Recall that in our experimental design the
minimum efficient institution size is of three members, and it was techni-
cally impossible to form an institution with only one member.
In the PLU3 games, even inefficient institutions are getting implemented
of around 50% of the cases. This relatively large rate, which is remarkably
close to the case for the minimum efficiency size, might have been in-
flated by the random tie-breaking rule that would determine the fate of the
institution if one member votes for, while the other against its implemen-
tation. Among all the initiated institutions with two members (49 in the
PLU3 games), only 11 are implemented such that neither of the members
votes for Project 0, i.e. to dissolve the institution. That corresponds to an
implementation rate of 22.45%.
Even if the implementation rate is far from the ideal 100%, the most
popular institution size both for initiated and implemented institutions is
three, which is exactly the minimum efficient size. It is when the number
of potential members is four or more, that the implementation rate jumps
well about 80% and reaches a constant 100% if at least half of the group,
i.e. five people, decide to join. The grand coalition of ten was not formed
in any of our treatments (or games). The largest institution both initiated
and/or implemented has seven members in the PLU3 games, which con-
firms our conjecture that when the group size is substantially larger than
the minimum efficient size, it is unlikely for the grand coalition to form.
This is in sharp contrast with the results reported by Kosfeld et al. (2009)
for a design where the group size is four and the minimum efficient size
is three. They stress that “the majority (on average, around 75 %) of the
organizations implemented are grand organizations.”
Exogenously determined membership makes the institution formation
almost always successful. However, it is worth noticing that there are play-
ers (among the 10 participants) who persistently vote to dissolve the insti-
tution. The unanimity rule would result in the institution to be dissolved,
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but the plurality rule does not and that is how participants managed to al-
ways achieve full efficiency in those games. Burger and Kolstad (2009),
who used a large group size (10 as in our design), a lower MPCR at 0.3
and only two projects, report an average institution size of 3.5, which is
somewhat lower than our 3.7 in the PLU3 games. The MAJ2 game has an
the average institution size of 3.32, which is lower than the average size
of 3.7 in the PLU3 games. We hypothesize that an additional project could
have potentially lured more subjects to participate in the first stage, and
therefore led to a higher average institution size. This is in line with our
regression analysis results in Table 4.3 and the numbers reported in Table
4.4: the unanimity rule makes the initiation easier, but the implementation
more difficult, having three (instead of only two) available projects has a
similar, but somewhat less pronounced effect.
In the PLU3 game, at an individual level, 42 (21%) out of 200 partic-
ipants never chose to join in the first stage, and another 70 (35%) partic-
ipants chose to join five times or less. On the other hand, only 4 (2%)
subjects chose to join all the time, and only 18 (9%) participants chose to
join 15 times or more. In the games with unanimity rule, i.e. UNA2 and
UNA3, 16 (20%) and 12 (15%) out of 80 always stayed out, and another
16 (20%) and 8 (10%) participants chose to join five times or less, respec-
tively. These proportions are not drastically different from the previously
discussed ones. However, in the UNA2 and UNA3 games many more par-
ticipants decided to join almost all the time. 14 (17.5%) and 12 (15%)
did so in all 10 rounds, and altogether 32 (40%) and 40 (50%) participants
chose to join 15 times or more, respectively.
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TABLE 4.4: Relative frequency initiation and implementation, and implementation rate by institution size
INST. PLU3 PLU3 PLU3 UNA2 UNA3 PLU2
SIZE POOLED POOLED POOLED INEXP. INEXP. INEXP. EXP. EXP. EXP.
INIT. IMPL. IMPL.% INIT. IMPL. IMPL.% INIT. IMPL. IMPL.% INIT. IMPL. IMPL.% INIT. IMPL. IMPL.% INIT. IMPL. IMPL.%
0 4.00 - - 8.75 - - 0.83 - - - - - - - - 10.00 - -
1 13.50 - - 18.75 - - 10.00 - - - - - - - - 12.50 - -
2 24.50 21.24 48.98 21.25 23.81 58.82 26.67 19.72 43.75 3.75 1.96 33.33 1.25 0.00 0.00 37.50 31.58 40.00
3 28.50 29.20 57.89 25.00 26.19 55.00 30.83 30.99 59.46 10.00 1.96 12.50 3.75 10.00 33.33 20.00 31.58 75.00
4 14.00 22.12 89.29 10.00 19.05 100.00 16.67 23.94 85.00 18.75 11.76 40.00 12.50 30.00 30.00 10.00 15.79 75.00
5 8.50 15.04 100.00 8.75 16.67 100.00 8.33 14.08 100.00 43.75 56.86 82.86 17.50 30.00 21.42 7.50 15.79 100.00
6 6.50 11.50 100.00 7.50 14.29 100.00 5.83 9.86 100.00 13.75 13.73 63.64 37.50 20.00 6.67 2.50 5.26 100.00
7 0.50 0.88 100.00 0.83 1.41 100.00 7.50 9.30 83.33 13.75 0.00 0.00
8 2.50 3.92 100.00 10.00 10.00 12.50
9 3.75 0.00 0.00
10
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 58.85 100.00 100.00 57.53 100.00 100.00 59.66 100.00 100.00 63.75 100.00 100.00 12.50 100.00 100.00 52.78
NOTE: PLU3 - all PLU3 games with or without experience; PLU3 INEXP. - PLU3 games from the first 20 rounds in session PLU3RS; PLU3 exp. - PLU3 games
from the last 20 rounds in sessions PLU3RS and PLU3SUB. INIT. - initiated institution; IMPL. - implemented institution; IMPL.% - implementation rate.
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4.4.3 Voting
Voting, from a game-theoretical point of view, constitutes a rather compli-
cated coordination problem, and especially so in the case of the plurality
rule with more than two projects. In all our games, we expect participants
to vote for Project 1 if and only if enough, i.e. at least s∗ = 3, participants
join the institution in the first stage. Even if Project 12 in available is some
game, it should never be voted according to the previously discussed theo-
retical argument.
Table 4.5 presents the distribution of votes observed in our experiments
according to the size of the initiated institution. The numbers confirm the
regression results by showing that, after its initiation, institution formation
is especially difficult if unanimity is required and when there are more
projects.
It is worth noting that the theoretical threshold for efficient institution
formation s∗ = 3 is barely enough for forming an institution even under
the plurality rule. Inexperienced participants needed at least 4 members
for at least half of them to vote for Project 1 as Project 12 was particu-
larly popular among them. In the games based on the plurality rule, we
observe that as the number of participants who join in the first stage in-
creases, members feel more confident (or optimistic) about the prospects
of an institution and the vast majority of them vote for Project 1. Project
1
2 is only popular among inexperienced participants and when the initiated
institution is small. It also could be the case that participants do realize
that the institution could be efficiently formed, but are reluctant to do so,
when too many participants have decided to stay out and it is very likely
that they are going to free ride on the contributions forcefully extracted by
the institution. Project 12 might then represent a compromise solution to
the members’ dilemma.
Interestingly, Project 12 turns out to be popular - and practically irre-
spectively from the institution size so - whenever it is available under una-
nimity rule. In that case, theoretical efficiency is not enough as a coordina-
tion device when more than two projects are to be considered by voters.
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TABLE 4.5: Distribution of votes (%) by institution size
INST. PLU3 PLU3 PLU3 UNA2 UNA3 PLU2
SIZE POOLED INEXP. EXP.
0 12 1 0
1
2 1 0
1
2 1 0
1
2 1 0
1
2 1 0
1
2 1
2 51 14 35 47 26 26 53 8 39 67 - 33 0 50 50 63 - 37
3 42 16 43 38 18 43 43 14 42 33 - 67 22 11 67 33 - 67
4 14 19 67 6 44 50 18 9 74 18 - 82 13 30 58 19 - 81
5 11 11 79 6 17 77 14 6 80 3 - 97 10 30 60 13 - 87
6 6 10 83 8 19 72 5 2 93 6 - 94 7 37 56 0 - 100
7 0 0 100 0 0 100 2 - 98 3 29 69
8 0 - 100 2 23 75
9 0 11 89
10
NOTE: PLU3 - all PLU3 games with or without experience; PLU3 inexp. - PLU3 games
from the first 20 rounds in session PLU3RS; PLU3 exp. - PLU3 games from the last 20
rounds in sessions PLU3RS and PLU3SUB.
A surprising result is that even in the PLU3SUB game, where all partic-
ipants are forced to join the institution, not all of them vote for Project 1,
which is the obvious optimal strategy. Although 77.75% of the votes went
for Project 1 in those (sub)games, 19.75% went for Project 0 and 2.5% to
Project 12 .
4.4.4 Contributions and Efficiency
Efficiency in our games is tightly linked to individual contribution levels
and successful (efficient) institution formation. We define efficiency as the
proportion of the additional profit above the absolute minimum level that
a group of participants achieve from the additional profit that they could
have achieved.
The last two panels in Table 4.2 reveal that the average contribution
level is below half of the initial endowment, somewhere around 27-43%,
and therefore observed efficiency is also rather low (25-42%). For a deeper
analysis and comparison across treatments we turn to the regression results
in the last two columns of Table 4.3.
Just like in the usual linear public-goods experiment (e.g. Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000), our regression reveals a significant, although not very steep,
negative trend in contribution levels. Experience with a similar game or
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subgame reduces contributions more radically, by 1.7 points (out of 20
points of initial endowment) on average. This effect is similar to what
appears as a restart effect in other studies (Andreoni, 1988), given that ex-
perience here means having played the same or a very similar game with a
different group of participants. Even if contribution levels decay with time,
a restart usually sends them back to a relatively high level which is typically
below to the one at the previous start. Another interpretation, based on the
coefficient estimates in the regression (5) of Table 4.3, is that experience
makes game-theoretical incentives clearer. Therefore participants outside
the institution contribute less with experience (it is a dominant strategy for
them to free-ride after all), while experienced participants inside the in-
stitution contribute more with experience (as they realise that voting for
Project 1 is the best strategy whenever the institution is large enough).
Interestingly, the voting rule has no significant effect on contributions.
Its impacts on initiation and institution formation, with opposing signs as
discussed before, entirely cancel each other out. It is important to under-
line though that contribution levels are significantly and remarkably higher
inside the institution. If we look at Regression (4) in table 4.3 which does
not control for the size of the implemented institution, and add the con-
stant and the coefficient that measures the average difference between in-
side and outside the institution, we get 19 points. That is nearly all of the
20 points that were available for each participant in each period to decide
about. However, comparing the average contribution level when no in-
stitution is formed, the failure of institution formation has a much bigger
negative effect on the contribution level in game UNA2 than in game PLU3
(p < 0.0001 for the Wilcoxom-Mann-Whitney test).
As for the effect of institution size, it is quite different inside and out-
side the institution (as shown by the four related coefficient estimates).
Inside the institution, it is positive and significant, and it is likely to be
explained by the previously discussed voting and institution-formation be-
havior which converges toward the equilibrium Project 1 as the number
of members in the institutions is getting larger. Outside the institution it
has a much smaller impact which is positive for institutions with 6 or less
members and negative for larger ones. In other words, these results show
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that relatively small institutions do generate a significant positive (although
moderate in size) externality on contribution levels outside their bound-
aries. We do not have a plausible explanation for it, but the number of
projects also seem to have a significant but rather small positive effect on
contribution levels.
4.5 Conclusions
We experimentally studied a linear public-goods game with endogenous
institution formation. Participants were asked to decide whether to join an
institution before deciding on their contribution to the public good. Mem-
bers of the institution were required to contribute the amount the institution
members voted for. While previous studies have shown that institution for-
mation has a positive effect on the overall efficiency (Kosfeld et al., 2009,
Burger and Kolstad, 2009), our experimental design focuses on the effect
of the voting rule used by the institution for collective decision-making.
In the literature and numerous real-life situations, the unanimity rule is
the most commonly used voting rule. However, following the breakdown
of various international negotiations (environmental summits, security and
peace talks) and the increasing dispute in the European Union about the
sluggishness of its decision-making process, unanimity rule has been crit-
icised for being too restrictive and therefore hindering cooperation. In our
experimental design, we replaced the unanimity rule by a more flexible
majority/plurality rule and investigated its effects on institution initiation,
institution formation and contribution levels.
Firstly, our observations show that the majority/plurality rule signifi-
cantly decreases the initiation rate, but at the same time also significantly
increases the implementation rate of institution. These two effects cancel
each other out in the end, and suggest that the choice of the voting rule
(unanimity or majority/plurality) does not matter for the average contribu-
tion level or efficiency.
Secondly, our experimental design with an increased group size (from
the 4 in the literature to 10) shows that the grand coalition, even if it
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would be an efficient outcome, does not form. This result puts previous
experimental evidence (especial the one presented by Kosfeld et al., 2009)
into different light and suggests that what matters for institution forma-
tion is whether the to-be-formed institution has enough potential members
or not as compared to the theoretically minimum efficient institution size.
Whether that is closer or farther from the size of the grand coalition is of
secondary importance. Interestingly, that theoretical minimum size is not
enough of a guarantee for an institution to be formed in the experimental
laboratory.
Chapter 5
A Non-cooperative Approach to
the Talmud Solution for the
Bankruptcy Games1
5.1 Introduction
In a bankruptcy problem, every creditor has a certain claim over a perfectly
divisible estate which is insufficient to grant all the claims. The bankruptcy
problem captures the essence of most rationing situations, such as the exe-
cution of a will to disburse the insufficient property to the beneficiaries, the
distribution of the liquidation of a firm among its creditors, the collection
of a certain amount of tax among tax payers with different responsibilities,
etc.. Such problems, arising from the Talmud, are first studied by O’Neil
(1982) and Aumann and Maschler (1985). In order to allocate the estate
“fairly” among all the players, several rules have been proposed, including
the proportional rule (PRO), constrained equal awards rule (CEA), con-
strained equal losses rule (CEL), etc.. Aumann and Maschler (1985) first
formulated a solution from the Talmud (which we call the Talmud solution
(TAL)) which, restricting the creditors by their half claims, applies CEA to
the problem first and the excess (if any) is divided using CEL. Most studies
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Yuan Ju.
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since then take an axiomatic approach. (See Thomson (2003) and Moulin
(2002) for comprehensive reviews.)
In this chapter, we take a non-cooperative approach to the bankruptcy
problems. The aim is to provide a strategic game that yields the Talmud so-
lution in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). We first propose two games,
each of which has a unique SPE outcome that coincides with the CEA and
CEL allocation respectively. Then the two games are combined such that
the unique SPE outcome is the TAL allocation.
Studying the bankruptcy problems as non-cooperative games provides
additional support for the rules alongside their axiomatic considerations.
As early in O’Neil (1982)’s study, a claim game was proposed where any
Nash equilibrium gives the minimum overlapping rule allocation. Atlamaz
et al.(2011) extended O’Neill (1982)’s claim game and variations of their
game result in proportional division in equilibrium.
In this study, we mainly focus on the non-cooperative approach to the
CEA, CEL and TAL. Chun (1989) defined a game where players propose
order preservative rules and the limit point of a process of adjustment co-
incides with the CEA allocation. Herrero (2001) studied the dual game
of the above mechanism that reaches the CEL allocation as the unique
Nash equilibrium outcome. Sonn (1992) studied a game of demand (in a
modified alternating offer bargaining game style), where the SPE outcome
converge to the CEA allocation when the discount factor goes to 1. Differ-
ent from the above approach, the game proposed in this study reaches the
CEA (CEL) in SPE rather than the limit point of the procedure. It allows
the players to achieve the desirable allocation in finite steps.
In the line of non-cooperative method to TAL, existing mechanisms
rely on the contested-garment(CG) consistency. Serrano (1995) proposed
a bargaining game whose SPE yields the TAL. Dagan et al.(1997) extended
the mechanism to a class of consistent rules. In these two mechanisms, a
disagreement point corresponding to the CG solution of two-person re-
duced game is imposed to guarantee the desired outcome. This is a major
difference from the strategic games described in this chapter where the
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TAL allocation as the SPE outcome does not rely on the specification of
consistency.
The games proposed in this chapter are inspired by the famous cut-and-
choose mechanism in fair division (Brams and Taylor (1996)). When two
people share a (homogeneous) cake, they try to make the division as fair
as possible. One way to solve the dispute is to randomly choose one of the
players to cut the cake, while the other player has the right to choose first
which piece he gets. Thus, the best strategy for the player who cut the cake
is to cut it exactly in haves. The unique SPE outcome is an equal division
of the cake. This mechanism is extended to a n-player game preserving its
fairness consideration, while applied to a bankruptcy game by restricting
that no player get a payoff higher than his claim. As conventionally in
the literature of bankruptcy problems, the estate and claims are assumed as
common knowledge.
We first introduce a game where the player with the highest claim is
appointed as the executor and makes a proposal which is an efficient al-
location of the estate. Following the proposal, players, from the one with
the lowest claim, sequentially choose from the elements of the vector as
their payoffs.2 However, if at any point, a player’s choice is higher than
his claim, he only gets his claim and the executor makes a new proposal
with respect to the remaining estate for the players who have not received
their payoffs. The game ends when the executor takes the remaining es-
tate after all other players have received their payoff. It can be shown that
the unique SPE outcome of this game is the CEA allocation of the corre-
sponding bankruptcy problem. A similar game, where the deficit between
the estate and total claim is distributed by the executor, yields the CEL
allocation as the unique outcome in all SPE. A combination of the two
games gives the TAL allocation as the unique SPE outcome. In each of the
above games, the outcome could be reached in finite steps and the desired
allocation is the outcome in all SPE.
2Players with lower claims are given priority to choose early on in the game, while the
player who chooses last is given the power to make the division. The privilege of dividing
the estate and choosing early is spread among the players.
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section in-
troduces the problem and the allocation rules. In section 3, we present
the games and the main results. The last section concludes with several
extensions of the current model.
5.2 Bankruptcy Problems and the Talmud So-
lution
Let N = {1,2, . . . ,n} be the finite set of players. For each i∈N, let ci ∈R+
denote player i’s claim and c = (ci)i∈N the vector of claims. E ∈ R is the
perfectly divisible estate to be divided among all players. A bankruptcy
problem is a pair (E,c), such that 0<E <∑ci.3 Without loss of generality,
we assume players are ordered according to their claims, that is, for players
1,2, . . . ,n, we have 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 · · · ≤ cn. The order is randomly decided
among players with equal claims. An allocation in a bankruptcy problem
is an n-tuple x(E,c) = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈ Rn, with ∑xi = E and 0≤ xi ≤ ci.
An allocation rule is a function that assigns a unique allocation to each
bankruptcy problem.
Constrained equal awards rule (CEA) divides the estate equally among
all players, subject to the constraint that no player gets more than his claim.
CEAi(E,c) = min{α,ci},with α solves∑min{α,ci}= E.
Constrained equal losses rule (CEL) assigns equal loss to each player,
subject to the constraint that no player receives less than zero.
CELi(E,c) = max{0,ci−β},with β solves∑max{0,ci−β}= E.
TAL connects CEA and CEL, but half of each player’s claim is used
as the bound of award or loss. CEA is applied to the problem first, and if
there is excess of the estate after the distribution, CEL is applied.
3For simplicity of notation, ∑ stands for ∑ni=1 unless specified otherwise.
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TALi(E,c) =
CEAi(E,
ci
2
) when ∑ci ≥ 2E;
ci−CEAi(∑ci−E, ci2 ) when ∑ci < 2E .
The above equation could be written as the following:
TALi(E,c) =
CEAi(E,
ci
2
) when ∑ci ≥ 2E;
ci
2
+CELi(E−∑ ci2 ,
ci
2
) when ∑ci < 2E.
The equivalency between the above two expressions could be seen by
realising when ∑ci < 2E,
TALi(E,c) = ci−CEAi(∑ci−E, ci2 )
= ci−min{β , ci2 },s.t.∑min{β ,
ci
2
}=∑ci−E
= ci+max{−β ,−ci2 },s.t.∑max{−β ,−
ci
2
}=−(∑ci−E)
=
ci
2
+max{ci
2
−β ,0},
s.t.∑max{ci2 −β ,0}=∑
ci
2
−∑ci+E = E− 12∑ci
=
ci
2
+CELi(E−∑ ci2 ,
ci
2
)
5.3 The Mechanism
We propose a multi-step extensive form (divide-and-choose) game whose
unique SPE outcome coincides with the TAL allocation.
Consider a bankruptcy problem (E,c). We first define the game in each
step.
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5.3.1 Game Γ1
Game Γ1(E,c) is a divide-and-choose game with respect to the bankruptcy
problem (E,c). Denote the payoff for player i in game Γ1 as pi1i .
The game consists of n+1 stages: the opening stage 0 where the execu-
tor makes a proposal of how the estate would be divided, n−1 subsequent
stages where in each stage s ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n− 1}, each agent s sequentially
makes choice of his share of the estate from the opening proposal, and
finally a stage n where the executor gets his payoff.
For each stage s, there are two proposals: one before player s makes
his choice which we call the “opening proposal” and denote as Aso (the
subscript o stands for “opening”) and the one at the end of stage s which
we call the “closing proposal” and denote as Asc (the subscript c stands for
“closing”). There is only a closing proposal in stage 0.
Stage 0 Player n, who is the player with the highest claim, is ap-
pointed as the executor.4
Player n proposes an allocation A0c = (x
0
1,x
0
2, . . . ,x
0
n) ∈ Rn. The game
proceeds to stage 1.
For s = 1,2, . . . ,n−1, the stages proceed in the following way.
Stage s Player s chooses an element from stage s’ opening proposal
Aso = (x
s
s,x
s
s+1, . . . ,x
s
n), where A
s
o = A
s−1
c . From stage 1, players sequen-
tially make choices from the opening proposal. The opening proposal of
each stage is the same as the closing proposal of the previous stage. Define
player s’ choice as θs = xsi , i = s,s+ 1,2, . . . ,n. The smaller of his choice
or his claim is his payoff.
• If θs ≤ cs, player s leaves the game with payoff pi1s = θs. Stage s’
closing proposal is Asc = (y
s
s+1,y
s
s+2, . . . ,y
s
n) ∈ Rn−s, where Asc is a
4If there are more than one of players have the highest claim, an executor is randomly
chosen among such players. Without loss of generality, player n is always chosen as
the executor. Since it is always the executor who makes the proposal, we use the word
“executor” and “proposer” interchangeably.
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projection of Aso to Rn−s, such that
|{ j|ysj = θs, for some j = s+1,2, . . . ,n}|
= |{k|xsk = θs, for some k = s, . . . ,n}|−1. (5.1)
If his choice is smaller or equal to his claim, the closing proposal of
stage s is the same as its opening proposal except that player s’ choice
is removed from it, which means the number of such elements that
equal to θs is one less in the closing proposal, while all the other
elements are the same.
The game proceeds to the next stage.
• If θs > cs, player s leaves the game with payoff pi1s = cs. Player n
makes a closing proposal Asc = (y
s
s+1,y
s
s+2, . . . ,y
s
n) ∈ Rn−s with re-
spect to the remaining players s+ 1,s+ 2, . . . ,n and the remaining
estate E−∑sj=1pi1j such that
n
∑
i=s+1
ysi = E−
s
∑
j=1
pi1j .
The game proceeds to the next stage.
Stage n Player n leaves the game with payoff
pi1n = max{0,min{cn,E−
n−1
∑
i=1
pi1i }}.
We show that game Γ1 has a unique SPE outcome that coincides with
the allocation assigned by CEA.
Define the estate remaining at stage 1 as E1 =E, at stage s= 2, . . . ,n−1
for the n− s+1 players as Es = E−∑s−1i=1 pi1i .
The following lemma shows that at any stage, if the remaining estate
is not enough to award all the remaining players the amount as much as
the lowest claim among the remaining players, the opening proposal of the
stage must be an equal division of the remaining estate among the remain-
ing players. By reverse induction on the number of remaining players, we
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show that under the condition specified above, if the opening proposal is
not equal division, the proposer would end up with a lower payoff. Thus,
any proposer’s strategy that leads to a non-equal division at such stage is
not part of the SPE.
Lemma 5.1. If Es < (n− s+ 1)cs at any stage s,s = 1,2, . . . ,n− 1, in all
SPE, Aso = (x
s
s,x
s
s+1, . . . ,x
s
n) ∈ Rn−s+1, where xsi = Esn−s+1 , i = s, . . . ,n.
Proof. The proof is done by reverse induction on s.
We first show that the lemma holds for s = n−1. When s = n−1, the
lemma says if En−1 < 2cn−1, then in all SPE, An−1o = (x
n−1
n−1,x
n−1
n ), where
xn−1n−1 = x
n−1
n =
En−1
2 .
Given the proposal An−1o , either choice of player n− 1 is a best re-
sponse. The game ends with player n−1 and player n get payoffs pi1n−1 =
pi1n =
En−1
2 .
Now suppose the proposal is (An−1o )′=((x
n−1
n−1)
′,(xn−1n )′), where (x
n−1
n−1)
′
= En−12 −ε,(xn−1n )′= En−12 +ε,ε ∈ (0, En−12 ]. Player n−1 is at best response
to choose (xn−1n )′. (pi1n−1)
′ = min{En−12 + ε,cn−1} > En−12 . The game ends
with player n gets payoff (pi1n )′= En−1−(pi1n−1)′< En−12 = pi1n . At any stage
prior to stage n−1, player n would have at least one opportunity to make a
proposal to guarantee An−1o at equilibrium, giving him a higher payoff then
the current situation. Hence (An−1o )′ cannot be part of SPE.
Assume the lemma holds for s = 2. We show that the lemma holds for
s = 1.
When s = 1, the lemma says if E1 < nc1, then in all SPE, A1o = (x
1
1,
x12, . . . ,x
1
n) ∈ Rn where x1i = E1n , i = 1,2, . . . ,n. Given the proposal A1o, for
any i ∈ N, any choice of player i is a best response. No new proposal is
made by player n in the following stages. The only outcome following
proposal A1o is pi1i =
E1
n .
Suppose (A1o)
′ = ((x11)
′,(x12)
′, . . . ,(x1n)′),(x11)
′ ≤ (x12)′ ≤ ·· · ≤ (x1n)′ (at
least one inequality holds) and ∑(x1i )′ = E1, we must have (x11)
′ < E1n and
(x1n)
′> E1n . Player 1’s payoff at his best response is (pi
1
1 )
′=min{(x1n)′,c1}>
E1
n .
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Then at stage s = 2, (E2)′ = E1 −min{(x1n)′,c1} < (n−1)E1n < (n−
1)c1 ≤ (n−1)c2. By the assumption that the lemma holds at s = 2, player
n’s equilibrium payoff is (pi1n )′ when (A2o)′=(
(E2)′
n−1 , . . . ,
(E2)′
n−1 ), (pi
1
n )
′= (E2)
′
n−1 <
E1
n = pi
1
n .
5 Player n can increase his payoff by deviating from (A1o)
′ and
making a proposal A0c = A
1
o. Therefore, proposal (A
1
o)
′ cannot constitute an
SPE.
The next theorem shows that game Γ1 has a unique SPE outcome
which coincides with the allocation assigned by CEA in corresponding
bankruptcy problem. We show that in all SPE, the players whose claims
are lower than the average of the remaining estate over remaining players
would have their claims as their payoffs given any proposal. Until all the
remaining players have higher claims than the average of the remaining es-
tate, then by lemma 5.1, they would be have the average remaining estate
as their payoff.
Theorem 5.2. For any bankruptcy problem (E,c), the unique SPE outcome
of game Γ1(E,c) is pi1i =CEAi(E,c).
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the number of players.
We first show that the theorem holds for |N|= 2.
Case 1, E < 2c1. CEAi(E,c) = E2 , i = 1,2. By lemma 5.1, the only
SPE proposal at stage 1 is A1o = (x
1
1,x
1
2), where x
1
1 = x
1
2 =
E
2 . Any choice
of player 1 constitutes an SPE. All SPE yield the same outcome pi1i =
E
2 =
CEAi(E,c), i = 1,2.
Case 2, E ≥ 2c1. CEA(E,c) = (c1,E−c1). Any proposal A1o = (x11,x12),
such that x11 + x
1
2 = E at stage 1 constitutes an SPE in this case. In any
SPE, Player 1’s choice is θ1 = max{x11,x12} ≥ c1 and his payoff is pi11 =
min{θ1,c1} = c1. In all SPE, the payoffs are pi11 = c1 and pi12 = E − c1,
which are the CEA allocation.
Assume the theorem holds for |N|= n−1. We show the theorem also
holds for |N|= n.
5(pi1n )′ − pi1n = E2n−1 − E1n = nE2−(n−1)E1n(n−1) = E1−n·min{x
′
n,c1}
n(n−1) . Since E1 < nxn,E1 <
nc1,E1−n ·min{x′n,c1}< 0, which means (pi1n )′ < pi1n .
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Case 1, if E ≤ nc1,CEAi(E,c) = En for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n. By lemma
5.1, the only SPE proposal starting from stage 1 is A1o = (x
1
i )i=1,...,n where
xi = En . All SPE yield the same outcome pi
1
i =
E
n =CEAi(E,c).
Case 2, if nc1 <E <∑ci,CEAi(E,c)=min{ci,α}, where∑min{ci,α}=
E.
Consider the following strategy profile G . At stage 0, player n propose
A0c = (x
0
i )i=1,2,...,n, where x
0
i = ci for i = 1, . . . ,q,q < n and x
0
i = α for
i= q+1,2, . . . ,n, with∑x0i =E and q and α solve cq≤α < cq+1. At every
stage s, player s’ choice is θs = x0s ∈ Aso. Players’ payoffs are pi1i = ci for
i = 1, . . . ,q and pi1i = α =
E−∑qi=1 ci
n−q+1 for i = q+1,2, . . . ,n, which coincides
with the CEA allocation.
To see that the above strategy constitute an SPE, note that every player’s
choosing strategy is his best response. For player i = 1, . . . ,q, deviating
from the current θi would give no more than his current payoff. Player n’s
proposal at stage 0 is also his best response. Any other proposal would
lead to a payoff of ci for player i, i= 1, . . . ,q, leaving Eq+1 = E−∑qi=1 ci <
(n−q+1)cq+1. By lemma 5.1, player n’s payoff is maximised withAq+1o =
(xq+1i )i=q+1,2,...,n,x
q+1
i =
Eq+1
n−q+1 at pi
1
n =
Eq+1
n−q+1 , which is no higher than the
payoff he can get with proposal A1o. Thus, no player has incentive to devi-
ate from the strategy profile G which is an SPE, whose outcome coincides
with the CEA allocation.
It could also be shown that all SPE yield the same outcome which is the
CEA allocation. In all SPE, because E > nc1 and the proposal A1o must be
efficient as in ∑x1i = E, there must exist an x1i such that x1i ≥ c1. Player 1’s
best response at stage 1 is θ1 = x1i ≥ c1 for any i= 1,2, . . . ,n. His payoff is
pi11 = c1. At stage 2, E2 = E−c1. By the assumption that theorem holds for
n−1 players, all SPE starting from stage 2 give the same payoff for player
2, . . . ,n which is pi1i = min{ci,α}, i = 2, . . . ,n,∑ni=2pi1i = E− c1. Because
min{c2,α} > c16 the SPE outcome for n players could be expressed as
pi1i = min{ci,α}=CEAi(E,c), i = 1,2, . . . ,n,∑pi1i = E.
6If α < c2, then we must have α = E−c1n−1 > c1; if α ≥ c2, by assumption, c2 > c1.
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5.3.2 Game Γ2
Game Γ2(E,c) is a divide-and-choose game with respect to the bankruptcy
problem (E,c). In order for the estate to be distributed, each creditor has
to lose part of his claim. The procedure is similar to that of Game Γ1(E,c).
Game Γ2(E,c) distribute the total loss, i.e. the difference between the
estate and the sum of claims, among all creditors so that every creditor’s
payoff is his claim minus his distributed loss.
Define the total loss for all creditors N as L1 = ∑ci−E. Denote the
payoff for player i in game Γ2 as pi2i .
The procedure resembles that in game Γ1. The game consists of n+1
stages: an opening stage 0 and n subsequent stages, each involving one
player.
Stage 0 Player n, who is the player with the highest claim, is ap-
pointed as the proposer.
Player n makes a proposal B0c =(x
0
1,x
0
2, . . . ,x
0
n)∈Rn such that∑xi = L1.
The game proceeds to stage 1.
For s = 1,2, . . . ,n−1, the stages proceed in the following way.
Stage s Player s chooses an element from stage s’ opening proposal
Bso = (x
s
s,x
s
s+1, . . . ,x
s
n), where B
s
o = B
s−1
c . Define player s’ choice as ξs =
xsi , i = s,s+1,2, . . . ,n.
• If ξs ≤ cs, player s leaves the game with payoff pi2s = cs− ξs. Stage
s’ closing proposal is Bsc = (y
s
s+1,y
s
s+2, . . . ,y
s
n) ∈ Rn−s, where Bsc is a
projection of Bso to Rn−s, such that
|{ j|ysj = ξs, for some j = s+1,2, . . . ,n}|
= |{k|xsk = ξs, for some k = s, . . . ,n}|−1. (5.2)
The game proceeds to the next stage.
• If ξs > cs, player s leaves the game with payoff pi2s = 0. Player n
makes a proposal Bsc =(y
s
s+1,y
s
s+2, . . . ,y
s
n)∈Rn−s, such that∑ni=s+1 ysi =
L1−∑sj=1(c j−pi2j ). The game proceeds to the next stage.
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Stage n Player n leaves the game with payoff
pi2n = max{0,min{cn,E−
n−1
∑
i=1
pi2i }}.
The following lemma and theorem show that the only SPE outcome of
game Γ2(E,c) coincides with the allocation assigned by CEL.
Theorem 5.3. For any bankruptcy problem (E,c), the unique SPE outcome
of game Γ2(E,c) is pi2i =CELi(E,c).
The proofs are done similarly to those of Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 5.2.
We first need two Lemmas to facilitate the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.4. Given two bankruptcy problem (E,c) and (E ′,c) and the CEL
allocation for each problem as CELi(E,c)=min{0,ci−β},s.t.∑min{0,ci−
β} = E and CELi(E ′,c) = min{0,ci−β ′},s.t.∑min{0,ci−β ′} = E ′ for
players i = 1,2, . . . ,n. If E ′ < E, then β ′ > β .
Proof. The claim vector is c = (c1,c2, . . . ,cn),c1 ≤ c2 ≤ ·· · ≤ cn. Without
loss of generality, assume c j ≤ β < c j+1 and ck ≤ β ′ < ck+1 with j,k =
1,2, . . . ,n−1. Explicitly:
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
0+ · · ·+0+c j+1−β + c j+2−β + · · ·+ cn−β = E
k︷ ︸︸ ︷
0+ · · ·+0+ck+1−β ′+ ck+2−β ′+ · · ·+ cn−β ′ = E ′
First, with E ′ < E, we must have j ≤ k.
If j > k, and because j,k = 1,2, . . . ,n− 1, it must be j ≥ k+ 1. Then
we have c j ≥ ck ≥ ck+1. ck ≤ β ′ < ck+1 ≤ c j ≤ β < c j+1, which means
β ′ < β when j > k.
E ′−E = (ck+1−β ′+ ck+2−β ′+ · · ·+ cn−β ′)
− (c j+1−β + c j+2−β + · · ·+ cn−β )
= (ck+1−β ′+ ck+2−β ′+ · · ·+ c j−β ′)+(n− j)(β −β ′)
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The first part of the above equation is positive and j < n. E ′ < E requires
E ′−E < 0. So we must have β −β ′ < 0, i.e.β < β ′, which is a contradic-
tion of β ′ < β when j > k.
If j = k,
E ′−E = (ck+1−β ′+ ck+2−β ′+ · · ·+ cn−β ′)
− (c j+1−β + c j+2−β + · · ·+ cn−β )
= (n− j)(β −β ′)
E ′−E < 0, so β ′ > β .
If j < k, and because j,k = 1,2, . . . ,n− 1, it must be j+ 1 ≤ k. Then
we have c j ≤ c j+1 ≤ ck ≤ ck+1. c j ≤ β < c j+1 ≤ ck ≤ β ′ < ck+1, which
means β < β ′ when j < k.
E ′−E = (ck+1−β ′+ ck+2−β ′+ · · ·+ cn−β ′)
− (c j+1−β + c j+2−β + · · ·+ cn−β )
=−(c j+1−β + c j+2−β + · · ·+ ck−β )+(n− k)(β −β ′)
β < β ′ satisfies E ′−E < 0.
Define the loss at stage s = 2, . . . ,n− 1 for the n− s+ 1 players as
Ls = L1−∑s−1i=1 (ci−pi2i ).
Lemma 5.5. If Ls < (n− s+ 1)cs at any stage s,s = 1,2, . . . ,n− 1, in all
SPE, Bso = (x
s
s,x
s
s+1, . . . ,x
s
n) ∈ Rn−s+1, where xsi = Lsn−s+1 , i = s, . . . ,n.
Proof. If Ls ≤ (n− s+1)cs, given the proposal Bso = (xsi )i=s,...,n, with xsi =
Ls
n−s+1 , any choice the remaining players is a best response. Since
Ls
n−s+1 ≤
cs≤ ci,i>s, the only outcome following this proposal is pi2i = ci− Lsn−s+1 , i=
s, . . . ,n.
Now suppose the proposal at stage s is (Bso)
′ = (xss,xss+1, . . . ,x
s
n),x
s
s ≤
xss+1 ≤ ·· · ≤ xsn (at least one inequality holds) and ∑xsi = Ls, we must have
xs1 <
Ls
n−s+1 < cs and x
s
n >
Ls
n−s+1 . Player s is at best response to choose x
s
s.
His payoff is pi2s = cs− xss.
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If @i ∈ {s+1,2, . . . ,n},s.t.xsi > ci, then player n has no chance to make
new proposal until he gets payoff (pi2n )′= cn−xsn < cn− Lsn−s+1 = pi2n . Player
n gets a lower payoff following the proposal (Bso)
′. At any stage prior to
stage s, player n would have at least one opportunity to make a proposal to
guarantee the proposal Bso at stage s, giving him a higher payoff then the
current situation. Hence (Bso)
′ cannot be part of SPE.
If ∃i ∈ {s+1,2, . . . ,n},s.t.xsi > ci, suppose
• For s+1 < i < n−1,xsi ≤ ci and for i = n,xsi > cn. At equilibrium,
player n gets payoff of 0, which is lower than pi2n . Thus, (Bos )′ does
not constitute an SPE.
• For s+ 1 < i < n− 2,xsi ≤ ci and for i = n− 1,xsi > cn−1. Since
xsn ≥ xsn−1, we have xsn > cn−1. Ln−1 = xsn−1 + xsn. At equilibrium,
player n− 1 gets payoff of 0. Ln = xs1+ xs2− cn−1 > xsn > Lsn−s+1 .
Player n gets payoff (pi2n )′ = cn−min{Ln,cn} < pi2n . Thus, B′s does
not constitute an SPE.
• For s+1< i< n−3,xsi ≤ ci and for i= n−2,xsn−2 > cn−2. Since xsn≥
xsn−1 ≥ xsn−2, we have xsn ≥ xsn−1 > cn−2. Ln−2 = xn−2 + xn−1 + xn.
At equilibrium, player n−2 gets payoff of 0. Ln−1 = Ln−2− cn−2 >
xsn−2+x
s
n. The next proposal from player n satisfies min{yn−1,yn} ≤
Ln−1
2 . Player n−1 is at best response to choose min{yn−1,yn}. Ln =
Ln−1−min{yn−1,yn,cn−1} > Ln−12 >
xsn−1+x
s
n
2 > cn−2 > cs >
Ls
n−s+1 .
Player n gets payoff (pi2n )′ = cn −min{Ln,cn} < pi2n . Thus, (Bso)′
does not constitute an SPE.
• By similar argument, we can show that for any s+1< i≤ n, if ∃i≤ n,
s.t. xss+1 > cs+1, (B
s
o)
′ does not constitute an SPE.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on the number of players.
We first show that the theorem holds for |N|= 2.
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Case 1, c2− c1 < E, i.e. L1 = c1 + c2−E < 2c1. CELi(E,c) = ci−
L1
2 . By lemma 5.5, the only SPE proposal starting from s = 1 is B
1
o =
(x1i )i=1,2,x
1
i =
L1
2 . Either choice of player 1 constitute an SPE. The only
SPE outcome is pi2i = ci− L12 =CELi(E,c).
Case 2, E ≤ c2− c1, i.e. L1 ≥ 2c1. CELi(E,c) = (0,E). Any proposal
Bo1 = (x
1
i )i=1,2 such that x
1
i ≥ c1 constitutes an SPE in this case. For player
n, any other proposal (Bo1)
′ would lead to smaller loss for player 1, given
player 1’s best response is always to choose the smaller share of loss, which
would lead to a lower payoff for player 2. So (Bo1)
′ cannot be par to SPE.
The payoff in all SPE for player 1 is pi21 = 0 and that for player 2 is pi
2
2 = E.
Assume that the theorem holds for |N| = n− 1. We show that it also
holds for |N|= n.
Case 1, if ∑ci−nc1 < E, i.e. L1 =∑ci−E < nc1,CELi(E,c) = ci− L1n
for all i = 1,2, . . . ,n. By lemma 5.5, the only SPE proposal starting from
stage 1 is Bo1 = (xi)i=1,2,...,n,xi =
L1
n . Any strategy of player 1,2, . . . ,n con-
stitute an SPE. All SPE yield the same outcome pi1i = ci− L1n =CELi(E,c).
Case 2, if ∑ci− nc1 ≥ E, i.e. L1 = ∑ci−E ≥ nc1,CELi(E,c) = ci−
min{ci,β}, where ∑min{ci,β}= L1.
Consider the following strategy G . At stage 0, player n propose B0c =
(x0i )i=1,2,...,n, where x
0
i = ci for i = 1, . . . ,q,q < n and x
0
i = β for i = q+
1,2, . . . ,n, with ∑x0i = E and q and β solve cq ≤ β < cq+1. At every
stage s, player s’s choice is ξs = x0s ∈ Bso. Players’ payoffs are pi2i = 0 for
i = 1, . . . ,q and pi2i = ci−β = ci−
∑ni=q+1 ci−E
n−q+1 for i = q+1,2, . . . ,n, which
coincides with the CEL allocation.
To see that the above strategy constitute an SPE, note that for player
i = 1, . . . ,q, choosing any other share would give no more than 0. At stage
q+ 1, Lq+1 = L1−∑qi=1 ci = ∑ni=q+1β < (n− q)cq+1. By lemma 5.5, in
all SPE, Bq+1o = (x
q+1
i )i=q+1,2,...,n,x
q+1
i =
Eq+1
n−q+1 the outcome is pi
2
i = ci−
Lq+1
n−q+1 for player j = q+1,2, . . . ,n.
Thus, no player has incentive to deviate from the strategy profile G
which is an SPE, whose outcome coincides with the CEL allocation. Next,
we show that all SPE yields the CEL allocation.
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Because L1 > nc1, in all SPE, B0c = (x
0
i )i=1,2,...,n,x
0
i ≥ c1. Player 1 is at
best response to choose x0i for any i at stage 1 and gets payoff is 0. Then
at stage 2, L2 = L1− c1, the total estate left is still E and the total claim
becomes ∑ni=2 ci. By the assumption that theorem holds for n−1 players,
all SPE starting from s = 2 give the same payoff for player i = 2, . . . ,n
which is pi2i = ci−min{ci,β},∑ni=2pi2i = E. Because min{c2,β}> c1, the
SPE outcome for n players could be expressed as pi2i = ci−min{ci,β}, i =
1,2, . . . ,n,∑pi2i = E. Specifically, pi2i = min{0,ci − β} and since E >
0,pi2n > 0.
Suppose in a proposal (B0c)
′, there exist a x0j < c1, at stage 1, player 1
has best response ξ1 = x0j and gets payoff (pi
2
1 )
′ = c1−x0j . Then at stage 2,
(L2)′ = L1− x0j , the total estate left is E ′ = E− c1+ x0j and the total claim
is ∑ni=2 ci. By the assumption that theorem holds for n−1 players, the SPE
outcome starting from stage 2 gives the payoff pi2i = ci−min{ci,β ′}, i =
2, . . . ,n,∑ni=2pi2i = E ′ < E. In this subgame, player n gets a payoff no
greater than pi2n = min{0,cn−β ′}. Since E ′ < E, then we must have β ′ >
β .(By lemma 5.4.) So (pi1n )′ < pi1n . Player n has an incentive to deviate
from (B0c)
′ to B0c . Any proposal other than B0c cannot be part of the SPE.
The only SPE outcome is pi2i = min{0,ci−β} such that ∑pi2i = E.
5.4 The Non-Cooperative Game Γ
Game Γ(E,c) is a combination of game Γ1 and game Γ2. The game has
four steps. First, the estate is double. Then players distribute awards by
playing the Game Γ1(E,c). If there is any excess left, the players distribute
losses by playing the Game Γ2(E,c). In the end, all players get half of their
total payoff of these two games to balance the budget of the original estate.
Consider any bankruptcy problem (E,c).
Step 0 The total estate is doubled. Let Eˆ = 2E.
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Step 1 Game Γ1(Eˆ,c) is played with respect to the bankruptcy prob-
lem (Eˆ,c). The allocation for player i in step 1 is his payoff pi1i in game
Γ1(Eˆ,c).7 The game continues to Step 2.
Step 2 Game Γ2(Eˆ−∑pi1i ,c) is played with respect to the bankruptcy
problem (Eˆ−∑pi1i ,c). The allocation for player i in step 2 is his payoff pi2i
in game Γ2(Eˆ−∑pi1i ,c).8
Step 3 Player i takes the final payoff pii =
pi1i +pi
2
i
2 .
The next theorem shows that Game Γ(E,c) has a unique SPE out-
come which coincides with the Talmud solution of the bankruptcy problem
(E,c). First, it is shown that if the estate is not enough to grant every player
half of her claim, the doubled estate will be fully distributed by the end of
step 1. Second, if the estate is more than half of the total estate, in step 1,
every player’s payoff is his claim. Finally, the payoff for every player is
the allocation assigned by the Talmud solution.
Theorem 5.6. For any bankruptcy problem (E,c), the unique SPE outcome
of game Γ(E,c) is the allocation assigned by Talmud rule for the problem
(E,c).
5.4.1 Proof of Theorem 5.6
Before the proof of Theorem 5.6, we first need to show the homogeneity
of the Talmud solution.
Lemma 5.7 (Homogeneity of CEA and CEL).
CEA(λE,λc) = λCEA(E,c)
CEL(λE,λc) = λCEL(E,c)
Proof.
CEAi(E,c) = min{ci,α},with α solves∑min{ci,α}= E
7The restriction that Γ1 is played with respect to a strict bankruptcy problem is relaxed.
Eˆ < ∑ci is not required.
8The restriction that Γ2 is played with respect to a positive estate is relaxed. pi2i = 0 if
Eˆ−∑pi1i = 0.
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There is a unique α satisfying the above equation.
CEAi(λE,λc) = min{λci,α ′},s.t.∑min{λci,α ′}= λE
= λ min{ci, α
′
λ
},
s.t.∑λ min{ci, α
′
λ
}= 2E, i.e.∑min{ci, α
′
λ
}= E
By the uniqueness of α , we must have α = α
′
λ .
We have
CEA(λE,λc) = λ min{ci,α},s.t.∑min{ci,α}= E
= λCEA(E,c)
The proof of CEL(λE,λc) = λCEL(E,c) could be done similarly.
The following result immediately follows.
TALi(E,c) =

1
2
CEAi(2E,c) when ∑ci ≥ 2E;
1
2
(ci+CELi(2E−∑ci,c)) when ∑ci < 2E.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 5.6.
Proof. The proof is done by a series of claims.
Claim 1: if E ≤ ∑ci2 , in all SPE, Eˆ−∑pi1i = 0 in Step 2. Suppose there
are two SPE strategy profiles G and G ′. By following G , Eˆ−∑pi1i = 0 in
Step 2 and the payoff for any player i is pii =
pi1i
2 , while by following G
′,
Eˆ−∑pi1i > 0 and player’s payoff is (pii)′ = (pi
1
i )
′+(pi2i )′
2 .
105
In G ′, at the last stage of Step 1, it must be the case that (pi1n )′ = cn.9
So pi1n ≤ (pi1n )′. It implies that ∑n−1i=1 pi1i > ∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′.10
There must be at least one player j, j 6= n whose allocation in step 1 is
lower in G ′ than in G , i.e. c j ≥ pi1j > (pi1j )′. Suppose player j is the only
such player. At step 1, game Γ2 is played with respect to ((pi1j − (pi1j )′)−
(cn−pi1n ),c). Player j’s payoff is (pi2 j)′ < (pi1j −(pi1j )′)−(cn−pi1n )< pi1j −
(pi1j )′. His final payoff is (pi j)′ =
(pi1j )
′+(pi2j )′
2 <
pi1j
2 = pi j. So player j has an
incentive to deviate from G ′. G ′ cannot be an SPE.
Claim 2: if E ≥ ∑ci2 , in all SPE, the allocation in step 1 for every player
is pi1i = ci. Suppose there are two SPE strategy profiles G and G ′. By
following G , pi1i = ci for any i, while by following G ′, there exist at least
one player j such that (pi1j )′ < c j. Because the proposal at any stage in
step 1 must be efficient, we have j 6= n. Without loss of generality, assume
player j is the only such player. In G , the game in step 2 is game Γ2 with
respect to (Eˆ −∑ci,c). Player j’s allocation in step 2 is pi2j = max{c j−
β ,0}, where β solves∑max{ci−β ,0}= Eˆ−∑ci. Player j’s final payoff is
pi j =
c j+pi2j
2 . In G
′, the game in step 2 is game Γ2 with respect to (Eˆ−∑ci+
(c j− (pi1j )′),c). His allocation in step 2 is (pi2j )′ = max{c j−β ′,0}, where
β ′ solves ∑max{ci−β ′,0} = Eˆ−∑ci +(c j− (pi1j )′). His final payoff is
pi ′j =
(pi1j )
′+(pi2j )′
2 . It can be easily shown that (pi
2
j )
′−pi2j < c j− (pi1j )′.11 So
player j must have an incentive to deviate from G ′ which is not an SPE.
Claim 3, in all SPE, the final payoff for every player in game Γ co-
incides with his payoff assigned by Talmud rule in bankruptcy problem
(E, c). By claim 1 and theorem 5.2, for all bankruptcy game (E,c) such
that E ≤ ∑ci2 , the final payoff for any player i is pii =
pi1i
2 =
CEAi(2E,c)
2 =
TALi(E,c). The last equality follows from the homogeneity of TAL.
By claim 2, for all bankruptcy game (E,c) such that E > ∑ci2 , the al-
location in step is pi1i = ci. By theorem 5.3, in step 2 the allocation is
pi2i =CELi(2E−∑ci,c). The final payoff for any player i is pii = pi
1
i +pi
2
i
2 =
9Eˆ−∑pi1i > 0⇔ Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′− (pi1n )′ > 0⇔ Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′ > (pi1n )′ > 0. Because
(pi1n )′ = max{0,min{cn,E−∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′}}, we must have (pi1n )′ = cn.
10At G , if pi1n = cn, we must have Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 pi1i = cn. Since Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′ > cn, which
means Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 (pi1i )′ > Eˆ−∑n−1i=1 pi1i .
11(pi2j )′−pi2j < c j− (pi1j )′.
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ci+CELi(2E−∑ci,c)
2 = TALi(E,c). The last equality follows from the homo-
geneity of TAL.
The idea is that the estate is doubled at the beginning of the game to
support players working with their claims (rather than half of their claims).
The final payoff is halved in order to balance the budget.
5.4.2 The Uniqueness of SPE
In the above model, there exist multiple SPE which lead to the same out-
come. A simple modification of the rules could achieve the unique SPE.
First assume that a player always prefers the share equal to his claim in
the proposal rather than any share higher, since choosing any higher share
would also give the same amount as their claims. In any stage s > 0, if
the proposer makes a new proposal, he bears a cost of µ . µ is a pure loss
which will not be awarded to any other players. Explicitly:
In game Γ1µ , at each stage s > 0, there is a potential cost µ1s for player
n.
• If θs ≤ cs, µ1s = 0.
• If θs > cs, µ1s = ε,ε > 0.
Then at stage n, player n leaves the game with payoff
pi1n = max{0,min{cn,E−
n−1
∑
i=1
pi1i }−
n−1
∑
i=1
µ1i }.
In game Γ2µ , at each stage s > 0, there is a potential cost µ2s for player
n.
• If ξs ≤ cs, µ2s = 0.
• If ξs > cs, µ2s = ε,ε > 0.
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Then at stage n, player n leaves the game with payoff
pi2n = max{0,min{cn,E−
n−1
∑
i=1
pi2i }−
n−1
∑
i=1
µ2i }.
The game Γµ is a combination of game Γ1µ and Γ2µ .
It imposes a cost on the proposer for redistribution during the game. In
order to minimise the cost, the proposer would make the proposal as the
desired allocation at stage 0 in each step. The game Γµ has a unique SPE
whose outcome is the Talmud solution of the corresponding bankruptcy
problem.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we introduce a non-cooperative game whose unique SPE
outcome is the Talmud solution of the corresponding bankruptcy problem.
Not only it provides a profounding foundation for the Talmud solution, but
also due to the close connection of the Talmud solution and the prenucle-
olous in TU game, it could potentially be a step towards the noncooperative
approach of the solution in TU game.
The current model requires player n to make a redistribution every time
a player makes choice higher than his claim. The timing of the redistribu-
tion can be modified without changing the outcome. A game Γd is defined
similarly as Γ only that the differences between every player’s choice and
his claim are accumulated until the end of the game. After player n receives
his payoff, the accumulated estate/losses is shared among all players whose
claims have not been satisfied/sacrificed completely, following the rules of
game Γ2. It can be shown that game Γd yields the TAL solution as the only
SPE outcome.
Chun et al. (2001) proposed a reversed Talmud rule which applies CEL
first and if there is excess after the initial distribution, CEA is applied. By
switching the order of the two games in step 2 and 3, our model yields a
unique SPE outcome that coincides with the reverse Talmud rule.
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Furthermore, the model is not restricted to bankruptcy problem. For
surplus sharing problems, where the estate to be distributed is bigger than
the total of claims, the model could be modified accordingly and reach
solutions with distinctive features. The mechanism for the surplus sharing
problem (E,c), where E > ∑ci is a multi-step game. Starting from step 0,
let stage k+1 be the final stage.
If in every step game Γ1 is played,then the SPE outcome for the game
is pii = kci +CEAi(E − k∑ci,c). According to this solution, the estate is
shared proportional to the players’ claims up to a point where the remain-
ing estate is not enough to share another round. Then the remaining is
distributed by CEA. If in every stage game Γ2 is played,then the SPE out-
come for the game is pii = kci+CELi(E−k∑ci,c). Similarly, the problem
is reduced to a bankruptcy problem by awarding all players k times of their
claims until the remaining estate is less than the sum of all the claims. Then
the remaining is distributed by CEL.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
As put by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) “It is not possible to understand
the peculiarities and the forces behind human cooperation unless we un-
derstand social norms.” The thesis consists experimental and theoretical
studies on social norms and cooperation.
The four chapters include three experimental studies respectively on
the Golden Rule in the context of the ultimatum game, on trust and expected-
norm in the context of the trust game and on the cooperative behaviour in
the context of the public goods game; and a theoretical study that builds
a link between the cooperative and non-cooperative interpretation of the
Talmud solution in the bankruptcy problems.
The first two chapters focus on effects of social norms on people’s be-
haviour in strategic situations. Chapter 2 discusses the Golden Rule in
a simple bargaining situation. I experimentally test whether people do not
treat others in ways that they themselves find not agreeable, which is called
role-reversal consistency. The results show that over three quarters of the
subjects are role-reversal consistent. Such subjects are more accurate pre-
dictors of whether others accept the way they treat them and also earn more
money than role-reversal inconsistent subjects. Furthermore, regression
analysis shows that role-reversal consistency is not the result of strategic
behaviour, in the sense of maximisation of one’s expected monetary earn-
ings given one’s beliefs about one’s opponent’s behaviour. I also find a
higher rate of role-reversal consistency under the response method than
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under the strategy method. In Chapter 3, I explore the phenomenon of peo-
ple’s expectation of social norms and their own behaviour in the context of
trust and trustworthiness and investigate how people’s trust and trustwor-
thiness are connected to their beliefs about their opponents. The results
confirm that about half of the subjects carry out their actions based on their
beliefs of what the others would do in their positions. Moreover, subjects’
behaviour as trustees are significantly influenced by their experience and
feedback of playing the trustors role. The experience of playing the trustees
role, even without feedback information, helps the trustors make a better
prediction of the trustees’ behaviour.
In next two chapters, I study the way people cooperate and how to
sustain the cooperative results for all the people involved, using both theo-
retical and experimental methods.
Chapter 4 experimentally explores the mechanisms that make people
more willing to cooperate and increase the overall welfare in a public goods
game. I show that compared to the unanimity rule, the majority/plurality
rule significantly decreases the institution initiation rate, but at the same
time also significantly increases the implementation rate of institutions. In
the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the vot-
ing rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or effi-
ciency.
In Chapter 5, I theoretically study a well-established cooperative solu-
tion for the bankruptcy problem. I first propose two games that yield the
constraint equal awards allocation and constraint equal losses allocation re-
spectively as their unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE) outcomes.
I then integrate the two games to achieve the Talmud solution in SPE. Fi-
nally, modifications to the games are introduced such that the game’s SPE
is unique and the procedure could be extended to a family of “Talmud-
related” solutions in bankruptcy problems and surplus sharing problems.
Besides the results presented above, two design features in experiments
from the first two chapters also contribute to the methodology of experi-
mental study of games.
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First of all, the three-group-three-part design used in Chapter 2 and
3 structurally guarantees a role-reversal in a two-role game. It makes sure
subjects only interact with the same opponent once. The three-group-three-
part design could be a useful device when a strict role-reversal matching is
required and reputation and reciprocity needs to be suppressed in the game
play. It also allows for the study of the effect of experience and feedback
information on decision making and beliefs. The experience is specific to
that of playing in the opposite role rather than the role that a subject is
currently playing.
Secondly, in the belief elicitation task used in Chapter 2 and 3, subjects
state probability distribution over certain events instead of making a guess
of which event is likely to happen. It allows subjects to state equal prob-
ability over two or more events which might represent their view of the
situation more accurately. The elicitation of subjects’ probability distribu-
tion is commonly used to assess subject’s risk attitude. However, in studies
involving social norms, it is rarely used due to its complex nature. But in
the afore mentioned two experiments, we have shown that the stated prob-
ability distribution allows us to have a closer look of how subjects evaluate
the situation.
Appendix A
Instructions and Screenshots for
Experiment in Chapter 2
A.1 Instructions – Introductory remarks (com-
mon to both treatments)
WELCOME!
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO
START
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision-making. Uni-
versities have provided the funds for this experiment.
In this experiment we will first ask you to read instructions that explain
the decision scenarios you will be faced with. Next, you will be asked to
make decisions that will allow you to earn money.
Your monetary earnings will be determined by your decisions and the
decisions of other participants in the experiment. All that you earn is yours
to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today’s session.
Your earnings will be kept strictly anonymous.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s
work. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise
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your hand, and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will forfeit your earnings.
Thank you.
The experiment consists of three parts, parts I, II and III. You will par-
ticipate in two parts. In each part in which you participate, you will anony-
mously interact with other participants in the room. For the entire exper-
iment today, you will not interact with any participant more than once.
Thus, if you interact with a participant in one part, you will not interact
with him/her in the other part in which you participate. The decisions that
you make in a part will NEITHER influence the decisions you will be faced
with NOR the participants you will interact with in the next part in which
you participate.
We will now randomly determine the two parts in which you will par-
ticipate.
You will participate in parts <? > and <? >.
A.2 Instructions – Feedback Treatment
Instructions for Proposers - Offer stage
In this part, you will be asked to decide how to split £7 with each of
ten other participants. That is, for each pairing with another participant,
you will propose £X for you, and £(7-X) for her/him (X has to be a whole
number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6, 7)).
For each pairing, upon being informed of how you want to split the £7,
the other participant will either accept or not accept your proposed split.
If the other participant accepts your proposed split you will receive £X,
and s/he will receive £(7-X). If the other participant does not accept your
proposed split, you will receive £0, and the other participant will receive
£0.
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In summary, you will make one proposal that will be sent to ten other
participants. Each of them will separately and independently decide whether
to accept or reject your proposal.
After your proposal has been made and accepted or rejected by each
of the ten participants who receive it, you will be informed about each of
their decisions.
Two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly at the end of the
session, and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus,
the chance that you will be paid for a particular outcome is one in five.
Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also has the same chances
(as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for Responders
In this part, you will receive ten proposals, each from a different partic-
ipant, on how to split £7 with her/him. That is, for each of ten pairings with
other participants, you will receive a proposal of £Y for you, and £(7-Y)
for her/him (Y has to be a whole number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . ,
6, 7)).
For each pairing, upon being informed of how the other participant
wants to split the £7, you will either accept her/his proposed split, or will
not accept it. If you accept the proposed split you will receive £Y, and
s/he will receive £(7-Y). If you do not accept the proposed split, you will
receive £0, and the other participant will receive £0.
In summary, you will receive ten proposals made separately and inde-
pendently by ten different participants. You will then decide whether to
accept or reject each of the ten proposals you receive.
After you have made a decision on each of the ten proposals you re-
ceive, each of the other participants will be informed of the outcome of his
or her own proposal (but not that of others’).
Two of the ten outcomes will be chosen randomly at the end of the
session, and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them. Thus,
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the chance that you will be paid for a particular outcome is one in five.
Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also has the same chances
(as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for Idle-Subjects
You are not participating in this part.
Please be patient and wait until this part is over.
A.3 Instructions – No-Feedback Treatment
Instructions for Proposers - Offer stage
In this part, you will be asked to decide how to split £7 with each of
ten other participants. That is, for each pairing with another participant,
you will propose £X for you, and £(7-X) for her/him (X has to be a whole
number between 0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6, 7)).
For each pairing, the other participant will not be shown your proposed
split, but instead will be asked to accept or not accept each of the eight
feasible splits ((£0 for you, and £7 for her/him), (£1 for you, and £6 for
her/him), . . . , (£7 for you, and £0 for her/him)). upon being informed
of how you want to split the £7, the other participant will either accept
or not accept your proposed split. If the other participant accepts your
proposed split you will receive £X, and s/he will receive £(7-X). If the
other participant does not accept your proposed split, you will receive £0,
and the other participant will receive £0.
In summary, you will make one proposal that will be sent to ten other
participants. Each of them will separately and independently have to de-
cide whether they would accept or reject each of the feasible proposed
splits.
After your proposal has been made, and each of the ten other partici-
pants to whom you are paired has decided whether they would accept or
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reject each of the feasible proposed splits, your proposal will be matched
to each of their accept/reject decisions for your proposed split, and an out-
come for each pairing will be determined. You will only be informed about
the outcomes at the end of the session.
Moreover, at the end of the session, two of the ten outcomes will be
chosen randomly, and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them.
Thus, the chance that you will be paid for a particular outcome is one in
five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also has the same
chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for Responders
In this part, each of ten participants will make a proposal on how to split
£7 between you and her/him. That is, for each of ten pairings with other
participants, each of the 10 participants paired to you will make a proposal
of £Y for you, and £(7-Y) for her/him (Y has to be a whole number between
0 and 7, i.e., (0, 1, . . . , 6, 7)).
Since you will not be informed how each of the other participant wants
to split the £7 between you and her/him, you will be asked to decide
whether you would accept or not accept each of the eight feasible splits
((£0 for you, and £7 for her/him), (£1 for you, and £6 for her/him), . . . , (£7
for you, and £0 for her/him)). For each of the feasible splits if you accept
it you will receive £Y, and s/he will receive £(7-Y), if £Y is the amount
proposed to you. If you do not accept the proposed split, you will receive
£0, and the other participant will receive £0.
In summary, ten different participants will separately and independently
each make a proposal on how to split £7 with you. Since you will not see
the proposals you will be asked to decide for each of them whether to ac-
cept or reject each of the feasible splits.
After you have decided whether you would accept or reject each of the
feasible splits, each of the ten proposals will be matched to your accept/re-
ject decision for the proposed split, and an outcome for each pairing will
117
be determined. You will only be informed about the outcomes at the end
of the session.
Moreover, at the end of the session, two of the ten outcomes will be
chosen randomly, and you will be paid the sum of your earnings in them.
Thus, the chance that you will be paid for a particular outcome is one in
five. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant also has the same
chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for Idle-Subjects
You are not participating in this part.
Please be patient and wait until this part is over.
A.4 Instructions for Proposers’ Belief Elicita-
tion stage (common to both treatments)
To finish this part we now ask you to give us your ESTIMATE about the
chance a randomly chosen participant would accept each of the different
feasible splits. Specifically, we ask you for each feasible split, how likely
do you think that some other participant would accept it?
You will be asked to answer with a percentage number. If you are ab-
solutely sure that that other participant would ACCEPT the proposed split,
then you would want to answer with 100%. If you think it is absolutely
certain that the other participant would REJECT the proposed split, then
you would want to answer with 0%. If you are less certain that that other
participant would ACCEPT the proposed split, then you would want to re-
spond with an intermediate percentage number, reflecting what you think.
A higher number would indicate a stronger tendency towards acceptance,
and a lower number would indicate a stronger tendency towards rejection.
You will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimates, as follows:
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First, we will randomly select two proposed splits (drawn from the pool
of proposals made by all the participants making proposals, including you)
received by two participants who were asked to reject or accept them.
Second, for each of the two proposed splits selected, we compute your
reward which is equal to 100 points (each point is worth one pence), minus
a number “L” (short for “loss”) that indicates how well your estimate indi-
cates the decision made by the participant who faced that proposed split.
This number L is determined in several simple steps. The first step is
to identify the decision of the participant who received the proposal, i.e.,
we look up whether s/he accepted or rejected that proposed split. If it was
ACCEPT, we take the difference between 100 and your estimate (which
we call “ESTIMATE” in the following formula).
Then, this difference is multiplied by itself, and then multiplied by
0.01, yielding the number L.
If, on the other hand, the actual value of that other participant was RE-
JECT, then we simply take your ESTIMATE, multiplied by itself and then
by 0.01, to arrive at the number L. Expressed as a formula, your earnings
from the estimate are therefore given by:
100−L, where:
• if the other participant’s decision was ACCEPT: L = 0.01× (100−
ESTIMATE)× (100−ESTIMATE);
• if the other participant’s decision was REJECT: L= 0.01×ESTIMATE×
ESTIMATE.
You can convince yourself that with this formula, you will earn an
amount between £0.00 and £1.00, and that you will earn more money if
your ESTIMATE is closer to indicating correctly the other participant’s
DECISION. It will therefore pay off for you to report a good guess. In
fact, your expected earnings are maximal if you report truthfully what you
think is the chance that the other participant ACCEPTED the proposed
split. (We skip a more mathematical version of this property, and you can
trust us on this. But fairly obviously, it has to do with the fact that L is a
positive number, and that it is smaller the better is your estimate.)
119
Example: Suppose that the other participant ACCEPTS the proposed
split choice (this decision is hypothetical, and not the actual decision of
that other participant). Your task is to estimate this decision - you earn
more points if your estimate better reflects the other participant’s decision.
With the above formula, you can verify that for this given outcome of the
other participant’s decision, you would receive:
• 100 points, if your estimate of the other participant’s decision AC-
CEPTING the proposed split is 100%, or
• 100−9 = 91 points, if your estimate of the other participant’s deci-
sion ACCEPTING the proposed split is 70%, or
• 100−81 = 19 points if your estimate of the other participant’s deci-
sion ACCEPTING the proposed split is 10%.
If you have a question on this procedure, please raise your hand. Oth-
erwise, please give us now your estimates that the other participant would
ACCEPT each of the feasible splits (a percentage number between 0% and
100%).
If for some reason you want to change any of your decisions, simply
re-enter a new number. You have to confirm your decisions (by clicking
the OK button) to make them final. Once you confirm your decisions you
will not be able to change them.
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A.5 Screenshots
FIGURE A.1: Proposers’ decision screen in both treatments
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FIGURE A.2: Responders’ decision screen in the response treatment
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FIGURE A.3: Responders’ initial decision screen for pairing #1 (optional 2nd screen for pairings #2 to #10) in the strategy treatment
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FIGURE A.4: Responders’ decision screen for pairings #2 to #10 in the strategy treatment
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FIGURE A.5: Proposers’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments
Appendix B
Instructions and Screenshots for
Experiment in Chapter 3
B.1 Instructions – Introductory remarks (com-
mon to both treatments)
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO
START
Welcome to our experiment!
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision-making. In
this experiment we will first ask you to read instructions that explain the
decision scenarios you will be faced with. Next, you will be asked to make
decisions that will allow you to earn money. Your monetary earnings will
be determined by your decisions and the decisions of other participants
who interact with you in the experiment. All that you earn is yours to keep,
and will be paid to you in private, in cash, at the end of today’s session.
Your earnings will be kept strictly anonymous.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s
work. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise
your hand, and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will forfeit your earnings.
Thank you.
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The experiment consists of three parts, parts I, II and III. You will par-
ticipate in two parts. In each part in which you participate, you will anony-
mously interact with other participants in the room. You will not interact
with any participant more than once throughout the experiment. Thus,
if you interact with a participant in one part, you will not interact with
him/her in the other part in which you participate. The decisions that you
make in a part will influence NEITHER the decisions you will be faced
with NOR the participants you will interact with in the next part in which
you participate.
We will now randomly determine the two parts in which you will par-
ticipate.
You will participate in parts <? > and <? >.
B.2 Instructions – No-Feedback Treatment
Instructions for trustors – Send stage
In this part, you will be anonymously paired with two other partici-
pants. For each pairing, you will be allocated £3 and the other participant
will be allocated £0. Next, for each pairing, you will decide how much
out of £3 to send to the other participant, keeping the rest for yourself.
That is, for each of the two participants paired with you, you will send £X
to him/her, and keep £(3-X) for yourself. Note that X has to be a whole
amount in pounds between 0 and 3, i.e., (0, 1, 2, 3). The amount of money
you send to each of the other participants, £X, will be tripled (by the exper-
imenter). Hence, each of them will receive £(3×X). In summary, after you
send £X to each of the two other participants, you will have £(3-X), and
each of them will have £(3×X). However, the other participants will not be
told how much you sent. Thus, neither of them will know how much s/he
has as a result of your decision.
Next, each of the other two participants, will independently decide how
much out of her/his money, £(3×X), to send back to you, with her/him
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keeping the rest for her/himself. Since s/he does not know how much s/he
has, s/he will be asked to specify for each of the three feasible amounts
s/he could receive (i.e., £3, £6, £9), how much s/he would like to send back
to you, £Y which will also be a whole amount in pounds, and which can
vary with the amount s/he has, £(3×X). (Note that the other participants
do not need to specify how much you would return if you were to send £0,
because they would receive £0, and so can only send you £0.)
After both you and they have decided, we will match your actual de-
cision of how much you sent them, i.e., £X, with the decision each of
them made on how much s/he would send back to you if s/he were to have
£(3×X) after your decision, to determine the amounts earned by each of
you.
Your earnings for each pairing will be equal to the sum of the amount
you keep for yourself, i.e. £(3-X) plus the amount sent back to you by
the other participant, £Y. Each of the other two participants will earn the
amount they keep for themselves out of £(3×X) they have after your deci-
sion of sending £X, i.e., £(3×X-Y).
In summary, for each pairing, you will decide how much out of £3 you
send to the other participant, keeping the rest for yourself. Each of the
other participants receive the triple of the amount sent by you. They will
separately and independently decide how much they would send back to
you for each of your feasible decisions. After both you and they make
your decisions, we will, for each pairing, match your decision with that of
the other participant to determine that pairing’s outcome, i.e., the amount
earned by each of you. However, you will only be informed about the
outcomes at the end of the entire experiment. At that time, one of the two
pairings will be randomly chosen, and you will be paid the earnings of its
outcome in cash. Thus, the chance that you will be paid for a particular
outcome is one in two. Likewise, for each pairing, the other participant
also has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her earnings.
[Only shown in the Feedback Treatment]: You will be informed about
the actual amounts the others returned to you and your earnings at the end
of this part.
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Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for trustees – Return stage
In this part, you will be anonymously paired with two other partici-
pants. For each pairing, you will be allocated £0 and the other participants
will be allocated £3. Each of the other two participants will independently
decide how much of the £3 to send to you, keeping the rest for him/her-
self. That is, each of the other two participants paired with you will send
£X to you, and will keep £(3-X) for her/himself. Note that X has to be a
whole amount in pounds between 0 and 3, i.e., (0, 1, 2, 3). The amount
of money each of the other participants sends to you, £X, will be tripled
(by the experimenter). Hence, you will receive £(3×X). In summary, after
each of the other participants sends £X to you, you will have £(3×X), and
s/he will have £(3-X). However, you will not be told how much each of
the other participants sent you. Thus, you won’t know how much you have
received for each of the pairings.
Next, you will decide, for each of the three feasible amounts you might
receive (3×X)(i.e., £3, £6, £9), how much you would like to send back to
each of the other two participants, £Y, keeping the rest for yourself. £Y
is a whole amount in pounds, which can vary with the amount you have,
£(3×X). (You do not need to specify how much you would return if you
were to receive £0, because you could only send back £0.)
After both you and they have decided, we will match their actual de-
cisions of how much they sent you, i.e., £X, with the decision you made
on how much you would send back to each of them if you were to have
received £(3×X) as a result of their decisions, to determine the amounts
earned by each of you. Your earnings for each pairing will the amount
you keep for yourself out of (3×X) (the money you have after they send
you £X), i.e. £(3×X - Y). Each of the other two participants will earn
the amount they keep for themselves out of their initial allocation of £3,
£(3-X), plus the amount sent back by you £Y.
In summary, each of the other two participants will decide how much
out of £3 to send to you, keeping the rest for him/herself. You will receive
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the triple sent by him/her. You will then decide how much you would send
back to each of them for each of their feasible decisions. After both you and
they make your decisions, we will, for each pairing, match your decision
with that of the other participant to determine that pairing’s outcome, i.e.,
the amount earned by each of you. However, you will only be informed
about the outcomes at the end of the entire experiment. At that time, one
of the two pairings will be randomly chosen, and you will be paid the
earnings of that outcome in cash. Thus, the chance that you will be paid
for a particular outcome is one in two. Likewise, for each pairing, the
other participant also has the same chances (as you) of being paid his/her
earnings.
[Only shown in the Feedback Treatment]: You will be informed about
the actual amounts the others sent to you and your earnings at the end of
this part.
Are there any questions? Please do not talk with others during the
experiment.
Instructions for Idle-Subjects
You are not participating in this part.
Please be patient and wait until this part is over.
B.3 Instructions for Belief Elicitation stage (com-
mon to both treatments)
Instructions for trustors - After the Send stage
To finish this part, we now ask you to give us your ESTIMATE about
the chance that one of the two participants paired with you would send
back a certain amount out of what they received.
Specifically, given that that other participant has received< £3×SEND>,
we ask you how likely you think that s/he would send back £0; how likely
130
you think that s/he would send back £1; · · · ; how likely you think that s/he
would send back < £3×SEND >.
You will be asked to answer with a percentage number. If you are
absolutely sure that s/he would send back to you a specific amount out
of < £3× SEND >, then you would want to answer with 100% for this
amount. If you think it is absolutely certain that s/he would NOT send
back a specific amount to you, then you would want to answer with 0% for
that amount. If you are less certain that s/he would send back that amount,
then you would want to respond with an intermediate percentage number
(somewhere between 0% and 100%), reflecting what you think. Note that
one and only one of the amounts that you are asked to state your estimate
about will actually be sent back by her/him, thus the sum of all percent-
age numbers you stated should be 100%. Assigning a higher percentage
number to a particular amount would indicate that you estimate a stronger
tendency towards that amount being actually sent back by her/him, while
assigning a lower number to it would indicate that you estimate a stronger
tendency that the stated amount is not the amount actually sent back by
her/him.
You will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimates, as follows:
First, we select the participant whose decisions will be used to deter-
mine your earnings from your estimates. That participant is the one whose
decisions were NOT randomly chosen to determine your earnings in the
previous task, i.e., the one whose decisions of how much to sent back
were NOT chosen to determine how much you earned given the amount
of money you sent.
Next, we compute your reward which is equal to 100 points (each point
is worth one pence), minus a number “L” (short for “loss”) that indicates
how well your estimate is when compared to the actual amount sent back
by that other participant. You will be paid £0.02 for each point you earn in
this task.
This number L is determined in several steps.
First, we look how well you estimated the amount actually sent back
by her/him. We identify the decision of the other participant, i.e. look up
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how much he/she did send back to you. Your estimate (a percentage num-
ber between 0 and 100) for that particular amount will be compared with
100. We take the difference between 100 and your estimate (the percent-
age number between 0 and 100). The difference is squared (multiplied by
itself), and then multiplied by 0.005.
Second, we also take into account how well you predicted the remain-
ing possible amounts (which were not chosen by him/her) would be sent
back to you. Each of these estimates (numbers between 0 and 100) will be
squared (multiplied by itself) and multiplied by 0.005.
The number L is the sum of the numbers computed above.
You will earn an amount between £0.00 and £2.00, and you will earn
more money if your estimate is closer to indicating correctly the amount
sent back to you by her/him. It will therefore pay you to make a good
guess. In fact, your expected earnings are maximal, if for each feasible
amount, you report truthfully what you think is the chance that the other
participant would send that amount back to you. (We skip a more math-
ematical version of this property, and you can trust us on this. But fairly
obviously, it has to do with the fact that L is a positive number, and that it
is smaller the better is your estimate.)
To illustrate what your payment would be for this task, we will consider
three examples.
[For trustors who send £1]
Example 1: Suppose the other participant sends back £1, and your es-
timates for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 10%, 20%, 30%, 40% . The
number of points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−10)2−0.005(100−
20)2−0.005(0−30)−0.005(0−40)2 = 54). At £0.02 for each point, you
will earn £1.08 for this task.
Example 2: Suppose the other participant sends back £2, and your es-
timates for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%. The num-
ber of points you would earn is (100− 0.005(0− 0)2− 0.005(0− 0)2−
0.005(100− 100)2− 0.005(0− 0)2 = 100). At £0.02 for each point, you
will earn £2 for this task.
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Example 3: Suppose the other participant sends back £3, and your es-
timates for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%. The num-
ber of points you would earn is (100− 0.005(0− 0)2− 0.005(0− 0)2−
0.005(0−100)2−0.005(100−0)2 = 0). You earn nothing for this task.
[For trustors who send £2]
Example 1: Suppose the other participant sends £1, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3, £4, £5, £6 respectively are 10%, 20%, 10%, 20%, 10%,
20%, 10%. The number of points you would earn is (100− 0.005(0−
10)2− 0.005(100− 20)2− 0.005(0− 10)2− 0.005(0− 20)2− 0.005(0−
10)2− 0.005(0− 20)2− 0.005(0− 10)2 = 62). At £0.02 for each point,
you will earn £1.24 for this task.
Example 2: Suppose the other participant sends £2, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3, £4, £5, £6 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%, · · · , 0%.
The number of points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−
0)2−0.005(100−100)2−0.005(0−0)2−·· ·−0.005(0−0)2 = 100). At
£0.02 for each point, you will earn £2 for this task.
Example 3: Suppose the other participant sends £3, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3, £4, £5, £6 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%, · · · , 0%.
The number of points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−
0)2−0.005(0−100)2−0.005(100−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−
0.005(0−0)2 = 0). You earn nothing for this task.
[For trustors who send £3]
Example 1: Suppose the other participant sends £1, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, · · · , £9 respectively are 10%, 10%, · · · , 10%. The number
of points you would earn is (100− 0.005(0− 10)2− 0.005(100− 10)2−
0.005(0−10)2−·· ·−0.005(0−10)2 = 55). At £0.02 for each point, you
will earn £1.1 for this task.
Example 2: Suppose the other participant sends £2, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, · · · , £9 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%, · · · , 0%. The
number of points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−
0.005(100−100)2−0.005(0−0)2−·· ·−0.005(0−0)2 = 100). At £0.02
for each point, you will earn £2 for this task.
Example 3: Suppose the other participant sends £3, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, · · · , £9 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%, · · · , 0%. The
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number of points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−
0.005(0− 100)2− 0.005(100− 0)2− ·· ·− 0.005(0− 0)2 = 0). You earn
nothing for this task.
N.B. The numbers used in these examples were selected arbitrarily.
They are NOT intended to suggest how anyone might respond in any situ-
ation.
If you have a question about this procedure, please raise your hand.
Otherwise, please give us your estimates (a percentage number between
0% and 100%) for each of the feasible amounts the other participant could
return to you. If for some reason you want to change any of your esti-
mates, simply re-enter a new number. You have to confirm your estimates
(by clicking the OK button) to make them final. Your estimates will be
accepted only if they add up to 100. Once you confirm your estimates you
will not be able to change them.
A calculator will be available on the next screen where you enter your
estimates.
Instructions for trustees - Before the Return stage
To finish this part, we now ask you to give us your ESTIMATE about
the chance that one of the two participants paired with you would send you
a certain amount out of the £3 initially allocated to her/him.
Specifically, we ask you how likely you think that that other participant
would send you £0, how likely you think that the other participant would
send you £1 (in which case you would receive £3 after £1 is tripled by the
experimenter), how likely you think that s/he participant would send you
£2 (in which case you would receive £6 after £2 is tripled by the experi-
menter), how likely you think that s/he would send you £3 (in which case
you would receive £9 after £3 is tripled by the experimenter)?
You will be asked to answer with a percentage number. If you are ab-
solutely sure that s/he would send you a specific amount, then you would
want to answer with 100% for that amount. If you think it is absolutely
certain that the other participant would NOT send that amount, then you
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would want to answer with 0%. If you are less certain that that other par-
ticipant would send that amount, then you would want to respond with an
intermediate percentage number between 0% and 100%, reflecting what
you think. Note that one and only one of the amounts that you are asked
to state your estimate about will actually be sent by her/him, thus the sum
of all percentage numbers you stated should be 100%. Assigning a higher
percentage number to a particular amount would indicate that you estimate
a stronger tendency towards that amount being actually sent by her/him,
while assigning a lower number to it would indicate that you estimate a
stronger tendency that the stated amount is not the amount actually sent by
her/him.
You will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimates, as follows:
First, we select the participant whose decisions will be used to deter-
mine your earnings from your estimates. That participant is the one whose
decisions were NOT randomly chosen to determine your earnings in the
previous task, i.e., the one whose decisions were NOT chosen to determine
how much you earned given the amount of money you sent back.
Next, we compute your reward which is equal to 100 points (each point
is worth one pence), minus a number “L” (short for “loss”) that indicates
how well your estimate is when compared to the actual amount sent by
that other participant. You will be paid £0.02 for each point you earn in
this task.
This number L is determined in several steps.
First, we look how well you estimated the decision actually made by
her/him. We identify the decision of the other participant, i.e. look up
how much he/she did send. Your estimate (a percentage number between
0 and 100) for that particular amount will be compared with 100. We
take the difference between 100 and your estimate (the percentage number
between 0 and 100). The difference is squared (multiplied by itself), and
then multiplied by 0.005.
Second, we also take into account how well you predicted the remain-
ing 3 possible amounts (which were not chosen by him/her) would be cho-
sen. Each of these estimates (numbers between 0 and 100) will be squared
(multiplied by itself) and multiplied by 0.005.
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The number L is the sum of the 4 numbers computed above.
You will earn an amount between £0.00 and £2.00, and you will earn
more money if your estimate is closer to indicating correctly the other par-
ticipant’s decision. It will therefore pay you to make a good guess. In fact,
your expected earnings are maximal if you report truthfully what you think
is the chance that the other participant would do. (We skip a more math-
ematical version of this property, and you can trust us on this. But fairly
obviously, it has to do with the fact that L is a positive number, and that it
is smaller the better is your estimate.)
Example 1: Suppose the other participant sends £1, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%. The number
of points you would earn is (100− 0.005(0− 10)2− 0.005(100− 20)2−
0.005(0−30)2−0.005(0−40)2 = 54). At £0.02 for each point, you will
earn £1.08 for this task.
Example 2: Suppose the other participant sent £2, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%. The number of
points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(100−
100)2− 0.005(0− 0)2 = 100). At £0.02 for each point, you will earn £2
for this task.
Example 3: Suppose the other participant sent £3, and your estimates
for £0, £1, £2, £3 respectively are 0%, 0%, 100%, 0%. The number of
points you would earn is (100−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−0)2−0.005(0−
100)2−0.005(100−0)2 = 0). You earn nothing for this task.
N.B. The numbers used in these examples were selected arbitrarily.
They are NOT intended to suggest how anyone might respond in any situ-
ation.
If you have a question about this procedure, please raise your hand.
Otherwise, please give us your estimates (a percentage number between
0% and 100%) for each of the 4 feasible amounts the other participant
could send you. If for some reason you want to change any of your esti-
mates, simply re-enter a new number. You have to confirm your estimates
(by clicking the OK button) to make them final. Your estimates will be
accepted only if they add up to 100. Once you confirm your estimates you
will not be able to change them.
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A calculator will be available on the next screen where you enter your
estimates.
B.4 Screenshots
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FIGURE B.1: Trustors’ decision screen in both treatments
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FIGURE B.2: Trustees’ decision screen in both treatments
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FIGURE B.3: Trustors’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments (for trustors who send £1)
140
FIGURE B.4: Trustors’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments (for trustors who send £2)
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FIGURE B.5: Trustors’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments (for trustors who send £3)
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FIGURE B.6: Trustees’ belief-elicitation decision screen in both treatments
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FIGURE B.7: Trustors’ feedback in Feedback treatment
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FIGURE B.8: Trustees’ feedback in Feedback treatment
Appendix C
Instructions and Questionnaire
for Experiment in Chapter 4
This appendix presents the English translation of the instructions1 that we
used in the Treatment PLU3SUB in which participants played three se-
quences of two games, and the post-experimental questionnaire. In the
first two sequences, the interaction started at the implementation stage (and
the participation stage was automatized by forcing everyone into the insti-
tution). In the third sequence the complete three-stage game was imple-
mented as explained in the main text. Instructions for other sessions and
the original Japanese versions are available upon request.
C.1 General Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
You are about to participate in an experiment, which will help us to
study decision-making and economic behavior. In this experiment, we will
first ask you to read the instructions which explain the rules. Then you
will be asked to make a series of decisions that will allow you to earn
money. Your earnings will depend on the decisions you make and also
on the decisions others make. During the experiment your earnings are
counted in points. At the end of the experiment your earnings in points
will be exchanged into Japanese yen at a rate of
1Instructions in Japanese and zTree codes are available upon request from the author.
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2 Points = 1 JPY.
We will pay you at the end of the experiment in cash. Your identity, deci-
sions and earnings will be kept strictly anonymous and confidential.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s
work. If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise
your hand, and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will forfeit your earnings.
There are 20 people participating in today’s experiment. You will later
be divided into two groups of 10 people. The experiment is divided into
three sections. Each section consists of 20 rounds. You will interact with
the same group of people in one section, but after each section, the mem-
bers in your group will be changed. Other members of your group will
face the same situation as yours. You will receive detailed instructions at
the beginning of each section.
C.2 Instructions for Section I and II
In each round, you will receive 20 points, and you will be required to de-
cide how many of them to keep to yourself and how many to contribute to
a public project.
We first explain how the contribution you make to the public project
benefit you and other members of the group. Your earnings in each round
is the sum of the money you keep for yourself and the benefit from the
public project, minus a cost. Expressed with the help of a formula:
1. Earnings = points you keep + benefit from the project − cost
The benefit from the public project is the same for each group mem-
ber and it is determined in the following way:
2. Benefit from the project = 0.4 ∗ (total contribution by group mem-
bers)
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Now we explain how the value of cost is determined. The cost is of
either 0 or 0.2 points, depending on the situation the group is facing. At
the beginning of the game, you are automatically in an institution with all
the other members of your group. The institution operates with a cost of 2
points that are shared by its 10 members. All members of this institution
must vote in order to determine the level at which every member must
contribute to the public project.
There are three options: “level 100%”, “level 50%”, and “level 0%”.
The option that gets the most votes will be chosen. In case of a tie, an
option will be selected randomly among those that got the most votes. If
“level 100%” is chosen, each member must contribute all 20 points and pay
a cost of 0.2 points. If “level 50%” is chosen, each member must contribute
half of his/her points (that is 10 points) to the public project and pay a cost
of 0.2 points. If “level 0%” is chosen, the institution will be dissolved,
which means there is no cost to be paid and all the members will be asked
to decide on their own how many points to contribute to the public project.
Remember that earnings are calculated in the same way for each mem-
ber of the group. So for each point you keep for yourself, you earn 1 point,
but for each point you contribute to the project, each member of the group
earns 0.4 points and the total earnings of the group increase by 4 points.
Thus, your contribution to the project raises the earnings of everyone in the
group. Other members’ contribution increases your earnings in the same
way. You earn 0.4 points for every extra point contributed to the public
project by a members in the group.
You will receive information on your earnings at the end of each round.
Any questions? If you have a question during the experiment, please
raise your hand.
C.3 Instruction for Section III
In each round, you will receive 20 points, and you will be required to de-
cide how many of them to keep to yourself and how many to contribute to
a public project.
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Earnings are going to be calculated in the same way as in Section I and
II. But in this section, at the beginning of each round, you will have the
opportunity to decide whether to join the institution or not. If you join the
institution, you must contribute your points according to the option that is
most voted by the members of the institution, and share the cost with the
other members who also joined the institution like in Section I. If you stay
out of the institution, you can decide on your own how much to contribute
to the public project.
After your decision, you will be informed about how many participants
decided to join the institution. If there are less than 2 people who choose
to join, the institution is not formed, which means no cost is to be paid and
everyone in the group will decide on their own how much to contribute to
the public project.
Any questions? If you have a question during the experiment, please
raise your hand.
C.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
1. Age Gender Major
2. Have you studied (or currently studying) Microeconomics?
Yes  No 
3. Have you studied (or currently studying) Game Theory?
Yes  No 
4. Have you studied (or currently studying) Economics?
Yes  No 
5. Have you ever heard of the Prisoners’ Dilemma?
Yes  No 
6. Is your hometown located in any of the following major metropolitan
areas? Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Sapporo, Sendai, Yokohama, Kyoto,
Kobe, Hiroshima, Fukuoka.
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Yes  No 
7. Do you live with your family?
Yes  No 
8. Do you consider yourself a cooperative person?
Yes  No 
9. Do you think that most people are usually cooperative?
Yes  No 
10. What do you think is the most efficient way to achieve a social goal?
Cooperation  Competition 
11. What was your goal in this experiment?
Maximum payoff Maximum satisfaction Hurt the op-
ponent  Other 
12. Which of the following kind of associations (student circles) are you
a member of?
Sports (excluding gym)  Cultural (music, theatre) 
Environmental (Greenpeace) Other(please specify)
13. How often do you use social networking websites, such as Facebook,
Mixi, Twitter?
Many times a day  Normally once a day 
Several times a month  Almost never 
14. Have you ever taken advantages of someone?
Yes  No 
15. How much do you agree with the saying “good things happen to
good people”?
Strongly disagree  Disagree 
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Agree  Strongly agree 
16. How much do you agree with the saying “no pain, no gain”?
Strongly disagree  Disagree 
Agree  Strongly agree 
17. To what extend do you think your opinion matters to the society?
Very much  Just slightly  Not at all 
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